The Bible Accordant with Human Reason

Christianity would fain make converts of all classes of men. It would win and gain over the high and the low, the rich as well as the poor, the enlightened and thinking part of mankind, as well as the more uninformed. Men there are who regard it as making demands upon their credulity, which they feel themselves called on to resist. They look upon it as so repugnant to the first principles of reasoning and the ordinary laws of credibility, that, instead of commending itself to human reason, it is an outrage upon common sense. We have no hope of rendering it acceptable to the hearts of such men; while we may hope to rescue it from the charge of this monstrous absurdity. We are anxious to do so for the interests of truth, and because truth is the appointed means of salvation.

It requires but little acquaintance with the world to perceive, that one of the causes which contributes to confirm a certain class of men in their disbelief, is the impression that the claims of Christianity cannot be vindicated by human reason; and that, in order to receive it, they must forego all the authority of dispassionate and fair argument. The object of the present chapter is to throw out several suggestions, with the view of obviating this difficulty, and, so far as we are able, setting the claims of the Christian religion, in this particular, somewhat in their true light. We have a strong conviction, that this religion is distinguished from all false religions by its perfect agreement with reason. While all other systems of religion are deficient, or absurd and contradictory, this alone will bear examination; the more severe the examination, the better does it stand the test. It is a perfectly rational thing. It makes no demands upon a senseless credulity, nor in approaching it are men solicited to leave their own minds behind them, or throw away their reasoning faculties.

By reason I understand that faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood, and enables us to deduce truths that are unknown from those that are known. It is a faculty which exists in different power in different minds. There is a Mind in the universe which perceives all truth intuitively; there are other minds which arrive at it by a slow and more laborious process. The act of reasoning consists in judging of the truth of propositions brought before the mind, and inferring conclusions which are so just and natural, and which so necessarily result from the propositions thus presented, that they are intuitively perceived. In investigating the question, for example, whether the Scriptures are of divine origin, we go back to these first and universal truths which thus lie at the foun-Bible not of Man. I Q dation of all reasoning; which are sustained by an appeal to every man’s consciousness, and which are believed because it is impossible not to believe them. If the Bible is true, the truth of it must rest on this solid foundation. On no subject whatever are reason and argument more fitly employed, therefore, than in investigating this momentous question. If its divine authority cannot be substantiated by fair reason and argument, or if reason and argument can overthrow it, it is no longer worthy of confidence.

But it may not be forgotten, that, in order to reason justly on religious subjects, men must have the opportujiity and the means of reasoning. The truth of this remark neither requires, nor needs evidence in proof of it. Be it political, or legal science; be it in the physical, or the more exact sciences; in order to reason successfully, or even safely, men must not only possess the faculty and power of reason, but the opportunity and means of reasoning. These consist in a greater or less degree of knoioledge and information on the subjects about which they reason. A lucid argument on the subject of civil government requires some degree of acquaintance with the science of civil government; a convincing argument on the law of bailments, or insurance, requires legal attainments; the solution of a difficult problem in geometry requires no inconsiderable advancement in mathematical learning. So it is with regard to questions of a religious kind. As men cannot reason safely on any other subject without some degree of information on the subject about which they reasoiij it is indispensable they should have some degree of religious information before they can reason on the subject of religion. Reason is fitted to the perception of truth and must therefore have the opportunity and means of perceiving it. Whatever is true sooner or later falls in with the conclusions of reason. One mind may discover it later, and by a more tedious process, than another; but when perceived, it is equally believed by both. Truth does not depend on our perceiving it; nor is it less true when perceived by other minds, though unperceived by our own. A religious truth that is worked out by the tardy process of human reasoning, is not the less true because it is intuitively discovered by a mind that is more exalted; nor is it less true, though we receive it on the testimony of his perceptions. Nor, when it is reached by the process of reasoning, is it less true because it is first perceived by those who have superior knowledge and superior means of reasoning; for when we ourselves come to possess the same knowledge and the same means, we shall perceive it as well as they. The more our sources of religious knowledge are increased, and the greater the variety of religious truths with which our minds are furnished, the better are we fitted to reason on the subject; and if we follow the sound and true dictates of reason, the more confidently may we rely on our conclusions.

There are several sources of information, and means and opportunities of reasoning, on religious subjects. One of these is the Book of Natnre,

^’ The heavens declare the glory of God, and tho firmament sheweth his handy work.” -’Ask now the beasts, and they shall teach thee; and the fowls of heaven, and they shall tell thee. Or speak to the earth, and it shall teach thee; and the fishes of the sea shall declare unto thee. Who knoweth not in all these, that the hand of the TiOrd hath wrought this?” One of them is the Book of Providence where, from facts in the history of the world, as well as events which take place under our qavu observation, important lessons are learned concerning God as the great Governor, and men as his responsible subjects. These instructions are valuable in proportion to their plainness and extent. They are so, because they utter the voice of God; they are a Tevelatio7i of his will; they constitute some of the forms in which he himself addresses truth to the minds of his creatures. Nor is there anything that is imreasonahle in such a revelation as this. It is reasonable to suppose that the creation should speak for its Creator, and that the government which he is exercising over his creatures, by his providence, should speak to them in language of no equivocal import. I have yet to learn that any class of infidels have called in question the reasonableness of such a revelation.

But what if, in addition to such a revelation, it has pleased God to make a more full disclosure of his mind and will? Is there anything unreasonable ’ in this hypothesis? The Bible professes to be such a revelation: is there anything unreasonable in what

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it reveals? Let us direct our thoughts a few moments to these two inquiries.

Is it unreasonable that such a revelation should be made, in addition to the disclosures of nature and providence? It is the province of reason, not to originate truth, but to discover it. Ca7i it discover, from these sources alone, all that is necessary for men to know? Can it discover it with that certainty that satisfies the philosophic, or to that extent which satisfies the popular mind? Socrates and Seneca did not think so — the civil and popular theology of the pagan world bears uniform testimony that “the world by wisdom knew not God.” To the great purpose of man’s existence as a moral and immortal being, the works and providence of God have spoken in vain. So far as they regard the Divine counsels respecting our fallen race, they have spoken in vain. If it were reasonable that He who is the light of the universe should not leave this lower world in darkness that may be felt; if it were reasonable that the Father of mercies and the God of the spirits of all flesh should stretch forth his hand to rescue his falling children from the bottomless abyss; it is reasonable to look for a more abundant and hopeful revelation than is contained in his works of creation and providence. ‘-Let reason count the stars, weigh the mountains, fathom the depths — the employment becomes her, and the success is glorious. But when the question is, How shall man be just with God?’ reason must be silent, revelation must speak.”

If J then, there is nothing unreasonable in the hypothesis that God should give men a more full revelation, is there anything unreasonable in the revelation itself, which professes to have God for its Author? In replying to this inquiry, several distinct thoughts deserve consideration.

All will agree, that a religion that has God for its Author, cannot be unreasonable. Whether we can discover it to be so, or not, it must be a reasonable religion. Better were it to impeach our own reason, than his. Nor is this altogether a ‘^ begging the question,” or “reasoning in a circle.” To exalt reason above its own place, is to debase it: to set the human in rivalry with the Divine, is to make it contemptible. The Bible claims to be a reasonable religion; to require a “reasonable service;” to reveal ^’ the words of truth and soberness.” Reason in creatures is essentially the same with reason in the Deity; save that, while their conclusions are arrived at, for the most part with difficulty, his are intuitively made; and while with them reason is finite, and liable to err, in the Divine mind it is unerring and infinite. The most reasonable Being in the universe cannot be the author of an unreasonable revelation. The God of heaven does not need to be instructed, and dictated to by human reason: human reason needs to be tutored and schooled by Divine wisdom. Whether the system of truth and piety revealed in the Scriptures, does or does not, in our judgment, coincide with sound reason, we have the highest evidence the nature of the case

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admits, that it does so in fact. This, however, is not the ground on which we rest the reasonableness of the religion revealed in the Scriptures. The question, whether this religion is or is not intrinsically contrary to reason, is not out of place.

I remark therefore, further. It is no objection to the reasonableness of this religion, that it C07itains truths which human reason itself could never have discovered. There are those who hold that nothing is reasonable, save that which human reason originally discovers. But is it so, that there is nothing known to the minds of angels, or to the mind of the Infinite Deity, that is unknown to men? If human reason could have devised the system of truth and grace found in the Bible, there had been no need of a supernatural revelation. It is not denied that truths are here revealed that could never have been known but for Divine teaching. The utmost powers of the human mind fail in the effort to discover them; nor, untaught of God, could they ever have proved them to be true. Unaided reason had not the remotest suggestion, or hint of some of them, until they were disclosed by light from heaven. Imagination herself did not venture a faint foreshadowing of them. Human reason had no creed, no fixed opinions, in relation to problems which the Bible solves to the satisfaction of the merest tyro in the school of Christ. The solution of them haa not its antetype in the human mind: it was nowhere, save in the mind of the Deity, and in the deep counsels of the eternity where he dwells.

We say to those persons who have persuaded themselves that human reason could have accomplished all that was necessary for man’s salvation, that the moral history of our world, nay, the history of the universe shows, that when once any race of creatures have fallen from their primeval integrity, it is beyond the limits of reason, whether in the human or the angelic mind, to devise a method by which they may be restored to the Divine favor. The angelic race who fell, with all their lofty powers of intellect, have not, during the progress of tedious centuries of suffering, discovered any way of escape. It is perfectly obvious that, on the apostacy of our first parents, all expectation of recovery from the efforts of their own reason was a forlorn hope. Nor has it been in the power of their descendants, during the progress of six thousand years, in any part of the world, to ascertain from the lights of reason and nature, whether God will forgive sin. Human reason has had full and unobstructed opportunity to make the discovery — among all nations and every clime, in ages of ignorance and barbarism, and in ages of great intellectual cultivation and vigor; and the result shows, that the most acute philosopher, and the degraded child of the forest, are alike ignorant of those truths which bring relief to the solicitude and despondency of man when contemplating his character as a sinner. The various religions of man’s devising are everywhere the religions of penalty, of fear: the basis of them all is a deep and inwrought impression of the awful majesty of God as the Avenger. It is perfectly accordant with the dictates of reason, therefore, that a revelation that meets the wants of man should itself be, not the creature of reason, but of God.

As a consequence of this position, it is altogether reasonable J that a religion, revealed from heaven, should contain truths that are above and beyond the power of human reason to comprehend. Infidels and rationalists object to the Bible, and aiSrm that it is contrary to reason, because it contains mysterious truths. But why should it be thought unreasonable, that a system of truth, which is confessedly beyond the power of man’s devising, should contain truths which convict human reason of imbecility? What is there irrational and illogical in the position, that the wisdom of man is confounded and baffled before “the deep things of God?” We affirm, that it is most reasonable to believe that a revelation from God contains some such mysterious features. It is for such truths among others, if not for such truths mainly, that such a revelation is needed. Now that it reveals them, so far from being any objection tojhe divine origin of the revelation, they remain among the evidences of its divine origin. They constitute one of the proofs that such a revelation is consistent with the highest reason. They are truths that are unwelcome to the proud and selfish heart of man; truths which show that human reason, with all its self-confidence, has its boundaries; and at the same time truths which reason, unless strangely recreant to her own prerogative, is constrained to honor.

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There are truths above the discovery of human reason, and which, when revealed, reason comprehends; and there are also those which, when revealed, are above its comprehension. There are more of the former than the latter; while the latter are, if possible, of greater importance, because thoy are so intimately connected with the most important practical truths of Christianity. The doctrine of the Trinity, and of the Incarnation, are mysterious and incomprehensible truths. They are revealed as mysteries; they are facts the existence of which is affirmed by the testimony of Him who cannot lie, and believed on that testimony. But there is nothing contradictory in the statements we find of them in the Bible; there is nothing in these statements that contradicts any other truth which the Scriptures reveal; nor has it ever been shown, nor can it be, that they are inconsistent with reason. Though man’s reason does not comprehend them, the reason of the Great God comprehends them; and for all that we know, in a future and more advanced state of being, they may be comprehended by creatures. In a revelation from the incomprehensible God, it is not unreasonable to look for some incomprehensible truths. His nature leads us to look for them; his works lead us to look for them; his providence leads us to look for them: it was to be expected that the Bible would contain them. “Who by searching can find out God? who can find out the Almighty to perfection?” It were a fault, rather than an excellence in the Scriptures — it were in ill

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keeping with the revelations God has made of himself elsewhere, did they contain no mysteries. Did they not contain them, infidels themselves would have laid hold of this fact as proof of imposture. It is no impeachment of the Divine wisdom, or goodness, that the Bible contains them; nor are they the less reasonable, because they cannot be explained. We have no right to claim of God, that all that he reveals should be divested of incomprehensibleness. Such a curiosity were unhallowed; nor could any limit be assigned to it, if once indulged. Angels do not comprehend all that God has revealed; and why should man be dissatisfied?

That no man can rationally believe facts which he does not comprehend, is, of all positions, one of the most unreasonable and absurd. If it is reasonable to believe facts which he cannot comprehend, it is reasonable to believe truths which he cannot comprehend; for truth is but the veracious statement of facts. The objector himself believes a multitude of such truths, and regulates his conduct by them every day. Some of them he perceives intuitively: they are, indeed, too plain to be capable of proof by any logical process. He cannot explain the very union between his own body and mind; nor the action of his thoughts upon his will; nor the influence of his will upon his outward conduct; nor the manner in which his own mind holds intercourse with other minds, any more than he can explain how God was manifest in the flesh, or how his Spirit acts upon the soul in fitting it for heaven. He cannot escape from the region of incomprehensibleness, go where he will. A revelation that instructs him in the nature of the incomprehensible God; in his counsels and government; in the method of his incomprehensible grace, and in an incomprehensible eternity; bears a relation to realities so vast and immeasurable, that it is constantly bordering on mystery. It is incomprehensible, for the very reason that it is true — truth that must be incomprehensible, because it is lofty and sublime as its Author. These are the truths, in the contemplation of which ^’ they in heaven veil their faces with their wings.” You cannot dishonor these wondrous truths, without dishonoring their wondrous Source. You cannot discard them without discarding his whole revelation; without tearing away the foundations of human hope; without uprooting the truth which sustains the branches and the fruit of immortality. Those very truths of the Bible, therefore, which to the slight inspection of the rationalist appear the most objectionable to human reason, are truths which human reason might well presume such a revelation would contain. But we cannot establish the position we have taken in the present chapter, without directing our thoughts somewhat more minutely to some of the great truths and principles which the Bible reveals for the purpose of seeing if they do not coristitute a reasonable system. If we mistake not, there are grounds and reasons for these truths sufficient to satisfy every sober and dispassionate mind. They are at war with no previous truths revealed by the lights of nature and reason, and inscribed on the consciences of men; but are, on the other hand, in perfect harmony with them all. It is indeed a presumptuous service which we assign to human reason, to sit in judgment upon the truths which the unerring Oracle of the universe has revealed, and whose “ways are past finding out.” But for the sake of the argument, we will give the infidel this vantage ground, and ask him to look into the Bible, and indicate to us the truths against which human reason rebels.

The leading truths, and those on which all the rest depend, are few, and are very intelligibly revealed. They are, the sovereign right of the Great God to give law to his creatures — the apostate character and lost condition of man as the transgressor of that law — the great remedy which the Gospel provides for the pardon and justification of all those who truly receive it — the provision which it makes for their personal holiness and sanctification — and the unalterable retributions of the eternal world. Let common sense inspect these doctrines; let reason investigate them: let philosophy analyze them — let her intellectual resources be taxed to the uttermost; and they can find nothing in them that is not worthy of having a place in their creed. They all commend themselves to our honest convictions of truth and right; we have but to state them truly, and we may safely make the appeal to all intelligent beings, if they are not conformed to human reason.

The sovereign right of God to give law to his creatures, belongs to him from his original and imderived supremacy. Reason decides intuitively, that it is the prerogative of a superior to give law to his inferiors. This is the prerogative of all civil rulers, whatever be the form of government under which this prerogative is exercised. And if men, who have no natural, but only a borrowed, delegated and conventional supremacy, possess this right, much more does the Infinite God possess it, who is by nature supreme, and whose power, wisdom, goodness and rectitude qualify him, and him alone, to be the universal Lawgiver.

The doctrine of human apostacy is rather stated and illustrated in the Bible, than revealed; for the history of man demonstrates it; human reason, however reluctantly, confesses it to be true; and though she strives to view it in more flattering lights than those in which the Scriptures represent it, she is constrained to behold it in all its ugliness, and in the dark shadows of scriptural truth. The consequent ill desert of man is an unavoidable inference from his sinfulness, deduced as certainly by reason as by the Scriptures. Reason decides, that no wise and good lawgiver may overlook the violations of his law. There is no such thing as law without an expressed, or implied penalty. The force and sanction of law consist in penalty, and without it the lawgiver has no authority. Conscience, too, everywhere recognizes man’s ill desert as the consequence of his sin; and no sooner does he sin, than there arises in his bosom a sense of ill desert, and an indestructible conviction of his obnoxiousness and obligation to punishment.

Men in all ages of the world have adopted the principle, that the wrath of Heaven must be appeased for past offences. Their altars and their sacrifices, with one voice, bear testimony to the necessity of some propitiatory libations to the offended Deity. What, then, is there unreasonable in the method of redemption by Jesus Christ? Reason surely does not divest the Supreme Lawgiver of his pardoning power. Every lawgiver has a natural right to exercise this prerogative; and he has also a moral right to exercise it, wherever it can be done without conflicting with the best interests of the government. Whether the Great Lawgiver could wisely and rightfully exercise the pardoning power, through the mediation of another, who should himself make satisfaction to Divine justice, is a question for the discretion, the wisdom, the rectitude of the Lawgiver to decide. He has decided it in favor of such a commutation of punishment, as shall rescue the guilty without destroying the innocent substitute. That there should be no act of injustice to the substitute, everything on his part is perfectly voluntary. And that there should be no injustice to the government, the substitute himself is of such high consideration in the court of heaven, that the ends of justice are not trifled with, but fully answered by his substitution in the place of the guilty. Now, why should human reason revolt at this? Remote as it is from the ordinary apprehensions of mankind, does not reason decide that very important ends are gained by it, which could not have been gained by the absolute and sovereign exercise of the dispensing power? Are there not manifestations of love and goodness which could not have been made without it? Is not such a procedure more conducive to the ends of justice, more expressive of the evil of sin, better adapted to strengthen veneration for the law and promote the interests of good government, than either the sealed and certain ruin of the entire race, or the arbitrary exercise of the pardoning power without any atonement for transgression? Human governments cannot exist without the great principle of representation; the parent represents his child, the guardian his ward; moneyed associations their constituents: why should this arrangement be impugned in the Divine government? Men forgive for the love of another; and so does God. Human governments remit penalty through the intercession of men of merit, men in power, and men of high and commanding influence; and so does God, through the intercession of his Son. Men accept the responsibility of one man for the defalcations of another; and so does God. Men receive an amendment for wrong, freely offered by another than the wrong-doer; and so does God. If the Roman Fabius, when condemned to death by the dictator, was pardoned because the Roman people implored that he might find mercy for their sakes, what is there unreasonable in the fact, that sinners of our race should be forgiven for the sake of Christ? If the rigid execution of the penalty had been ruinous to the entire race, and clemency thus exercised would give authority to the Divine government, why should reason oppose such a method of mercy? Why may not the Divine government accept some competent substitute, if some kinsman Redeemer can be found, who is too much the friend of justice to see sin go unpunished, and who is, at the same time, too much the friend of man to see him sink under the stroke of justice? Why, I demand, may not such a substitute be accepted, when he not only freely offers himself to bear the mighty burden, but is able to bear it; and from the low grave, to which it crushes him, to rise with new laurels on his brow, with his rescued victims on his breast, penetrated by his love, reformed and

restored, loyal subjects of the Divine kingdom, affectionate and dutiful children of the Divine family? Is this an unreasonable redemption? Were all the wisdom of angels and men collected in one vast assembly, to scrutinize this method of mercy, with all its wonders, could its reasonableness be challenged, or its fitness be called in question, or its moral influence impugned?

This great truth is connected in the Scriptures with the provision they make for the personal holiness and sanctification of the fallen. And what is there in this that is unreasonable? Is it not a fact, that creatures depraved and degenerate as men are, need a radical transformation of character in order to be happy? Reason and philosophy urge the necessity of this change, as well as the Bible.

Is it the decision of the Bible, that no means and no motives are effectual for the production of this change? Such is the rigid conchision of reason and experience, as well as the decision of the Bible.

Is it the decision of the Bible, that the Author of this change is God himself? Why should he not be? Does reason decide that he renews the face of the earth, and crowns the year with his goodness; that he opens his hand, and satisfies the desire of every living thing; that he is the Father of the rain, and begetteth the drops of the dew; and does it question if he is the Author of a spiritual character in fallen man? Does reason decide that every good gift, and every perfect gift, is from the Father of lights, and that this highest and best gift has no such divine origin?

Or is it the decision of the Scriptures, that this heaven-imparted holiness is the fruit of the Saviour’’s deaths and that it is his love which constrains men to cease from their hostility to God, and to return to his Father, and their Father, in his name? Is it unreasonable that this Great Sufferer should have some reward — some fitting recompense? And what so fitting, so reasonable, as to have gained the objects of his redemption, and when once gained, that “nothing should pluck them out of his hand?”

We will not pursue this specification of particular truths. They are all of a piece. Human reason need not take the alarm; she may be satisfied with them. The understanding, the conscience, the heart, the whole soul may be satisfied with them, as every way worthy of God, as furnishing the highest proof of his wisdom and love, as reading the most instructive and striking lessons to the universe, as announcing glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, and good will to men. There is no folly, no weakness, no wildness, nor extravagance here. Wondrous as these truths are, they are too intelligible to be irrational; too rational not to interest the strongest intellect. There is a simplicity and grandeur in them that rebut all the cavils of a cold and sceptical rationalism, and carry conviction to thoughtful minds that they are of God. They make common cause with all that is intelligent in the universe. They form as truly the religion of philosophers, as of the common people. Some of the greatest minds the world has known, minds as vigorous and well-furnished, minds which science has been proud to honor, have revelled in the truths of the Bible, and been its triumphant defenders against all the invasion of its malignant foes. So far from being a shallow system, or making any claims on the credulity of men, it sounds the note of alarm against all belief on slight evidence, and is sure to gratify, by every fresh demand it makes upon human intelligence.

If from the truths of Christianity, Ave pass to the consideration of the duties it enjoins, we shall find that these also are founded in the highest reason. With the exception of its positive institutions, they are all founded in the nature of the Deity, in the nature of man, and in the relations which he sustains towards God and his fellow men. There is no form of iniquity, be it open excess, or hidden wickedness, on which it does not frown. In every conflict between right and wrong, however the wrong may be sanctioned by custom, influence, or law, it is always found on the right side. It has the only strong hold in the universe upon the morals of individual men, and upon the moral sense and habits of human society. It silently inweaves itself with all the relations of social and public life, everywhere proclaiming the laws of rectitude in the ears of the prince and the peasant. It has no pious frauds; no fabulous, or magic power; no falsehoods, by which the terrors of superstition are excited, or allayed; but urges all its obligations simply by the authority and love of its Author, and the allurement of its truths. It regulates the outward conduct by first regulating the heart, and implanting in the inner man the fear of God and the love of Jesus Christ. It diminishes what is imaginary, and gives power and prominence to what is real; it throws into the background the vanities of time, and brings forward in bold relief the realities of eternity. It controls, not by impulse and passion, but by the strength of principle.

The duties it prescribes are all intelligible, comprehensively expressed, and easily remembered. Nor is there one of them that is not right in itself, and of the happiest tendency. It requires men to love that which is lovely, and hate that which is odious; to neglect the unimportant, and pursue the important. It enforces every obligation of dependence and gratitude, of nature and of law. It gives its sanction to everything which reason sanctions. Reason instinctively revolts at every violation of its laws, as an unnatural perversion of what is right. Any other system of duties would at once be felt to be irrational. Notwithstanding all the power which sin exerts over the human mind, in spite of itself, human reason recoils from any moral direction different from that given to it by Christianity.

There is a great difference between the happiness enjoyed with the approbation of conscience, and that which is felt without, or against it. There is, no doubt, pleasure in sinning: the hope of unlawful gratification constitutes the fatal charm. But there is an immense abatement of this happiness, arising from remorse and fear: the consciousness of guilt often grows to such intensity, as more than to counteract all the pleasure. This is the moral arrangement of the Bible; and can there be an arrangement more reasonable, more Avise? The language of such an arrangement is, that its Author, solicitous as he is for the happiness of men, is mainly solicitous that they should be happy through the possession of a virtuous, moral character; and that their happiness itself should be the fruit and one of the expressions of their excellence.

I ask, then, if Christianity be not accordant with human reason? May not the man of this world deem it the proudest eminence to which his reason can aspire, to sit at the feet of this heavenly Teacher, and bow without gainsaying to its every decision?

It is only false and corrupted reason that fears the Bible, or that the Bible frowns upon. It inculcates no unreasonable doctrine, insists on no unreasonable duty, aims at no unreasonable end. It forms the most rational and consistent scheme of belief, and morals, and hopes.

Let it be compared with the systems of ancient philosophy, and no doubt can remain as to which is accordant with reason. Let it be compared with the fictions of paganism; with the fables of its poets, and the representations of its historians; and while, in its best forms, paganism will be found a disgrace to human reason, this wonderful Book will be found to be no dishonor to the intelligence of the “God only wise.” Thousands of years rolled over the pagan world, and its most gigantic minds in vain attempted to invent a religion which reason could approve. Never was experiment more fairly, or more fully made; never was failure more complete. Reason covers her face, and retires ashamed from the inspection.

With very little pretext may men boast of their reason, who reject the Bible. The more this book is read, and the better it is understood, the more rational will it appear. If men of lofty intellect have disbelieved it, it was not owing to their superior intelligence. Intelligence — enlightened, unbiassed intelligence — cannot see that to be irrational which is not so. On a multitude of subjects, the reason of these very men has been satisfied with a tithe of the evidence that estabhshes the reasonableness of the Scriptures. That there are instances in which intelhgent men have rejected it from the want of evidence which to them is inaccessible it is very difficult to believe, so long as the Bible itself is accessible.

With the Bible in their hands, men may he safely left to the sound deductions of reason. To one of two results reason will lead them. Legitimately followed, it will make them Christians, or Atheists. If the Bible is not from God, I see not what is from him. An inadequate cause is no cause. I believe there is a God, because I find in the world such a book as the Bible: demonstrate to me that this book is not of God, and I cannot stop short of blank Atheism. God lives in vain, if he has not spoken in the Bible — or rather, he does not live — there is no God! Away, away with this thought of blasphemy! “The Lord liveth, and blessed be my Rock!” There is reality, there is truth, there is reason in this Book of God. “Call now, if there be any to answer thee; and to what other wilt thou turn?”