Concerning That Objection, That to Suppose Men to Be Born in Sin, Without Their Choice, Is to Suppose What Is Inconsistent with the Nature of Sin

Some of the objections made against the doctrine of Original Sin, which have reference to particular arguments used in defence of it, have been ah-eady considered in the handling of those arguments. What I shall therefore now consider, arc such objections as I have not yet had occasion to take any special notice of.

There is no argument Dr. Taylor insists more upon, than that which is taken from the Arnainian and Pelagian notion of freedom of will, consisting in the will’s selfdeterminationy as necessary to the being of moral good or evil. He oficn urges, Ihat if we come into the world infected with sinful and depraved dispositions, then sin must be natural to us; and if natural, then necessary; and if necessary, then 7?o sin, nor any thing we are blameable for, or that can in any respect be our fault, being what we cannot help: And he urges, that sin must proceed from our own choice. Sec*

* Page 125, 128, 129, 130, 186, 187. 188, 190. 230, 245, 246, 953, «18, 63, 64, 161, S. and other places.

Here I would observe in p;cncrill, that ihc forcmcntioncrt notion of Freedom of ill, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, secmi to he a grand fHvoritc point with Pelagi.ins and Armini.ins, an.) all divines of such characters, in their controversies vlilh llie orthodox. There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of reliyion; on the determination of this one leading point depends the issue of almost ail controversies we have with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a ?ircdi<s.’i ta?k for me particu’tA’-l;, to consider that matter in this place; having already Juigely discussed it, with all the main grounds of ihi«i notion, and the arpjumcn’s used to defend it7 in a hie book ou this subject, to which I ask leave ‘o refer th.e reader. It is very necessary, that the modern prevailinr; doctrine conccrnine ihi-.; point, should be well understood, and thtreforn thoroughly considered and examined: For without it tiicro is no hope of puttinc an end to the controversy about Orifinal Sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist, about many of the main points of religion, I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern divines, if they can mairtain their peculiar notion o{ freedom con u’^tinr in the sclfdctc •.n* ing power of the “xiH, as necessary to rijral atcTicy and; ja thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arrjuments Ijin against it, then they have an impi cgnable rasilc, to which they may repair, and remain invincible, in all the controversies they have with the reformed divines, concerning Oiijjinal Sin, the sovereignty of grace, election, redemption, conversion, the efficatious operation of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving faith, perseverance of the saints, and other principles of the like kind. Howcivcr at the same time I think this sanv thin:^ will be as strong a fortress for the dcUts,, in commo;» ■vvith them, as the great doctrines, subverted by their notion of freedom are so plainly and abundantly taught in the «;ciip’.urc. But I am under no apprehensions of ar»y danger, the cause of Christianity, or the religion of the reformed is in. fron anjr possibility of ///«’ r.otio?i- being ever established, or ot its being ever cvi;r mI that there is not proper, perfect, and r.Mnifcld demomtrauon lyinjj a^’aint it. Bat as I said, it wouM 1^ needless for me to enter into a particuhir disquisition of this point here; from which I shall easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give himself the trouble of consulting” what I have already written: And as to others, probably they will scarce be at the pains of reading the present discourse; or at least would not, if it should be enlarged by a full consideralion of that controversy.

I shall at this time therefore only take notice of some gross inconsistencies that Dr. Taylor has been guilty of, in his handling this objection against the doctrine of Ori2;inal Sin.

In places which have been cited, he says, that “Sin must proceed from our own choice: And that if it does not, it being necessary to us, it cannot be sin, it cannot be our faulty or -what we are to blame for:’* And therefore all our sin must be chargeable on our choice, which is the cause of sin: For he says, “The cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, and which proceedeth from it.”* Now here are implied several gross contradictions. He greatly insists that nothing can be sinful or have the nature of sin, but what proceeds from cup choice. Nevertheless he says, “....Not the effect lxn. the cause alone is chargeable with blayne.” Therefore the choice which is the cause, is alojifblamable, or has the natu’e of sin; and not the effect of that choice. Thus nothing can be sinful, but the effect of choice; and yet the effect of choice never can be sinful, but only the cause, which alone is chargeable wiih all the blame.

Again, the choice which chooses and produces sin, or from which sin proceeds, is itscU” sinful. Not oily is this implied m his saying, “the cause alone is chargeable with ail the blame” but he expressly speaks of the choice n^Jauiti/.-f and calls that ciioicc wicked, from which depravity and corruption proceeds. Now if the choice itself be sin, and there be no sin but what proceeds from a sinful choice, then the sinful choice must piocccd from another antecedent choice; it must be chosen by a foregoing act of will, determining itself to that sinful choice, that so it may have that which he i;peaks of as

* I’age 128. + Pae 190. Fac POO. Scealfo page eiG.

absolutely essential to the nature of ainy nami-ly, that it fire ceedafrom our choice and docs not happen to us nccc4»arily. But if the sinful ch(.ice itself proceeds from a fore voin.e; choice, then also that forc^oiii’^ choice must be sinful; it being the cause of sin and so alone chars;cable with the blavie. Vet if that foretoinp: choice be sinful, then neither must that happen to us necessarily, but must likewise proceed from choice, another act of cl’.oicc prcredini; that: I’or we must remember, that “nolhint; is sinful but what proceeds from our c/iozrc.” And then, for the same reason, even this prior choice, last mentioned, must also be sinful, being char«^eable with all the blame of that consequeni evil choice, which was its effect. And so wd must go back till we come to the €xy first volition, the prime or original act of choice in the whole chain. And this to be sure, must be a sinful ciioicc, because this is the origin or primitive cause of all the train of evils which follow; and according to our author, must therefore be “alone chart;eable with all the blame” And yet so it is, accordinsj to him, this “cannot be sinful,”!)ecause it does not ‘’ proceed from our own choice,’* or any foregoing act of our will; it being, by the supposition, thp very first act of will iti the case. And therefore it must be neccsari/y as to us, having no choice of ours to be the caue of it.

In page 2S2, he says, “Adam’s sin was from his own dis” abcdicnt will; and so must every man’s sin, and all the sin in the world be, as well as his.” By this, it seems, lie must have a ‘^ disobedient will” before he sins; for the cause must be before the effect: And yet that disobedient will itself is sinful; otherwise it could not be called disobedient. But the question is, How do men come by the disobedient t:///, this cause of all the sin in the world? It must not come ?ifccesa’ rily, without men’s choice; for if so, it is not sin, nor is there a’ny disobedience in it, ‘i’hercfore that disobedient will mujt also come from a disobedient will; and so on, in irfritiun. Otherwise it must be supposed, that there is some ain m the world, which dccu not come from a di’^l-c’- ’ -” ’ -’ •: — to our authoi’s dogmaiical as-crlions. Q P

In page 166, 6’. be says, “Adaiyi could not sin %vUhout a sivfulincUnation.’* Here he calls thilt inclination ilself sm/t^A which is the principle from whence sinful acts proceed; as elsewhere he speaks of the disobedient wilt from whence all sin comes; and he allows,* that “the lavj reaches to all the latent fir inciples of sin;” meaning plainly, that it forbids-, and threatens ftimishmcnt for, those latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these sinful inclinations, without which, according to our author, there can be no sinful act, cannot all proceed from a sinful choice; because that would imply great contradiction. For, by the supposition, they are the principles from whence a sinful choice comes, and whence all sinful acts of will proceed; and there can be no sinful act without them. So that ihefirst latent principles and inclinations, from whence all sinful acts proceed, are sinful; and yet they are not sinful, because they do not proceed from a ivick’ ed choice, without which, according to him, “nothing can be sinful.”

Dr. Taylor, speaking of that proposition of the Assembly of Divines, wherein they assert, that Man is by nature bitterly corrupt Sect thinks himself well warranted by the supposed great evidence of these his contradictory notions, to say, “Therefore sin is not natural to us; and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this proposition in the Assembly of Divines is Jhlse.** But it may be worthy to be considered, whether it would not have greatly become him, before he had clothed himself with so nvuch assurance, and proceeded, on the founchtion of these his notions, so magisterially to charge the Assembly’s proposition with falsehood, to have taken care that his own propositions, which he has set “in opposition to them, should be a little more consistent; that he might not have contradicted himself while contradicting them; lest some impartial judpcs, observing his inconsistence, should think they had warrant to declare with equal assurance, that «’ They shall not scruple to say. Dr. Taylor’s doctrine is false.”

Contents of Roro. chsp. vlii. in Notos en ic FMivtp r Pa-rc i’?r.