Concerning That Objection Against the Reasoning by Which the Calvinistic Doctrine Is Supported, That It Is Metaphysical and Abstruse

T has often been objected against the defenders of Calvinistic principles, that in their reasonings, they run into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtilities, and set these in opposition to common sense *, and it is possible, that, after the former manner, it may be alleged against the reasoning by which I have endeavoured to confute the Arminian scheme of liberty and moral agency, that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. — Concerning this, I would observe the following things:

I. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, it is as frivolous to enquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in; and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his op* ponent, by telling him, his arguments are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, Whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? But, whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disapprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; allgeing, it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. It is by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that

the rational soul is not corporeal; that lead or sand cannot think; that thoughts are not square or round, or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to shew their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is by metaphysics only, that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands; and, indeed, we have no strict demonstration of any thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct, and determinate meaning of the terms I use, should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet, metaphysical.

II. If the reasoning, which has been made use of, be in some sense metaphysical, it will not follow, that therefore it must needs be abstruse, unintelligible, and a-kin to the jargon of the schools. I humbly conceive, the foregoing reasoning, at least to those things which are most material belonging to it, depends on no abstruse, definitions or distinctions, or terms without a meaning, or of very ambiguous and undetermined signification, or any points of such abstraction and subtility, as tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds and darkness. There is no high degree of refinement and abstruse speculation, in determining, that a thing is not before it is, and so cannot be the cause of itself j or that the first act of free choice, has not another act of free choice going before that, to excite or direct it; or in determining-, that no choice is made while the mind remains in a state of absolute indifference; that preference and equilibrium never co-exist; that therefore no choice is made in a state of liberty, consisting in indifference; and that, so far as the will is determined by motives, exhibited and operating previous to acts of the will, so far it is not determined by the act of the will itself; that nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a cause, or some antecedent ground or reason, why it then begins to be; that effects depend on their causes, and are connected with them; that virtue is not the worse, nor sin the better, for the strength of inclination, with which it is practised, and the difficulty which thence arises of doing otherwise; that when it is already infallibly known, that the thing will be, it is not a thing contingent whether it will ever be or no; or that it can be truly said, notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it should be, that it either may be, or may not be; and the like might be observed of many other things which belong to the foregoing reasoning.

If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing reasoning is nothing but metaphysical sophistry; and that it must be so, that the seeming force of the arguments all depends on some fallacy and wile that is hid in the obscurity which always attends a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and refinement; and shall be ready to say,” Here is indeed something that tends to confound the mind, not to satisfy it; for who can ever be truly satisfied in it, that men are fitly blamed or commended, punished or rewarded for those volitions which are not from themselves, and of whose existence they are not the causes? Men may refine, as much as they please, and advance their abstract notions, and make out a thousand seeming contradictions to puzzle our understanding; yet there can be no satisfaction in such doctrine as this; the natural sense of the mind of man will always resist it V I humbly conceive, that such an objector,

* A certain noted author of the present age aays, The arguments if he has capacity, humility, and calmness of spirit sufficient impartially, and thoroughly to examine himself,

for necessity are nothing but quibbling or logoma-cliy, using words without a meaning, or begging the question. 1 do not know what kind

ef necessity any authors, he may have reference to, are advocates for; or whether they have managed their arguments well or ill. As to the arguments I have made use of, if they are quibbles they may be shewn so; such knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with respect to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon, I shall have just occasion for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my argumentations. I am willing my proofs should be thoroughly examined; and if there b nothing bat begging the question, cr mere logomachy, or dispute of words, let it be made manifest, and shewn how the seeming strength of the argument depends on my using words with* out a meaning, or arises from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words in an indeterminate and unsteady manner; and that the weight of my reasons rest mainly on such a foundation; and then, I shall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly exposed for my obstinacy.

The same author is abundant in appealing in this affair, from what he calls logomachy and sophistry to experience.- A person can experience only what passes in his own mind. But yet as we may well suppose that all men have the same human faculties; so a man may well argue from his own experience to that of others, in things that shew the nature of those faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good right to allege his experience as another. As to my own experience I find that in innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body in many respects, instantaneously follow the acts of my will concerning those motions; and that my will has some command of my thoughts; and that the acts of my will are my own, i. e. that they are acts of will, the volitions of my own mind; or, in other words, that what I will, I will. Which, I presume, is the sum of what others experience in this affair. But as to finding by experience, that my will is originally determined by itself; or that, my will first choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows; and that this is the first rise of the determination of my will in any affair; or that any volition rises in my mind contingently; I declare, I know nothing in myself by experience of this nature; and nothing that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any such thing, or gives me any more reason to suppose or suspect any such thing, than to suppose that my volitions existed twenty years before they existed. It is true, I find myself possessed of my volitions, before I can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them (for the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect) and will find that he knows not really what he would be at, and indeed his difficulty is nothing but a mere prejudice, from an inadvertent customary use of words, in a meaning that is not clearly understood, nor carefully reflected upon. — Let the objector reflect again, if he has candour and patience enough, and does not scorn to be at the trouble of close attention in the affair. — He would have a man’s volition be from himself Let it be from himself most primarily and originally of any way conceivable (that is, from his own choice) how will that help the matter, as to his being justly blamed or praised, unless that choice itself be blame or praise-worthy? — And how is the choice itself (an ill choice, for instance) blame-worthy, according to these principles, unless that be from himself too, in the same manner, that is, from his own choice? But the original and first determining choice in the affair is not from his choice, his choice is not the cause of it. And if it be from himself some other way, and not from his choice, surely that will not help the matter. If it be not from himself of choice, then it is himself voluntarily; and if so, he is surely no more to blame than if it were not from himself at all. It is a vanity to pretend it is a sufficient answer to this, to say, that it is nothing but metaphysical refinement and subtility and so attended with obscurity and uncertainty.

If it be the natural sense of our minds, that what is blame-worthy in a man must be from himself, then it doubtless is also, that it must be something bad in himself, a bad choice, or bad disposition. But then our natural sense is, that this bad choice or disposition is evil in itself, and the man blame-worthy for it, on its own

this, for ought I know, may make some imagine, that volition has no cause, or that it produces itself. But I have no more reason from hence to determine any such thing, than I have to determine that I gave myself my own being, or that I came into being accidentally without a cause, because I first found myself possessed of being, before 1 had knowledge of a cause of my being.

account, without taking into our notion of its blame-worthiness, another bad choice or disposition going before this, from whence this arises; for that is a ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate contradiction, which our natural sense of blame-worthiness has nothing to do with, and never comes into the mind, nor is supposed in the judgment we naturally make of the affair; as was demonstrated before, natural sense does not place the moral evil of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them, but the nature of them- An evil thing being from a man, or from something antecedent in him, is not essential to the original notion we have of blame- worthiness; but it is its being the choice of the* heart, as appears by this, that if a thing be from us, and not from our choice, it has not the natural, blame-worthiness or ill-desert, according to our natural / sense. When a thing is from a man, in that sense, that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for 1 it, because his will is in it *, so far as the will is in it, blame is in it, and no further. Neither do we go any 4 further in our notion of blame to enquire, Whether the bad will be from a bad will? — there is no consideration of the original of that bad will; because, according to our natural apprehension, blame originally consists in it. Therefore, a thing being from a man, is a secondary consideration, in the notion of blame or ill desert. Because those things, in our external actions, are most properly said to be from us, which are from our choice; and no other external actions, but those that are from us in this sense, have the nature of blame j and they indeed, not so properly because they are from us, as because we are in them, i. e. our wills are in them; not so much because- they are from some property of ours, as because they are our properties.

However, all these external actions being truly from us, as their cause, and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and in the common affairs of life, to speak of men’s actions and conduct that we see, and that affect human society, as deierving ill or well, as worthy of

blame or praise; hence it is come to pass, that philosophers have incautiously taken all their measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the dictates of common sense, about these overt acts of men, to the running of every thing into the most lamentable and dreadful confusion; and, therefore, I observe,

III. It is so far from being true (whatever may be pretended) that the proof of the doctrine which has been maintained, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphysical terms and notions; and that the Arminian scheme, without needing such clouds and darkness for its defence, is supported by the plain dictates of common sense; that the very reverse is most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is fact, that they, and not wep have confounded things with metaphysical, unintelligible notions and phrases, and have drawn them from the light of plain truth, into the gross darkness of abstruse metaphysical propositions,and words without am eaning. Their pretended demonstrations depend very much on such unintelligible metaphysical phrases, as. self-determination, and sovereignty of the will; and the metaphysical sense they put on such terms, as necessity, contingency, action, agency, &c. quite diverse from their meaning as used in common speech; and which, as they use them, are without any consistent meaning, or any distinct consistent ideas; as far from it as any of theabstruse terms and perplexed phrases of the Peripatetic philosophers, or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the cant of the wildest fanatics. Yea, we may be bold to say, these metaphysical terms, on which they build so much, are what they use without knowing what they mean themselves; they are pure metaphysical sounds without any ideas whatsoever in their minds to answer them; inasmuch as it has been demonstrated, that there cannot be any notion in the mind consistent with these expressions, as they pretend to explain them *, because their explanations destroy themselves. No such notions as imply self-contradiction and self-abolition, and this a great many ways, can subsist in the mind; as

there can be no idea of a whole which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension without dimensions,

or of an effect which is before its cause. Arminians

improve these terms, as terms of art, and, in their metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things which are contrary to common sense in a high degree. Thus, instead of the plain, vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face of the earth, and in all ages, have, consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases, they have introduced a new strange liberty, consisting in indifference, contingence, and self-determination; by which they involve themselves and others in great obscurity, and manifold gross inconsistence. So, instead of placing virtue and vice, as common sense places them very much, in fixed bias and inclination, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more established inclination, these, through their refinings and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty, consisting in indifference, to be essential to all virtue and vice. So they have reasoned themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions, but by metaphysical confusion, into many principles about moral agency, blame, praise, reward, and punishment, which are, as has been shewn, exceeding contrary to the common sense of mankind; and perhaps to their own sense, which governs them in common Me.

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