God's Certain Foreknowledge of the Future Volitions of Moral Agents Inconsistent with Such a Contingence of Those Volitions as Is Without All Necessity

Ttaving proved, that God has a certain and infal-M-Mlible Prescience of the act of the will of moral agents, I come now, in the second place, to shew the consequence; to shew how it follows from hence, that

these events are necessary, with a necessity of connection or consequence.

The chief Arminian divines, as far as I have had opportunity to observe, deny this consequence j and affirm, that if such foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any necessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this matter maybe particularly and thoroughly enquired into. I cannot but think, that on particular and full consideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so or not.

In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the following things.

I. It is very evident, with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which already hath, or has had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted,

1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in things which are past, their past existence is now necessary: having already made sure of existence, it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect: it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that that thing has existed.

2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already has, and long ago had existence; and so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this Foreknowledge should be, or should have been.

3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise, would be a contradiction: it would be in effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, whose

S existence is indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its existence. — Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.

4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain infallible and indissoluble connection between those events and that foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the proceeding observations, those events are necessary events, being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.

To say, the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connection of the event with that foreknowledge is not indissoluble, but dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd. To affirm it, would be the same thing as to affirm, that there is no necessary connection between a proposition’s being infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is necessary; or, in other words, that it is impossible but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible but th at it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible, but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be true. But how absurd is that, on the supposition that there is now an infallible knowledge (t. e. knowledge which it is impossible should fail) that it is true. There is this absurdity in it, that it is not impossible, but that there now should be no truth in that proposition, which is now infallibly known to be true.

II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all necessity, may be proved thus; it is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without evidence. To suppose otherwise, implies a contradiction; because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be evident to that understanding: and for a thing to be evident to any understanding is the same thing as for that understanding to see evidence of it: but no understanding, created or uncreated, can see evidence where there is none: for that is the same thing, as to see that to be, which is not. And therefore, if there be any truth which is absolutely without evidence, that truth is absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known.

But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely witJiout evidence. If there be any evidence of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either self evidence, or proof; for there can be no other sort of evidence, but one of these two; an evident thing must be either evident in itself, or evident in something else; that is, evident by connection with something else. But a future thing, whose existence is without all necessity, can have neither of these sorts of evidence. It cannot be self- evident; for if it be, it may be now known, by what is now to be seen in the thing itself; either its present existence, or the necessity of its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no present existence to be seen; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent for the future: so that its future existence is not self-evident. And secondly, neither is there any proof or evidence, in any thing else, or evidence of connection with something else that it is evident ‘, for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, that there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected. For such a connection destroys its contingence, and supposes necessity. Thus it is demonstrated, that there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that event, which is contingent, without ail necessity (if any such event there be) neither self evidence uor proof. And therefore the tiling in reality is not evident; and so cannot be seen to be evident, or, which is the same thing, cannot be known.

Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine Being; and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form; all in absolute contingence without any concern of God, or any other cause, in the matter; without any manner of ground or reason of its existence; or any dependence upon, or connection at all with any thing foregoing; I say, that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event before-hand. ‘1 herewasno evidence of it to be seen in the thing itself; for the thing itself as yet, was not. And there was no evidence of it to be seen in any thing else; for evidence in something else is connection with something else: but such connection is contrary to the supposition. There was no evidence before, that this thing would happen; for by the supposition, there was no reason why it should happen, rather than something else, or rather than nothing. And if so, then all things before were exactly equal, and the same, with respect to that and other possible things; there was no preponderating no superior weight or value; and therefore, no thing that could be of any weight or value to determine any understanding. The thing was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely unknowable. An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency, and makes no advance, to a discerning any signs or evidences of it, let it be increased never so much; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds and darkness; but it has no tendency to enable to discern evidence where there is none. If the sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will enable to see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease; yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence which is not; but, on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty that there is none.

III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to suppose God’s knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing, that he knows, is utterly inconsistent with another thing that he knows. It is the same thing as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is so without all necessity, that there is nothing hinders, but that it may not be, then the proposition, which asserts its future existence, is so uncertain, that there is nothing hinders, but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconsistent with his knowing that it is infallibly true; and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contingent, if he views things as they are. If the event be not necessary, then it is possible it may never be: and if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may possibly never be: and that is to know that the proposition, which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true; and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain; which surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without ail necessity, then it is no argument of perfection of knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but on the

contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake: because it would argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things considered, is uncertain and contingent. To say, in such a case, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous; as much so, as to say, that God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know, or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain though we cannot conceive how; because he has ways of knowing, which we can not comprehend.

Carol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident, ’ that the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any necessity of the event which follows from such decrees, than the absolute Foreknowledge of God. Because the connection between the event and certain foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than that the event and absolute knowledge should disagree. The connection between the event and foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the supposition: because it is supposed, that the certainty and infallibility of the knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connection, between the knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased; so that if a decree be added to the foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connection, or make it more infallible or indissoluble. If it were not so, the certainty of knowledge might be increased by the addition of a decree; which is contrary to the supposition, which is, that the knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree.

There is as much of an impossibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown, should be, or (which is the same thing) as great a Necessity of their i-uture existence, as if the event were already written down, and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the most indissoluble and perfect connection possible, between the writing, and the thing written. In such a case, it would be as impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had existed already; and a decree cannot make an event surer or more necessary than this.

And therefore, if there be any such foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then Necessity of connection and consequence, is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which man, or any other creature enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute decrees of God, which does not at all increase the Necessity, are not at all inconsistent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any such account, as that they make the event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are inconsistent with man’s liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any necessity which absolute decrees infer.

Dr Whitby supposes, there is a great difference between God’s foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to necessity of future events. In his Discourse on the five Points, p. 474, &c. he says,” God’s Prescience

has no influence at all on our actions, Should God

(says he.) by immediate Kevelation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man’s state of actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions? Surely none at all. — Our knowledge doth not affect the things we know, to make them more certain, or more future, than they would be without it. Now| foreknowledge in God is knowledge. As therefore knowledge has no influence on things that are, so neither has foreknowledge on things that shall be. And consequently, the foreknowledge of any action that.would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas God’s decree of election is powerful and active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such

means, as shall unfrustrably produce the end. — Hence God’s Prescience renders no actions necessary.” And to this purpose, p. 473, he cites Origen, where he says, God’s Prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the cause of God’s Prescience that they will be: and Le Blanc, where he says, This is the truest resolution of this difficulty, that Prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future is the cause they are foreseen. In like manner, Dr Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 95 — 99. And the Author of the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature, speaking to the like purpose with Dr Whitby, represents Forekowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make than necessary, than After- knowledge, or to that purpose.

To all which 1 would say; that what is said about knowledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does in the least affect the foregoing reason. Whether Prescience be the thing that makes the event necessary or no, it alters not the case. Infallible forekowledge may prove the necessity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which cause sthe necessity. If the foreknowledge be absolute, thia proves the event known to be necessary, or proves it is impossible but that the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or some other way, if there be any other way: because, as was said before, it is absurd to say, that a proposition is known to be cerainly and infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true.

The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that, inasmuch as certain Foreknowledge does not cause an event to be necessary, as a decree does; therefore it does not prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can prove, or be an evidence of a thing’s being necessary, but that which has a causal influence to make it so. But this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of an event, be not the thing, which first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet it may, and certainly does demonstrate, that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that impossibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it may prove that there is such an impossibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the cause to the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impossibility arises from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident, as it is possible any thing should be, that it is impossible a thing, which is infallibly known to be true should prove not to be’ true: therefore there is a Arecessity that it should be otherwise: whether the Knowledge be the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the cause of the Knowledge.

All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or After-knowledge,orconcomitantKnowledge, proves the thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true. — I freely allow, that Foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be necessary any more than After-knowledge: but then Afterknowledge, which is certain and infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the proposition known should be true. Certain After-knowledge proves that it is now, in the time of the Knowledge, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates past existence on the event should be true. And so does certain Fore-knowledge prove, that now, in the time of the Knowledge, it is by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates future existence on the event, should be true. The Necessity of the truth of the propositions consisting in the present impossibility of the non-existence of the event affirmed, in both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the Knowledge; there can be no certainty of Knowledge without it.

There must be a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly known, or (which is the same thing) known to be certain. For certainty of knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a .certainty in things to be a o-round of certainty of knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be certain. And this is nothing but the necessity of the truth known, or its being impossible but that it should be true; or, in other words, the firm and infallible connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition that contains that truth. All certainty of knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of that connection. So God’s certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indissoluble connection of the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future existence. The subject is that possible event; the predicate is its future existence: but if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then He sees a firm connection between a subject and predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a contradiction.

I allow what Dr Whitby says to be true, “That wiere knowledge does not affect the thing known, to make it more certain or more future.“” But yet, I say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already, both future and certain; i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of futurity supposesfuturity; and a certain knowledge of futurity, supposes certain futurity, antecedent to that certain knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of knowledge, than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true; or (which is the same thing) the necessity of the event.

I would observe one thing further concerning this matter, it is this; that if it be as those forementioned

Sect. XII. J infers some Necessity. T47

writers suppose, that God’s foreknowledge is not the cause, but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown; this is so far from shewing that this foreknowledge doth not infer the necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather shews the contrary the more plainly. Because it shews the existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if it had already been; in as much as in effect it actually exists already; its future existence has already had actual influence and efficacy, and has produced an effect, viz. Prescience: the effect exists already; and as the effect supposes, the cause is connected with the cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already. The effect is firm as possible, it having already the possession of existence, and has made sure of it. But the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground, and reason* The building cannot be firmer than the foundation.

To illustrate this matter, let us suppose the appearances and images of things in a glass; for instance a reflecting telescope to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance, and out of sight) which they resemble: if it be so, then, as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed; so they being the true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves the existing of those heavenly bodies, to be as real, infallible, firm, and necessary as the existing of these effects *, the one being connected with, and wholly depending on the other. Now let us suppose future existence some way or other to have influence back, to produce effects before-hand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a class, a thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages; but yet that these images are real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with their cause; these effects and images, having already had actual existence, rendering that matter of their existing perfectly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise: this proves in like manner, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things, which are their causes, is also equally sure, firm, and necessary; and that it is alike impossible but that’ they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind, which have existed there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with their cause, the case is not altered.

Another thing which has been said by some Arminians, to take off the force of what is urged from God’s Prescience, against the Contingence of the volitions of moral agents, is to this purpose; M That when we talk of foreknowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such things as before and after in God, but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession.’’ — To this I answer.

1. It has been already shewn, that all certain knowledge proves tha necessity of the truth known; whether it be before, after, or at the same time. — Though it be true, that there is no succession in God’s knowledge, and the manner of his .knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know concerning it, that there is no event, past, present or to come, that God is ever uncertain of; He never is, never was, and never will be without infallible knowledge of it; He always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always sees things as they are in truth; hence there never is in reality any thing contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen never to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no foreknowledge in God, it is betause those things, which are future to us, are as present to God, as if they already had existence: and that is as much as to say, that future events are always in GodVview as evident, clear, sure, and necessary as if they already were. If there never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present with God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence were present, find were already come to pass.

God’s viewing thing’s so perfectly and unchangeably ss that there is no succession in his ideas or judgment, do not hinder, but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a certain and perfect knowledge of moral actions of men, which to us are an hundred years hence: yea, the objection supposes this; and therefore it certainly does not hinder but that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these moral actions should not come to pass.

We know, that God knows the future voluntary actions of men in such a sense beforehand, as that he is able particularly to declare and foretell them, and write them, or cause them to be written down in a book, as he often has done; and that therefore the necessary connection which there is between God’s knowledge and the event known, does as much prove the event to be necessary before-hand, as if the divine knowledge were in the same sense before the event, as the prediction or writing is. If the knowledge be infallible, then the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible; that is, there is an infallible connection between that written prediction and the event. And if so, then it is impossible it should ever be otherwise then that that prediction and the event should agree; and this is the same thing as to say, it is impossible but that the event should come to pass: and this is the same as to say that its coming to pass is necessary. — So that it is manifest, that there being no proper succession in God’s mind, makes no alteration as to the necessity of the existence of the events which God knows. Yea,

2. This is so far from weakening the proof which has been given of the impossibility of the not coming to pass of future events known, as that it establishes that where-

in the strength of the foregoing arguments, consists, and shews the clearness of the evidence. For,

(1.) The very reason why God’s knowledge is without succession, is because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of clearness and certainty: all things, whether past, present, or to come, being viewed with equal evidence and fulness; future things being seen with as much clearness as if they were present; the view is always in absolute perfection: and absolute constant perfection admits of no alteration, and so no succession; the actual existence of the thing known, does not at all increase, or add to the clearness or certainty of the thing known: God calls the things that are not, asp though they were; they are all one to him as if they had already existed. But herein consists the strength of the demonstration before given, of the impossibility of the not existing of those things, whose existence God knows j that it is as impossible- they should fail of existence, as if they existed already. This objection, instead of weakening this argument, sets it in the clearest and strongest light; for it supposes it to be so indeed, that the existence of future events is in God’s view so much as if it already had been, that when they come actually to exist, it makes not the least alteration or variation in his view or knowledge of them.

(2.) The objection is founded on the immutability of God’s knowledge; for it is the immutability of knowledge makes his knowledge to be without succession. But this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I insist on, viz. that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of existence. For if that were possible, then it would be possible for there to be a change in God’s knowledge and view of things. For if the known event should fail of existence, and not come into being, as God expected, then God would see it, and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake; and thus there would be change and succession in his knowledge. But as God is immutable, and so it is utterly, infinitely impossible that his view should bechang. ed; so it is, for the same reason, just so impossible that the fore-known event should not exist; and that is to be impossible, in the highest degree: and therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossible than the immutable God should be changed* by the succession of time; who comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one most perfect and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is vita interminabilis, tota, simul, $ perfecta possessio.

On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever more capable of strict demonstration, than that God’s certain Prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a Contingence of these events, as is without all Necessity; and so is inconsistent with the Arminian notion of liberty.

CoroL 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists, concerning the absolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more fatality in things, then will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of most Arminian divines, who acknowledge God’s omniscience and universal Prescience. Therefore, ail objections they make against the doctrine of Calvinists* as implying Hobbes’s doctrine of necessity, or the stoical doctrine ofjale, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists than their own doctrine: and therefore it doth not become those divines, to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists on this account.

CoroL 3. Hence all arguing from necessity, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation, and the commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against the Calvinislic doctrine of efficacious grace; I say, all arguings of Arminians (such of them as own God’s omniscience) against these things, on this ground that these doctrines, though they do not suppose men to be under any constraint or coaction, yet suppose them under necessity, with respect to their moral actions, and those things which are required of them in order to their acceptance with God j and their arguing against the necessity of

mens volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God’s commands, promises, and threatening, and the sincerity of his counsels and invitations; and all objections against, and any doctrine of the Calvintsts as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer Necessity; I say, all these arguments and objections must fall to the ground, and be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them, being maintained in an inconsistence with themselves, and in like manner levelled against their own doctrine, as against the doctrine of the Calvinisls,