The True Nature of the Atonement Proved by the Nature of the Union Which the Scriptures Assert Subsists Between Christ and His People
As our eighth argument, I propose to establish, by an induction of scriptural passages, the fact that a UNION of such a kind subsists between the Lord Jesus and his people, as — however mysterious it may be in its own nature — yet when once admitted, on the ground of divine testimony, as a fact, involves, as a natural result, the consequence of his bearing our sins, and our being clothed upon with the rewardableness of his obedience, and which is utterly anomalous and meaningless if our doctrine of literal substitution and of penal sufferings is rejected.
The main objection alleged against the doctrine of vicarious expiation of sin by its opponents is, that it confounds all our elementary and necessary ideas of justice. This objection, in substance, though variously modified in form, is made by the Unitarian and Trinita rian advocates of the Moral Influence Theory, such as Socinus, S. Crellius, Bushnell and John Young, and by all classes of the adherents of the Governmental Atonement School. It may be considered in two relations: (1.) As it respects Christ, it is claimed that the judicial treatment of the innocent as if he were guilty is an outrageous injustice, involving the confusion of every moral principle. (2.) As it regards his sinful people, in whose stead Christ is said to have died, it is claimed that his punishment in their stead can, as a matter of abstract justice, avail them nothing, for the plain reason that the precise and only thing which justice demands is not the suffering of so much pain, but the judicial infliction of the pain upon the sinner in person. Fiske and many others insist, as do the Socinians, that it is essential to the idea of the penalty that it is pain inflicted by the lawgiver upon the transgressor in person. As to the first side of the objection, we admit that, in the common judgment of all men, to regard and treat a man as responsible for a sin for which he is not truly responsible is beyond question unjust. But this plain principle does not apply to the case of Christ suffering the just for the unjust; because (a) he, being the equal of God, the fountain of all law, and owing no obedience to the law on his own account, and having an unlimited right to dispose of his services and of his life as he pleased, voluntarily assumed our obligations and made them his own. As far as Christ is concerned, therefore, there is obviously no injustice in the Father’s exacting from him all the conditions of a suretyship which he has spontaneously assumed and voluntarily yields. Besides this, it is admitted on all hands that Christ suffered for his people. The advocates of the Moral Influence and Governmental theories of the Atonement maintain that our sins are the occasion of his sufferings. We say that they are the judicial ground of his sufferings. We all agree in maintaining that his sufferings are caused by our sins, and that they ;ire selfassumed by him with the utmost freeness and spontaneity of love. If this be so, it is evident that there is no injustice in the one view of the case any more than in the other. (6.) Since the sufferings of Christ satisfy God, and maintain the honour of his law and the interests of his government, even better than the punishment of each sinner in person would have done, there can, of course, be no injustice involved in the arrangement as far as the interests of God and his government are concerned, (c.) This vicarious suffering is an infinite benefit to those sinners who are saved, and no disadvantage whatsoever to any who may be left to bear the penal consequences of their own sins. Therefore, if there be no injustice done to any one of the parties concerned, there can be no injustice in the case.
As to the second side of the objection above made, we confess that the divine administration, both as to the coming in of the curse through Adam, and as to the redemption from the curse through Christ, rests upon principles higher and grander than those embraced in the ordinary rules of human law. Our doctrine, although never contradicting reason, does not rest upon it, but upon the supernatural revelation given in the Word But while the complete satisfaction which absolute justice finds in the vicarious sufferings of a substituted victim may transcend reason, it by no means conflicts with it, because (1) it is no part of the teaching of Scripture that sin can be imputed to any one, or its guilt be expiated by the sufferings of any one to whom it does not truly belong. There must be, of course, in every case such a union as shall in the unerring judgment of God be a firm foundation in justice for this imputation.
It is no mere mental assumption on the part of God of that which is not true in fact. On the contrary, it is a most wise and righteous recognition of the exact responsibility of each party in the relations in which he stands in the eye of law to all others. Grotius, who discussed the subject with great learning and ability, and certainly with sufficient deference to the claims of reason, maintains that while it is necessary to the essence of a penalty that it be inflicted on account of sin, it is not necessary that in every case it should be inflicted on the person of the sinner, if only there be such a union between the person who sinned and the person who is punished as justifies the imputation.* Turretin saysf that there are three kinds of union known to us which justify the imputation of sin, because they are of such a nature that, in the case of certain actions, the moral responsibility for the sin is common to all the parties involved. These are — (a) natural, as between a father and his children; (6) moral and political, as between a king and his subjects; and (c) voluntary, as between friends and between an arraigned criminal and his sponsor. Now the union of Christ with his people rests on stronger ground than any of these considered alone. It is, as we have seen, voluntary upon his part, who spontaneously assumed all the obligations he bore. But it was, moreover, the eternal and sovereign ordinance of the three divine Persons in council, whose behests are the foundation of all law, of all rights, and of all obli-
* Defensio F. C. De Satisfactione Christi, chap. iv. See also “The Gritian Theory of the Atonement,” translated from the German of Dr. F. C. Baur. Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. ix., p. 259.
j Locus 9, Qnws. 9.
gations. If it be a revealed fact that such a union subsists on such grounds, it is surely futile for a mortal to claim that it is a pure mental fiction, ar.d that the judicial action that proceeds upon it is unjust. (2.) Providence constantly, as a matter of fact, proceeds upor principles which appeal to be identical with that upoi which the substitution of Christ in the place of sinners ultimately rests. God, as the Creator, Father and Guardian of the human family, acting for its advantage, placed the moral probation of the whole race in the conduct of Adam, the natural head and covenant representative of that race, during a limited period and under the most favourable conditions, in the Garden of Eden. Adam sinned, and as a matter of unquestionable fact, the penalty of that sin has been executed in common upon him and on each of his descendants from birth. The penalty denounced and actually executed upon him included spiritual death, mortality of body, the earth cursed with briers and thorns, the necessity of winning bread by the sweat of the brow, and of bringing forth children in pain. Each one of these elements of evil has been executed upon his descendants universally, and literally in the same manner in which they were executed on him. They are not the mere natural consequences of his sin. If they were penal evils in his case, they are penal consequences of his sin in our case. This the apostle explicitly declares, Rom. v. 19: “As by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so [that is, upon the same principle] by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.” As a matter of daily experience, also, we find the penal consequences of many sins passing over upon those who are providentially bound up with the sinful agents. Ex. xx. 5. God does actually, as he says, visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him.
Now we propose to prove (1) that the Scriptures plainly teach that God has established between Christ and his people a union sui generis, transcending all earthly analogies in its intimacy of fellowship and reciprocal copartnership, both federal and vital, and hence called by theologians “mystical” in the sense of being mysterious, in perfection and completeness transcending all analogy. And (2) that the fact of this union being established, it goes far to explain his community with us in the guilt of our sins, and our community with him in the rewards of his righteousness.
I. The Scriptures teach that such a union exists as a matter of fact.
As might be supposed, the Scriptures present this union to us simply as a matter of fact, to be credited solely on the ground of divine testimony. They attempt no rational explanations of its nature. We can understand its essential nature no more than we can the coex istence from eternity of the three divine Persons in the unity of the’ one essence; or the union of the two natures in the one person of the God-man; or the union of the whole race in the person of Adam. As it transcends all natural analogies, the Scriptures set forth its variety and fulness, element by element, by means of many partial analogies. Thus they liken it to the relation the foundation of a building sustains to the superstructure erected upon it, configured to it, and supported by it (1 Pet. ii. 4 — 6); to a tree and itr branches. John xv. 4, 5. “Abide in me, and I in you. As a branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing.” It is also likened to the organic union of the different members of one body: “For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office, so we, being many, are one body in Christ.” Rom. xii. 4, 5.” For as the body is one, and hath many members,
.... so also is Christ Now ye are the body of
Christ, and members in particular.” 1 Cor. xii. 12, 27. “We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and his Church.” Eph. v. 30, 32, and iv. 15, 16. Also, to a husband in his relation to his wife. Eph. v. 31, 32; Rom. vii. 4; Rev. xix. 7-9; and xxi. 9. And more particularly to the relation sustained by Adam to his descendants. Rom. v. 12 — 19; and 1 Cor. xv. 22 and 45-49. He is called athe last Adam” and the “second man” It is a simple matter of fact, as we have seen, whatever philosophical explanation we may give
it, that
“In Adam’s fall we sinned all.”
The literal penalty in all its parts has been from the first universally executed upon the entire race, in the same sense it was executed upon Adam. The apostle calls it a “judgment” and a “condemnation” The same infallible authority declares (a) that “even so” that is, we are made righteous through the obedience of Christ, upon the same principles as those upon which we have been made sinners through the disobedience of Adam. And (6) that our union with Christ is of the same order, and involves the same class of effects as our union with Adam. We call it a union both federal and vital. Others may call it what they please, but it will nevertheless remain certain that it is of such a nature as to involve an identity of legal relations and reciprocal obligations and rights. “For as by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.” Rom. v. 19. He is said to have “borne our sins in his own body on the tree.” 1 Pet. ii. 24. We are said to “be made the righteousness of God in him” 2 Cor. v. 21. To have been chosen in him before the foundation of the world. Eph. i. 3-5. “Of his fulness have all we received, and grace for grace.” John i. 16. We are declared to be “complete in him, winch is the Head of all principality and power.” Col. ii. 10. To be circumcised in Christy to be buried with him in baptism, Col. ii. 11, 12; and to be quickened together with Christ, and made to sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus. Eph. ii. 5, 6. In ourselves we are declared to be dead, and our life hid with Christ in God, and Christ to be our life. Col. iii. 3, 4. We do not liv-.j, but Christ liveth in us. Gal. ii. 20. We are baptized ‘nto Christ (Gal. iii. 27), and sleep in Jems when we dk (1 Cor. xv. 18; I Thess. iv. 14), and our bodies are m« wbe.rs of Christ. 1 Cor. vi. 15. His death is said to live been virtually our death (Rom. vi. 8-11; and 2 Cor v. 14, 15), and his resurrection from the dead to involve the certainty of ours. 1 Cor. xv. 20-22; Phil. iii. 21; 1 John iii. 2. In him we have redemption — through his blood the remission of sins. Eph. i. 7. We share with him in his righteousness (1
Cor. i. 30), in his sufferings (Phil. iii. 10, 11), in his Holy Spirit. Rom. viii. 9. We are declared to be joint heirs with him, ordained to have fellowship hereafter with him in his glory, as now in his suffering (Rom. viii. 17), and to sit with him on his throne. Rev. iii. 21. As St. Augustine long ago noticed, “Such is the ineffable closeness of this transcendental union, that we hear the voice of the members suffering, when they suffered in the Head, and cried through the Head on the cross, ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ And, in like manner, we hear the voice of the Head suffering, when he suffered in his members, and cried to the persecutor on the way to Damascus, ‘Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?”
The nature of this union is further set forth by means of several titles applied to Christ in view of his relation to us. Thus he is called our “second or last Adam” (1 Cor. xv. 45-47), our “Head” (Eph. i. 22; iv. 15; Col. i. 18), our “High Priest” (Heb. ix. 11 and v. 1): “For every high priest is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins.” As I have abundantly proved,* the function of the priest was uniformly to represent man before God, and not God before man. The efficiency of his work was designed to terminate upon God, and not upon man. He is called also our “Mediator between God and man” (1 Tim. ii. 5), which is explained by the accompanying phrase, “who gave himself as a substitutionary ransom in the stead of all.” And in Heb. viii. 3-6 and ix. 11-15, he is set forth as Mediator in his capacity of High Priest. Hence he cannot be Mediator, * See Chapter ix.
as Young insists he is, in his constantly referred-to note,* in the sense of being the medium through which God produces a moral impression upon us. It must be interpreted in the sense of a medium through which we approach a reconciled Father. He is also called our “Advocate with the Father.” “If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the (lXaap.6^) propitiation for our sins.” 1 John ii. 1, 2. And finally, he is called our Surety (l/pyoc). In its classical sense I^KOC means “Bondsman” or “Bailsman” with the Father. Heb. vii. 22. This cannot mean, as the Socinians and their followers have, from the beginning, striven to prove, that Christ was Surety for the truth and fidelity of God to us. It must mean that he was our Surety for the solution of our legal obligations to God, because it is explicitly declared, in the only passage in which the word occurs, that he was Surety for us in his function as High Priest. “The Lord sware and will not repent, Thou art a PRIEST for ever after the order of Melchisedec: By so much was Jesus made the SURETY of a better testament.”
We here, of course, attempt no philosophical explanation of the essential basis of that union. We can know it only so far as its nature and its consequences are made known to us by direct revelation. The disciples of Schliermacher, and Realists in general, maintain that this union essentially consists in the fact that the eternal /fooc, in his incarnation, assumed the entire substance of human nature, and thus becomes, ipso facto, in the most literal sense, responsible for all the sin of that * Young’s” Life and Light of Men, ’ p. 27.
nature. This view we have rejected for reasons assigned in a preceding chapter,* and, whether true or false, it is no part of Christian doctrine, because no part of revealed truth, but at best a human attempt at the rational explanation of the truth revealed. All that is clearly taught in the Scriptures, and, therefore, all that ought to be received as Christian doctrine as to the nature of this union, is, (1) that it is a real union, such as in the infallible judgment of God lays the foundation in right for his being punished for our sins, and for our being credited with his righteousness — that is, so far as to answer all the federal demands of the law upon us. (2.) That it is, in some way to us unexplained, conditioned upon the fact that our nature is generative, hence that the whole race is made of one flesh, and that he became bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. (3.) That it is conditioned upon the eternal counsel of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. (4.) That our legal responsibilities were voluntarily assumed by the Logos, to be discharged by him as Theanthropos. (5.) That provision is made, through the operation of the Holy Spirit, for his becoming to all his people a “quickening spirit” (nv&fjia. ^woxotoljv), I Cor. xv. 45, and for their being made living members of that spiritual body of which he is the Head.
This much, and far more, the Scriptures teach to the same effect, the whole of which, taken together, conspires to form one perfectly self-consistent representation of a union most real and practical, though transcending all analogies. I do not deny that, by skilful selection and apposition, the advocates of each of the heterodox theo-
* See liapter vii.
ries of the Atonement may show that the maji rity of these passages, treated separately, are not absolutely incapable of being reduced into conformity with their views. And this follows necessarily from the fact that each of their hypotheses, as is the case with respect to every heresy which ever existed, is a partial truth. But —
II. I submit that the induction of scriptural passages I have presented makes certain the following points: (1.) That the entire class of passages above presented are not only without exception consistent with, but when taken together naturally suggest, the central principle of our doctrine, viz., that Christ, in the strict and proper sense of the term, was substituted in the law-place of his people. (2.) That the existence of this ineffable union, when established as a fact by infallible authority, goes very far to explain the relation which Christ has sustained to the penal sanctions of the law, and the effect which his work of active and passive obedience accomplishes in expiating the sins of his people, and in entitling them with himself to a glorious inheritance. And (3) that neither of the views which I oppose can, by any possible ingenuity, be adjusted to all that the Scriptures reveal concerning the union of Christ to his people, taken together as a whole. On neither hypothesis can a rational explanation of the application to the subject of such language in such variety and involution be afforded.
With respect to the Moral Influence Hypothesis, the
truth of this assertion is more than sufficiently evident.
If Christ comes to us merely that by a revelation of
divine love he may persuade us to lay aside our wicked enmity to God, in what sense, consistent with the honest use of language, can he be said to be our “second Adam,” our “Priest,” our “Ransom,” our “Advocate with the Father,” the “Propitiation for our sins,” our “Surety,” or Bailsman before God? In what sense were we “predestinated in 1dm” “baptized into his death?” In what sense was his death virtually our death, or his life virtually our life? In what sense is our life hid with Christ in God? In what sense do we have fellowship with him in his sufferings and in the power of his resurrection? In what sense is he our righteousness and we made righteous by his obedience?
The same essential incongruity will appear when we attempt to adjust the great central truth taught by these passages to the Governmental Hypothesis. If Christ was not strictly a Substitute in our place, and if he did not literally bear the penalty and expiate the guilt of our sins; if all he did was, by sufferings which were not of the nature of punishment, to prove that God will punish sin, and thus make it consistent with God’s rectitude as King for him not to save any, but to put all in a salvable state; if this represents the whole truth revealed as to the nature of redemption, — then it necessarily follows that, after all the Holy Ghost has said about it, the union between Christ and his people is not real, but only figurative. He helps us materially to help ourselves. But he never was literally one with us in the eye of the law. We are not truly of his flesh and of his bones, and he was neither our Ransom, nor our Bailsman. We are not truly joint Jieirs with him, but only beneficiaries. His obedience does not make us righteou«, but his sufferings open the way for God’s giving us an opportunity of becoming so. He did not bear our sin, and we are not clothed upon with his righteousness. Our sin was only the occasion of his suffering; and the same suffering is only the occasion, by means of which we may, if faithful, become p< rsoually righteous.