That Great Objection Against the Imputation of Adam's Sin to His Posterity Considered

That we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main objections agamst supposing the guilt of Adam’s sin to be imputed to his posterity; I would pret jnise some observaiions with a view to the rleht of the doctrine of ‘he imputation of Atlam’s fiist sin, and then shew the rcasonablencsft of ilm docliinc, in cppo:.uicn to the great clamor raised against it on ihia licad.

I think, it would p;o far towards dircctint us to the mort dear and distinct conceivinfij and rip;ht slavinjjj of this afT.tir, “were we steadily to bear ihi* in mind: That God, in each step of his proceedini with Adam, in relation to the covenant or coTistiiuiion established with him, l(;(;ked on his posterity as being 072c ujz7// him. (The propriety of his looking upon them so, I shall speak to afterwards.) And lhouc:h he dealt more immediately with Adam, yet it was as the head of the whole body, and the root ol the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches, as ii they had been then existing; in their root.

From which it will follow, that both guilt, or cxposcdacss Jo punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam*s posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difierence necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole, and being first and most immediately dealt with, and mon immediately acliiig and suffering. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root I)ad been attended, at the same instant, wiili the same steps and aJierations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branclu I think this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a constituted oneness or identity of Adam and his posterity in this affair.

Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any Iiave -upposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a double guilff one the guilt of Adam’s sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, ihey liavc not ro well conceived of the matter. The /{ui/f a man has upon his soul at his first existence, is one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by v. hicii the species first rebelled against (iod. This, and the guilt arising from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are

5 If OPvTGTNAL Slr.

not to be looked upon as 77yo things, distinctly imputed am! charged upon nien in the sight of God. Indeed the guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart, as it remains a confirmed principle, and appears in its consequent operations, is e distinct n additional guilt: But the guilt arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam’s posterity, I apprehend, %vot distinct from their guili of Adam’s first sin. For so it was not in Adam Irimself. The first evil disposition or inclination of the heart €f Adam to sin, was not properly distinct from his frrst act of in, but was included in it. The external act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceeded from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt he had double, aS for two distinct sins: One, the wickedness of his heart and TV ill in that affair: another, the wickedness of the external act, caused by his heart. His guilt was all truly from the act of bis inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body M’ere no more than the motions of any lifeless instru-STient. His sin consisted in wickedness of heart, fully suffi* cient/j7-, and entirely amounting to, all that appeared in the ect he committed.

The depraved disposition of Adam’s heart is to be consid* cred two ways, (-l.) As the first rising of an evil inclinatiofi In his heart, exerted in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2.) An evil disposition of heart continumi; afterwards, as a confirmed principle that came by God’s forsaking him; which was a fiuniskment of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his soul.

And in like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam’s jposterity. The Jirst existing of a corrupt disposition in tieir hearts, is not to be looked upon as sin belonging to them, distinct from their participation of Adam’s first sin: It is as it were the extended pollution of that sin, through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union of the branches with the root; or the inherence of the sin of that Iicudofthe species in the members, in the consent and concurrence of the hearts of the members with the head in that

Skst act. (Which may be, without Gf.cl’s being tljc author of sin, about which I have spoken in the former chapter.) Bit the depravity of nature remaininjp an c.stuMis/ied /iririci/i/e ia the heart of a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after operations, is a consrgurnce and fiunishmcnt of the first apostasy thut participated, andbrin^s new Ruilt.. The Qrsi bcin of an evil disposition in the heart of a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to aj’.firovc of the sin of his first father, as fully a* he himself approved of it when lie connnittcd it, or so far as to 5mp)y a full and perfect consent ol” heart to it, 1 think, is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the im’j)Uiation of tba first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam’s own heartp in the act of sinnintj; whit h was not consequent on the imputation of his sin to himself, but rattier //r:or to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil dispo .mora to the hearts of Adam’s posterity, or rather the coexistence of the evil disposition, implied in A(iam’s first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union that the v,”ism author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a consequence of the im/iuiattcn of his sin; nay, rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation ol that sin, are both the consequences of that est.iblished union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is y/Var, and the charge of guilt consequents as it was in the case of Adam Mr- aell.<

My roeaning, in the whole of ‘A-bai has been here %nd, may be ilU:st:av vd thus: I el us suppose, ihat Adam :nd all I. is posterity had co<-xipt(d, and that his posterity had been, through a law of nature, established by the Crealor, united to him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the rooi, or the members of the body o the head, s ) as lo constitute as it vveic our complex person, or one moral whole: “o that by the law of union, ibcfc should have been a communion and coexistence in acts and affection?; *I4 jointly participating, and all concurring, as one whole, in the dispoiitionand action of the head: As we see in the body natural, the whgle h’^dy i 2|yccte4 as the head is affected; and the whole body concur* when the :v?.d ?-••. Kow, in this case, the hearts of all the brunches of mqtikin4. by lie c tion of nature and liw of union, womIJ have been aflcried just as i: of Adam, their common root, was aiTcclcd. Vl en the ht of thr ‘•

320 ORIGINAL SllSr.

The.first existence of an evil disposition of heart, amoiint* ir to a full consent to Adam’s sin, no more infers God’s be* inr; ‘he author of that evil disposition in the c/«A/, than in the father, ‘the first arising or existing of that evil disposilion

a full disposition, committed the first sin. the hearts of all the branches would have concurred; and when the root, in consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the branches; and when the heart of the root, as a punishment of the sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like manner would it have fared with all the branches; and when the heart of the root, in consequence; of this, was confirmed in permanent depravity, the case would have been the same with all the branches; and as new guilt oh the soul of A-dam would have been consequent on this, so also -would it have been with his moral branches. And thus all things, with relation to evil disposition, gi-ilt, pol- lution and depravity, would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each branch, as in the root. Now, difTerence of the time of existence does oot at all hinder things succeeding in the same order, any moie than differ cnce of place in a coexistence of time.

Here may be worthy to be observed, as in several respects to the present purpose, some things that are said by Stapferus, ?n eminent divine of Zurich, in Switzerland, in his! he Jog;a Polem ca, published about fourteen years ago; in English as follovjrs. “Seeing all Adam’s posterity are derived from their fir.-.t parent, as their roct, the whole of the human kind, with its root, may be considered as constituting but one whole, or ne mass; so as not to be properly a thing d’stinct from its roi t; the posterity not differing from it, any otherwise than the branches from the tree. From which it easily ap* pears, how that when the root sinned, all that which is der ved from t, and with it constitutes but one whole, may be lookea U( on as also sinning; seeing it is not distinct froirt the root, but 13 one with it.” ...Tom. i. cap 3, ^856,57.

“It is ob’iectei again-s’ the im.putation of Adam’s sin. that we never commi’ted the same sin with Adam, neither in number nor in kind. I answer, we should distin)t;uish here between the physical act itself, which Adam cornmined, and the morality of the action, and consent to it. If we have respect only to the externa act, to be sure it must be oncssed. that Adam’s posterity did not put forth their hands to the ‘orbidden fruit: In which sense, that act of transgression, and that fall of Adam cannot be physically one with the sin of his po terity But if we consider the morality of the action, and wha*. consent here is to it, it is altogether to be maintained, that his posterity commi ted the smc sin, both in number and in kind, inasmuch as they arcto bz looked upon os rousenting to ii. For where there is consent to a sin, there the same .sin is committed. Seeing therefore that .-ldam, with all his posterity, constitute but one moral pcrs’)n. and are united in the same cove-ORIGINAL SIN. zil

in the heart of Adam, was by God’s pcrini.ssion; who coul4 have prevented it, if he had pleased, by ^iuintr ^i,cj, mflucijcea of his Spirit, us would have been aUsolntely cfTjcfuul lo hi idcr it; which, it is plain in fact, he did ivilhJiolJ: And wluicver

nant, an are transrensors of the same ‘aw, they arc aho to be looked upoa as having, in a moral cllimalion, cam mi ted the same trjns,;re»$ion of the »w both in number and in lund Thrrefora this reasoning avails nothing K^nnti the righteous imputation »f the sin of Adam lo all mankind, or to he whoU moral peison that is consenting to it. And for the reason menti pncd, we may rather argue thus: The sin of the posterity, on account «f ihcir conpeMl, and the moral view in which they arc to be taken, is the same with the sin of ldam, not only in kind, but in number; therefore the sin of Adam is rii’hirully imputed to his posterity.”.. ..Id. Tom. iv. cap i 6, 6o, 6t.

‘* The iTiputation of Adam’s first sin connists in nothing else thin thii that his posterity arc viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him. But seeing, agreeable to what we have already proTcd, God mi.’ht according to his own righteous judgmr-nt, which was founded on his most righteous law, give Adam a posterity that y, ere like himself; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according t’* the very laws of nature; th«rcfo.r he might plso in righteous judgriien impute Adam’:- sin to them; inasmuch as to gilc Adam a posterity like himselj. and to imputt his sin to thrm, i. one and the same thing. And therefore if the former be lot contrary to the divine perfections, so nei her is the latter Our advcrs-aries contend with us chiefly on this account, That according to our doctrine of Original Sin such an mputation of the first sin is main’ained, whereby God, without any legar! to universal native corruption, esteems all Adam’s posterity as gwlt), aid h.)ldi them as liable to condemnation, pweh 0,1 account of thit si lul act o( tncirfirs’: parent; so that they, without any respec had lo their own si«, and $0, as innocent in -hf-mselvcs, are destined to eternal puiiihm<-nt. I ‘avf therefore ever been careful to shew, thut they do trjuriruly supiosc t-ose things to bo separate!, in our doctrine, which aie by no means to h« »enarated. ‘I he whole of the controversy they have With us about this matter, evidently arises from this, That they suppose the mediate and the immediitc imputation are d>:>tinguished one from the other, not only in the manner of concoiion, but in rc- ;ility And so indeed they consider imputation <>nly as immedute and ab* stractly from the mediate; when yet our divi.cs supp sc, hat nciihtr ouhl CO be considered sepurMeh from the other. Therefore I ch se not to use any iuch distinction, or to suppose any such thing, in what J he -.-id t.n lle oiibject; but only have endeavored to explain the thing iuelf, and lo r. coucilc it with the divine attributes. And thcicfore I have every where conjoin-M both these conceptions concerning the impuiaiiou af Uic *;r»t jiu, a» iiucp-

2 R

fnystery mav be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian vpill’ presume. to say, it was not in perfect consistence with God*s /lo/iness and Hghteonfi?i€ss, notwiihstandinc: Adam had been guilty of no offence before. So root and branches beinu: one,* according to God’s wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by virtue of this oneness answerable chanpes or effects through all the brmichcs coexist with the chancres in the root: Consequently an evil disposition exists in the hearts of Adam’s posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted in his own heart, when he ate the forbidden fruit. Which God has no hand in, any o”heruise, than in not exerting such an influence, as tniRht be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was observed in the former chapter.

But now the grand objection is aJi:ainst the reasonableness of such a constitution by which Adam and his posterity should be looked upon as one, and dealt with accordingly, in an affair of -uch infinite consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessa’ily be made sinners by his disobedience, and come into existence with the same depravity of disposition and he looked upon and treated as though they were partakers with Adam in his act of sin. I have not room here to rehearse all Dr. TayV.r’s vehement exclamations against the reasonableness and justice of this. I’he leader may at his leisure consult his book, and see them in the places referred to below.* Whatever black colors and frightful representations are employed on this occasion, all may be summed up in this, That Adam and his posterity are not one, but entirely distinct airents. But with resptct to this mighty outcry made against the rcasonabUriess of any such coristitution by which

arable; and judgcH, that one ought never to be consic’ered without the other. While I have been writing this note, I consulted al! the systems of divinity, which I have by me, that I miht see what wvs the true and genuine opinion of ur chief divine; in this affair; and I found that, thty were of the same mind with me; namclv. That these two kinds of imputation are by no means to be separated, or to be considered abstiactly one from he other, but that one does involve the other.”. .H- there particularly ctes t’:ose two famoifs ‘clormcd divines, Vitriiiga and Lamp us .. Tom iv. Cap i”y, 78,

^6d is siippo«;e(l to treat Adam and his poFtrity a*; c?/ I “Woihd make the following; observations

I. It si{^ujfies noiiung totxclaiin ac:aii)<>t pbiit./afr. Siicli isthe.A’c most evident and at knowledied /ac with respect to the state of all mankind, without exception of one in’livid- lial among all the natural descendants of Adam, as makes it apparent, that God actu.illy deals wiih Adam and nis posterity as our in the affair of his apostasy, and i’^ mfiuit-jly terrible consequences. It has been demonstratod, and shewn to be in effect olainlv acknowledgec’., that every individual of mankind comes into ine world in such circumstances, as that liu-.ie is no hope or possibiliiy of a«iy other than their viulaliUL^ (iod’s holy law (if they ever live to act at all as moral yenls) and beini; thereby justly exposed to eternal ruin.* And it is il.us by God’s orderinij; and disposing: of thinp% And God either thus deals with mankind, because he looks upon them as one “wiin their first father, and so tieals thcn» •y’i sinful auCl guiliy by his apostasy; or (which will not mend the matter) he, without viewing them as at all concerned in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly ifrncccnt, does nevertheless sufjject ihem to this infinitely dr( adful calamity. Adam, by his sin, was exposed to the calamitiefi and norrowft of this life, to iimfloral death and eternal ruin.; as is confessed. And it is also in efi’tct confessed, that.all his posterity come into the worl(| in such a slate, as that the certain consequence is. their being ^j”/205^f/, andy«.s/// so, to the sorrorjs of this life^Ko tcmfioral death and eterncJ nun, unless saved by fracr. So that we sea God in fact deals with them toijelhcr, or as one. If God orders the c )nsequenrcs of Adam’s sin, with rcganl to his posterity’s welfare, even in those thinp;s which are most important, and which do in the hi^hest decree concern their eternal interest, to be the same with the consequences to Adam him» self, then he treats Adam and his posterity as one in that af* lair. Hence, however the matter be attended with difii .uhy, fact oblis:es us to (et over the difTicnlty, either by finclin’^ om -^ome solution, or by shutting our npo iths. and: rlcTio’vlcrlfinr’

Part I. Chap. I, the thicc (irsl Secuous

the weakness and scantiness of our v.ndcrstandings; as we must in inniimeraV)le other casesi where apparent and unde* niMcJacry in Clod’s works of creation and providence, is at* tended with events and circumstances, the manner and rtafiort of which are difficult to our under>.tandini?s. But to proceed,

II. We will consider the r/Z^czi,”/es themselves, insisted on in the objections of our opposers. They may be reduced to these two: First, That such a constitution is injurious to Adam’s posterity. Secovdhj, That it is altopjether imfiroper, as it implies falsehood vie win [^ and treating those as one, •’A’hich indeed are not one, hu entirely distinct.

First Difficulty, That the appointing: Adam to stand, 5n this great affair, as the morl hfad of his po’-.terity, and so treating them as one with him, as standing or failing with him, is injuricus to tlrem, and tends to thtir hurt. To which 1 answer, it is demonstrably otherwise; that such a constitution was so far from being injurious and hurtful to Adam*s posterity, or tending to their calamiiyi any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himstlf personally, that it Vas, in itself considered, very much of a contrary tendency, tnd. was attended with a more eligible probability of a kafifiy issue than the latter would have been t And so is a constitution truly eypressitig the goodness of its author. For, here the following things are to be considered,

1. It is reasonable to suppose, that Adam was as likely on account of his capacity and natural talents, to jiersevere in obedience, as his posterity (taking one with another) iffliey had all been put on the trial singly for themselves. And supposing that there was a constituted union or oneness of him jnd his posterity, and that he stood as a public person, or common head, all by this constitution would have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience, as of the ill consequenf e of hi*, disolirdience, in case of his fall.

2. There was a greater tendency to a happy issue, in such an appointment, than if every one had been appointed to stand for himi-elf; especially on two accounts. (1.) That Adam bad stronger motives to tvatch fulness than his posterity would have had in that not only hie own eternal Xvelfare lay af

Stake, but also that of all his posterity. (2.) Adam was in a state of coniplcte manhood, when his trial began. It was a constiiulion very aKrcealilc to the goodness of God, conbidcrinp: the state of mankind, which was to he propagated in the way of generation, that ltw frtit father should be appointed to stand f(;r all. For by reason of the manner of their coming into existence in a state of infancy and their coming so gradually to mature slate, and so re.naining for a great while in a Slate of childhood and comparative iinpcrfeclion, aficr they were become moral agents, ihcy would be less fit to stand for themselves, than their first father to stand for them.

If any man, notwithstanding these things, shall say, that for his own part, if the affair had been proposed to him, he should have chosvn to have had his eternal interest trusted in his onun hands; it is sufficient to answer, that no man’s vain oipinion of himself, as more Jit to be trusted than otiicrs, alters the true nature and tendency of things, as they demonstrably are in themselves. Nor ib it a just objection, that this consli’ution has in evevt proved for the hurt of mankind. For it dtes not follow that no ac!vanta:.::c was given for whafifjy event, ui such an establishment, because it was not such as to TTiake i>. utterly impossible there should be any other event,

3. The goodness of God in such a constitution with ^Idam appears in this: That if tlicrc had been no sovereign, grwcious establishment at all, but God had piocecded only on the foot of mere ^ttr/ff, and had gone no further than this required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his posterity, that they should perform /ler,”cct, ^icrfietual cbcdicncCf without ever failing in the least instance, on pain o{ eternal deaths and might have made this demand ivitLout the /iromise of any positive rfryrtrrf for their obedience. For perfect obedience is a debty that every one owes to his Creator, and therefore is what his Creator was not obliged to pay him Tor. None is obliged to pay his debtor, only for discharging his just debt. But such was evidently the constitution with Adam, that an eternal happy life was to be the consequence of his persevering fidelity, to all such as were included within that constitution (of which the tree nf ///> wns a sign) as well as eternal death to be the consequence of his disobti*’ •dience.

I come now to consider t*^e

Second Difficulty. It bc’nq: thus maniles: hat this consiitiUJon, by wnicli Avlam and hib -^o.-terity are deal yith as o72(?, is net unreasonable upon accouni .fits beine; injurious vt.rli hurtful to the interest of mankind, the oniv thing remaining in the objection ap;a.nbt such a constitution, is the imfiropriety of it, as implying fanehood and contradicticr to the true nature of thinpjs; as hereby tney are viewed and trea ed cs one, who are net one, but wholly distinct; and no arbitraiy constitution can ever make that to be true, which in itself consiviered is not true.

This objection, however specious, is really founder, on a false hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call sameness or oneness<i amon* created things; and the seenfimg ioi ce of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the degree in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the Supreme Author and Disposer of the Universe.

Some things, being most simply considered are entirely distinct f and very diverse, which yet are so united by the established law of the Crtator,in some respects, and with regard to some purposes and effects, that by virtue of that establishment it is with them as if they were one. Thus a tree, grown -great, and an hundred years old, is one plant with the little rout, that first came out of the ground, from whence it grew, arid has been continued in constant succession, though it is now so exceeding diverse many tijousand times bigger, and of a very different form, and perhaps not one atom the very same; yet Cod, according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession communicated to it many of the same qualities and most important properties,^as if it were cwr. It has been his pleasure to constitute an union in these respects, and for these purposes, naturally leading us to look upon all us one. So the bvdy of man at forty years of age, is our with th’,- ivfunt body which first came into the world. fioni whence it grew; th’^ugli now constituted of different substance, and the pjreater part of the substance probably chunfijed scores (if not hundreds) oflinrics; and though it be now in so many rcspcris exceeding diverse, yet God, according to the course of na’ure, whu li he has been pleased to es’ablish, has caused that in a cerliiiu mclho<l it should communicate with that itifantilc body, in tl»e same life, the same senses, the same features, and many of the same qualities, and in union widi the same soul, and so, with reyard to these purposes, it is dealt with l)y him as oyir body. Attaint the body and soul of a man are onc in a very different manner, and for different purposes. Considered in themselves, they are exceedinf different beinpjs, of a nature as diverse as can be conceived; and yet, by a very peculiar divine constitution or law of nature, which God has been pleacd to establish, they are strongly united, and become onc in most important respects; a wonderful mutual communication is established; so that both become different parts of the sarnc maru But the union and mutual communication they have, has existence, and is entirely rci2;ulated and limited, according to the sovereign pleasure ot God, and the constitution he has been pleased to establish.

And if we come even to the fiersonal identify of created intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist wholly in that which Mr. Locke places il in, i. e. Same comdous” ness; yet I think it cannot be denied, that this is one iliinj essential to it. But it is evident that the communication or continuance of the same consciousness and memory to any, subject, through successive pans of duration, depends wholly on a divine establishment. There would be no necessity that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but by an arbitrary consii’ulion of t!ic Creator. If any should here insist that there is no need of having recourse to any such const Itutioji in order to account for the co(.;inuance of the same consclousncua, and shovild say, that the very nature of the soul is such as will s’lfficicntly account fur it; and that the seul will reiaiii the icL-.^s and consciousness it once had, according to the coumr c.f vaiirc: then let it be icjneraberedj who il is gives the soul ihis naltae; aad Ic? that be remembered, which Dr. Taylor says of the course of n ture, before observed; denyinir, that the cour<»e of nature is a proper active causep which will work and o on by itself without God, if he lets and penniis it;” siiyin.c that the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no c:.use, or nothing ;** and affiiming that “it is absolutely impossible the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than pmduce its.tif;“* an<J that” Gof’, the Oriyinal of all Being, is the OiUy Cause of alj natural effects.“t Here is worthy also to be observed, what: Dr. TurnbuU says of the laws of nature in words which h cites from Sir Isaac Newton |” It is the will of the mind that is the frst cause, that gives subsistence and efficacy to all those laius who is the efficient cause that produces the phenomena which appear in analoey, harmony and agreement, according to these laws.** And he says, “The same principles must take place in things pertaining to moral, as well as natural philosophy.”§

From these thihgs it will clearly follow, that identity of consciousness depends wholly on a law of nature, and so, on the sovereign will and agency of God; and therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine constitution; and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be ‘he only thing which constitutes oneness of person, but should, besides that, suppose sameness of substance requisite. For, if same consciousness be one thing necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God’s sovereign constitution, it will still follow that personal identity depends on God’s sovereign coiistl-, tvtim.

And with respect to the identity of created substance itself, in the different moments of its duration, I think, we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like thai absolute, independent identity of the liusx Being, whereby he 15 the naine, yesterday, today, and forever. Nay, on the contrary;

Page 134,S. + Page io,S. * Mor. Phil. p. 7, Ibid,, p. 9.

-it may be demonstrated that even this oneness of created substance, cxi«tinjj at diirercnl times, is u incnly dc/ieudryit identity, dependent on the pleasure and soverci:!;n constilution of llnlslorjorktth all in all. Tl.is will follow from what i» generally allowed, and is crtainly true, ihat Cod not only created all thints, and gave them beinir at first, but cominunlly preserves ihcm, and upholds ihein in brinr. This being a mutter of considerable importance, it may be worthy here to be considered with a little attention. Let us inquire therefore, in the fi”st place, whether it bo not evident that God does continually, by his immediate power, ufihold every created substance in being; and then let us sec the co.Tjrfjucncc.

That God does, by his immediate power, v/i/ichl cvcTy created substance in bcinu;, will be manifest, if we consider that tb.eir present existence is a dcficndcjit existence, and therefore is an rfycct and must have some cause; and the cause must be one of these two; either the antecedent existence of thp same substance, or the fioiver of the Creator. But it cannot be the antecedent exiatence of the same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of the mooji at this present moment, cannot, bo the eycct of its existence at the last foregoing moment. For not only was what existed the last moment, no active cause, but wholly a passive thinpj; but this also is to be considered, that no cause can produce elTects in a time and t-lace in wlsicli itself is noL -It is plain, nothintj can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not exiiing. But the nioon*s pas existence wl’>s neither xokere nor ivhcn its prc•ent existence is. In point of liir.e, what is /.-ar, entirely ceases, when firescnt existence begins; otherwise it would notbe/:as/. The past moment is ceased and gone, when the present moment takes place; and does no more coexiit with it, than does any other moment that had ceased twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence of the particles of this movbiff body produce effects in any other filace than where it then was. But its existence at the present moment, in everv noint of it, is in a different fda-e fronr! “.i.^-e I’s -xistence was at the last preceding; moment. From these things - Isiippose it “will certainly follow that the present existence, either of this, or any other created substance, cannot be an effect of its past existence. The existences (so to speak) of an effect, or thing dependent, in different parts of space or duration, thrugh ever so 7ieao’ one to another, do not at all cO’ exist one with the other; and therefore are as truly different effects, as if those parts of space and duration were ever so far asunder; and the prior existence can no more be the proper cause of the new existence, in the next moment, or next part of space, than if it had been in an age before, or at a thousand miles distance, without any existence to fill up. the intermediate time or space. Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be the effect of the immediate agency, will, and power of God.

If any shall say, this reasoning is not good, and shall Insist upon it, that there is no need of any immediate divine power to produce the present existence of created substances, but that their present existence is the effect or consequence of past existence, according to the nature of things; that the established course of nature is sufficient to continue existence where existence is once given; I allow it: But then it should be remembered, nvkat nature is in created things j and nvhat the established course of nature is; that, as has been observed already, it is nothing, separate from the agency of God; and that, as Dr. Taylor says, God, the Original of all beinc;? is ^^ic rcwse of all natural effects. A father, according to the course of nature, begets a child; an oak, according to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or a bud; 30, according to the course of nature, the former existence of the trunk of the tree is followed by its new or present existence. In the one case and the other, the new effect is consequent on the former, only by the established laws and settled coune of nature, which is allowed to be nothing but the continued immediate efficiency of God, according to a constitution,; that he has been pleased to establish. Therefore, according to what our cuthor urges, as the child and the acorn, which crroe into cxiftcrxc according to the cqutsc ffnaiurc-i i« cos- ‘sequence oftnc prior existence and slate of the parent and the oak, are truly, immediately created or made by God; ao itiust the existence of each created perswn and thing, at each moment of it, be from the immediate cmtinucd creation oi Cod. It will ceriuinly follow from these things, that GodS Jirenerving created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation, or to his creating those thinis out of no. thing at each moment of their existence. If the continued existence of created things be wholly dependent on God’s preservation, then those things would drop into nothing, upon the ceasing of the present moment, without a new exertion of the divine power to cause them to exist in the following moment. If there be any who own, that God preserves things in being, and yet hold that they would continue in being without any further help from him, after they once have existence; 1 think, it is hitrd to know what liiey mean. To what purpose can it bep to talk of ^o*^ fireacrving things in being, when there is no need of his preserving them? Or to talk of iheir being deliendcnt on God for continued existence, when they would of themselves continue to exist without his help; nay, though he should wholly ^YillKlraw his sustaining power and influence?

It will follow from what has been observed, that God*o upholding created substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an immedrcte production out of7iothing, at each moment. Because its existence at this moment is not merely in part from God but wholly from him, and not in any part or degree from its entecedcnt exiatcnce. For the supposing that its antecedent existence concurs with God in cjjiciency, to protluce some fiar: of the effect, is attended with ail the very same absurdities, which have been shewn to attend the supposition of its producing it nvholly. Therefore the antecedent existence is nothing, as to any proper infincnce or assistance in the afTair; and consequently God produces the effect as much from woihlng as if there had been nothing before. So that this cflcct differs not at all from the first creation, but only circuntetan tinlly; as mfrst creation there hn:l bern no such act and cf

.’5T2 OKIGlNA”L SIKfeet of God) power brforc; whereas, his giving; cxisteiK^b, afterwards, yi//o-Tr.5 preceding acts and cfTccls ot the sairc kind, in an cslablishcd order.

Now, in the next place, let ii”. see how the con.iecjjxcncc of these th!np:s is to my present purpose. If the existence 6i created nubstmice in each successive moment, be Viholly the effect of God’s immediate power, in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of ^.-dVi/;/^ then what exists at this moment, by this powtr, is a ncrj c//ref, and simply and absolulcly considered, rot the same with any past existence, though it be like it, nnd fellows it according to a certain established method.*

When I suppose that nn effcdt wh cH l* produced every moment, by a new action or excriion of power, must be a neio effect in each moment, and not absolutely and numerically the 5ame with ibat which existed in preceding moments, the ir.ing that I intend, may be illustrated by this example. The lucid color or brightness of the moon, as we look stcdlastly upon it, seems to be ^prrmancnt thing, as though it were perfectly the same brightness continued. But indfcd it is an effect produced every moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in each successive point of time; and so becomes altogether a new effect at each instant; and no one thing that belongs to it, is numerically the same that existed in the preceding moment. The ty% of the sin, impressed on that body, and reflected from it, which cause the effect, are none of them the same: The impression, made in each moment on our sensory, is by the.’.troke of rerc rays; and the sensation, excited by the stroke, is a new effect, nn effect of a nero impulse. Therefore the brightness or lucid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing with that which existed ia the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now, is individually the .^^me with the sound of the wind tr.at blew just belore, which, though it be like it, is not the same, any more than the agitated air that makes the sound, is the same; or than the water, flowing in a liver, that now passes by, is indivdually the fame with that which passed a little before. And if it be thus with the brightness or color of the moon, so it must be with its sclidify and every thing else belonging to its substance, if all be, each moment, as much the immediate effect of a vcic exertion or application of power.

The matter may pcihaps be in some respects stili more clearly illustrated by this. The i?«jjff o( things in z glass, as we keep xjur eye upon them, «vcm to remain precis, ly the same, with a continaing, pcrfec. identity. But it IS V.nown to be othcrwtse. Philosophers well know that these images are cOnvtan’ly renczccJ, by the -mpression and reflection of vfic rays of light; so tiiiit the ima-^c impress’.d by the former rays is conslanliy vanishing, and

O’itlGINAL 3I!C. 353

And ihcrc is no iiicntily or oneness in t!ic case, hut wliai depciids on ihc arditranj conslitmion of tlic Creator; who by his wise sovcrei!>n est;il)rr,him.’ht bo unites these succesbivo new cn’ects, that he treats tlwm an ojic, by communicaiinf lo Ihcm like propciiies, rclalions, an.l circumstances; and so, leads u.<t to reinrd and ircat them as o;/r. When 1 call this un arbitrary constiiutiou, mean, it is a constitution which depends on nothin;^ but the dlcinc win; which div;ne uiil depends on nol’nini; hut the divine rviAdom. In this sense, the •ivhole course of nature, wiih ail that belongs lo it, all its lawn and methods, and constancy and regulaiiiy, continuance and proceedini;, is ai arbitrary coji.^titiition. In this bunsc, the coniiniiance of the very being of the world and ail its parts, a well as the manner of continued bciii, depends entirely on an arbitrary constitution: For it docs not at all neceaftarily {u. low, lliat because thcr’j was sound, or lieht, or color, or resistance, or gravity, or thought, or consciousness, or any other dependent thing- the kist moment, that ihcicforc there sliaU be the like at the next. All dependent existence wnatsocvcr

ino image impressed by neuy rays every momci-!t, both on thi la$4 ant on the eye. The 1111356 constantly renewed, by new sui tessivc rays, is m more numcrcally he same, than if it were by some artist put en anew with a pencil, and the colois constar.tly vanishintj ns fast as put on. And the new imies being put on immediately or instantly, do not make them the same, any more than if it were done with the intermission ri4 an hour or a c/rfv. The im- .ige that exists this moment, is not at all Merited from the image which existed the last preceding moment; as may be ?een, because, it” the succession of new rays be inlerccptcd. by som.ething interposed between the objet and the glass, the image immediately ce3ses; .lc past existence of the ima;;^ has no influence No Jiphold it, so much as for one moment. Which shews, that the image is altogether iricw made every moment; and strictly spe?king, is if. no part numerically the snme with that which existed the moment preceding And truly so the matter must be with the bodies themselves, as well a* their images t They also cannot be the same, with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment, if ihc case be ns has been proved, that iheir frcjcnl existence is not, strictly speaking, at all th- ctlcct of their past existence; but is wholly, every instant, the effect of a new agency, orcxmion of the power, of the cause of their existence. II »o, the existence caused is every ins-ant n new effect, wheth-r thr c^Mse be Ifht. or immediate <iiiin’ tc-xcT, or whatever is in a constant flux, ever passing and relurnine;; renewed «very moment, as the colors of bodies are every moment re- rewed by the light that bhines upon liiem; and all is constantly proceeding from Gody as light from the sun. In hhz ive livf and Tnove, and have our being.

Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on God*8 fpovereign constitution. And so it appears, that the objection we are upon, made against a supposed divine constitution, whereby Adam and his posterity are viewed and treated as 072^, in the manner and for the purposes supposed, as if it were not consistent ii-iih truths because no conbiitution can make those to be 07ie<i which are rcot one :. I say, it appears that this objection is built on a false hypothesis; For it appears, that a divine ccnsututicn h the tiling which makes truth, in affairs of this nature. The objection supposes, there is a oneness in i-reated beings, whence qualities and relations are derived -down from past existence, distinct’fvomy and/??7orto any oneness that can be supposed to be founded on divine constitution. Which is demonstrably false, and sufficiently appears so from things conceded l)y the adversaries themselves: And therefore the objection wholly falls to the groundo

There are various kinds of identity and oneness, found among created things, by which they become one m different mannersy res/ircts and degrees and to various purposes; several of which differences have been observed; and every kind is ordered, regulated and iimi:ed, in every respect, by divine constitution. Some things, existing in different times and places, are treated by their Creator as one in 077c respect ancj others in flTzor/ir; some are united for this co7n7y:unication, and others for that; but all according to the sovcrcigji pleasure of the founiain of all bi:ing and operation.

It appears, particularly, from what has been sc?id, th.at all oneness, by virtue whcvto[ pollution and guilt hom past wickedness are derived, deper.ds eniii tly on a divine ef’:tobIi.’;hme7lt, It is this, and this only, that must account for guilt and an evil t:ih.l on any individual tcul, in consequence of a ciime com-ORIGINAL STN. S«!^

•milted twenty cr forty years ap;(), rcmaininp; still, and etc:i to the end of the world and forever. It is lhi», that must account for the continuance of any such thinji:, any where, as conscioufiTif’s.t of acts that arc past; and for the coniinuancc of all /lalntsj either good or bad: And on this depends every thine; that can belong lo fursoJiat idrntiiij. And all communications, derivations, or continuation of qualities, piopcriies or relations, natural or moral, from what h /las’t us if the subject were otic, depends on no other foimdation.

And I am persuaded, no solid reason can be given, why God, who constitutes all other created union or oneness, according to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communications, and effects, he pleases, may not esiablis!) a constilutioa ‘.vhereby the natural posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the buds and branches from the stock or root of a “”tree, should be treated as o-r’ with him, for the derivation, either of righteousness, and communion in rewards, or of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt.*

I appeal to such as are not wont to content ihemsclves with judging by superficial appearance and view of things, but are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, that they may judge righteous judgment, Whether on supposition that all mankind bad coexisted, in the manner mentioned before, any good reason can be given, why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established such an union between Adam ?nd the rest of roan kind, as was in that case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the case, that Adam’s posterity had actually, according to a law ofnatnrc, some howroa’* out of him, and yet remained contiguous and literally united ‘.o hvn, as the branches to a tree, or the mcmbeis of the body to the head; and had all, before the fell, existed together at the sane time, though in dijfeycrt places, ns thehead’and members are in different places: In this case, who can determine, that the author of nature might not, if it had pleased him, have establi.vhcd such an union between the root and branches of this complex bring, as that all should constitute one moral whole; so that by the law of union, there should be a ftpmraunion in each moral alteration, and that the heart of every (ranch should at the same moment participate with the heart of the r.v/, be conformed to it, Rud concurring with it in all its aifections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as i purt oi the same thing? Why might not God, it lie had pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, an union of the various parti ot iuch a moral whcfe, as well as many’othcr unions, which he lias actually fixed, ^ircording.tc hi< overeign plcai’.iic? And if be rv.icht, by his loverein con-As I said before, all oneness in created things, whence c]lialiues and relations are derived, depends on a divine consiituiion that is arbitrary in every other respect, excepting that it is regulated by divine wisdom. The wisdom, which is exercised in these constituiions, appears in these two things. Firsts In a beautiful analogy and harjyiony with other laws or constitutions, especially relating to the same subject; and accondly in the good ends obtained, or useful consequences of such a constitution. If therefore there be any objection still lying against this constitution with Adarp and his posterity, it must be, that it is not sufiicienily toise in these respects. But what extreme arrogance would it J3e in us, to take upon us to act as judges .of the beauty and wisdom of the laws and established constitutions of the supreme Lord ind Creator of the universe? And not only so, but if this constitution, in particular, be well considered, ii wisdom in the two fcrementioned respects, may easily be made evident. There is an apparent manifold a?;alogy to other constitutions and laws, established and maintained through the whole system of vital nature in this lower world; all parts of which, in all successions, are derived from ther oft fie kind as from their root, or fountain; each deriving from thence all properties and qualities, that are proper to the nature and capacity of the kind, or species No derivative having any one perfection (unless it be what h merely circumstantial) but what was in its firindcive. And that Adam’s posterity should be without that original righteous7iessy v. hich Adam had lost, is also anolagous to other laws and establishments, relating to the nalurc of mankind; according to which, Adam’s posterity have no one perfection of nature, in any kind, superior to what was

ititution, have established such an union of the various branches of mankind, when existing in different /i/deci, I do not see why he might not also do ihc same, though ihcy exist in different tinie.. I know not why succession, or diveriity of /JWf, should make any such constituted union more unreasonabl9, than diversity oi place. The only reason, why diversity of lime can seem to make it unreasonable, is, that difference of time shews, there is no absolute identity of the things existing in those different limes: But it shews this, I think, not at all more than the difference of lhe place of existence.

ii him, when the human race began to be propsa’cd from him.

And as such a constiunion was fiC aim -a-rsr m (;’.i;ri respe-cts, so it was in this that follows. Sccing the divine constitution concerning the manner of mankind’s coming into existence in their propagation, was such as did i:o naturally unite them, and made them in so many respects owr, naturally leading them to a close union in society, and manifold intercourse, and mutual dependence. Things were widely so established, that all should naturally be in one and the same moral state; and not in such exceeding different state<, as that some should be perfectly innocent and holy, but others corru/u and wicked; some needing a Saviour, but others ncedini none; some in a confirmed state of perfect /m/i/iineas but others in a state of public condemnation to perfect and eternal 7WiVri,; some justly expoied to great calamities in this world, but others by their innocence raised above all suffering. Such a vast diversity of state would by no means have agreed with the natural and necessary constitution and unavoidable situation and circumstances of the world of mankind; all made of one bioodj to dwell o?i all the face of the earth, to be united and blended in society, and lo partake together in the natural and common goods and evils of this lower woilcj.

JDr. Taylor urges,* that sorrow and &hafne arc only (or /lersonal sin: And it has cficn been urged, that re/ientance can be for no other sin. To w hich I would say, that the use of ■:vords is very arbitrary: But that men’s heart a should be dceplv affected wuh giief and humiliation before Cod, for the pollution and guilt which they bring into the world with them I think, is not in the least unreationable. Nor is it a thing strange and unheard of, that men should becAAcwr of ihings done by others, whom they are nearly concerned in. I am sure, it is not unscri/itural; especially when they are justly looked upon in the sight of God, who sees the dispoiition cf heir hearts, as fuliy cvnctnti?ig and concurring.

* Page 14
2 T

From what has been observed it may appear, there is nosure ground to conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thln’^, for the race of mankind truly to partake of the of the first apostasy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become their sin; by virtue of a real unio7i between the root and branches of the world of mankind (truly and properly availing to such a consequence) established by the Author of the whole system of the universe; to whose establishments are owing all propriety and reality Q^Umiou, in any part of that system; and by virtue of the full coment of the hearts of Adani’a posterity to that first apostasy. And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because Gnd imiiute.^ it to them; but it is truly and profierly theirs,, and on that o-rozn, God imputes it to them.

By reason of the established union between Adam and his posterity, the case is far otherwise between him and them, than it is between distinct parts or individuals of Adam*s race; betwixt whom is no such constituted union; as between children and other ancestors. Concerning -whom is apparently to be understood that place, Ezek. xviii. 1....20.* Where God reproves the Jews for the use they made of that pFoverb, Ths fathers have eaten sour gra/iesy and the children’’ s teeth are set on edge; and tells them, that hereafter they shall no mor-? have occasion to use this proverb; and that if a son sees th<3 ^vi■ckedness of his father and sincerely disa/i/iroves it and avoids it, and he himself is righteous, he shall not die for th iniquity of his father; that all souh brAh the soul oft he father and the son, are lus; and that therefore the son shall Jict bear the iniquity ofhisfather, nor the father bear the iniquity of the son but the soul that sinneth, it shall die; that the righteousness of the righteous shall be ufion him, and the noickedncss of the ‘:vicked shall be uftcn him. The thing denied, is communion in the guilt and pur/ishment of the sins of others, that are distinct parts of Adam’s lace; and cx’pressly, in that case, wher« there 13 no consent and concurrence but a sincere disapprobation of the wickedness of ancestors. It is declared, that child

WhkH Dr. T.iylor alleges, p. i 9, 1 1, 5.

re?i who are adu/: rnd come to act for themselves, who arc ‘n/tfcouf!, and do not approve of, but sincerely condemn iht. ‘wickedness oflhcir yw/ir;-.?, shall not be punished for //ir/r disapproved and avoided Iniquities. The occaaion of what is here said, as well as the cfr.-iiffn and plain <rn«r, shews, that noihint is here intended in the least degree inconjiintcyic with what has been supposed concernini Adam’s posterity’s sinning and fallinc in his afiontasy. The occasion is, the people’s murmurinij: at (iod’s methods under the Mosaic dispensation; ai,’recablc to that in Levil. xxvi. 39, “And they that arc left of you, shall pine away in their iniquity in their enemies lands; and also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them:” And other parallel pLices, vespcctii:^ external judsments, whidi were the punishments most plainly threatened, and chiefly insisted on, under that dispensation, (which was, as it were, an external and carrw.l covenant) ane’ particularly the people’^ suffering such terrible judgments at that day, even in Ezekiel’s time, for the sins of Manassch according to what God says by Jeremiah (Jer. y.v. 4.) and agreeable to what is said in that confession, Lam. v. 7. ‘• Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their iniquities.”

In what is said here, there is a special respect to the ii;- troducing of the gospel dispensation; as is greatly confirmed by comparing this place with Jer. xxxi. 29, 50, 31. Under which dispensation, the righteousness cf God’s dealings with mankind would be more fully manifested, in the clear revelation then to be made of the method ot the Judrnerj of God, by which the JiTial utatc of wicked men is determined; which is not according to the behavior of their ])articu1ar ancestors; but every one is dealt with according to the sin of /«* o«7i wicked heart, or siwful natuie and practice. The affair o derivation of the natural corruption of mankind in general, and of their consent re, and participation of, xbc firimitive and com- ■i.’ion apostasy, is not in the least intermtdclled with, or touched, by any thing meant or almrd at in Vac. true scope and design tjf this nlrice in Erekicl.

On the whole, if any do not like lhs fihilosofihi/y or the metcifi/njsics (as some perhaps may choosebo call il) made use of in the foregoing; reasonings; yet I cann6t4lpubt, but that a proper consideration of what is apparent and undeniable in fact with respect to the defiendence of the state and course of thinti;s in this universe on the sovereign constiiutlons of the suprerae Author and Lord of all, who gives none account of any of his matters and nvhose ways are past finding out will be sufficient, with persons of common modesty and sobriety, to stop their mouths from making peremptory decisions a>;ainst the justice of God, respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in his holy word-, concerning the derivation of a depravity and guilt from Adam to his posterity; a thing so abundantly confirmed by what is found in the f a-// en e wee of all mankind in all ages.

This is enough, one would think, forever to silence such bold expressions as these...” If this be just.,. .U the scri/uures teach such doctrine. Sec, then the scriptures are of no use.... understanding is no understanding. ...and, JVhat a God must //c be, that can thus curse innocent creature;^ l....Is ^A/* thy Goz>, O Christian.’” Se. See.

It may not be improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this chapter, in which we have had occasion to say so much about the imfiutq.tion of Adam’s sin) concerning the opinions of two divitesy of no inconsiderable note among the dissf;nters in England, relating to -a /lartialim/iutC’ tion of Adam’s first sin.

One of ihem supposes that this sin, though truly imputed to INFANT’S, so that thereby they are exposed to a proper /2wnishmr?itj yet is not imputed to them in such a degree as that upon this account they should!)e liable to eerwrn’ punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to tcmfwral death, or annihila’ tion; Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely more guilty by it, than his posterity. On which I would observe, that to suppose, God imputes not all the guilt of Adam’s sin, but only some little part of it, relieves nothing but one’s imagination. To think of poor little infants bearing; i;ueh torments for Adam’s sin, as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments cmllng in death and annihilation, may sit easier on the ima,;inalioiJ, than to conceive ol tiuir sufTering eternal misery lor it. Bui it does not at all relieve one’s reason. There is no rule of reason that can be supposed to lie ap:ainst impu’inpj a sin in the whoLy of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not personally commit it, hnt what will also lie atainsi its beinr; so imputed and punished in part. For all the reasons (if there arc any) lie apainst the ititfiutclion; not the ijuanlitij or degree of rjhat 10 imputed. If there be any rule of reason, that is sirong and good, lyint against a proper derivation or communication of guilt, from one that acted, to another thai did not act; then it lies ai,^ainst all that is of this nature. The force of the reasons brought against imputing Adam’s sin to his posterity (if chere be any force in them) lies in this, That Adam and his posterity are not one. But this lies as properly against charginp a part of the guilt, as the whole. For Adam*s posterity, by not being the same with him, had no more hand in a little of what was done, than in the whole. They were as absolutely free from being concerned in that act partly as they were li’/ioHij. And there is no reason to be brought, why one man’s sin cannot be justly reckoned to another’s accouat, who was not then in being, in the iv/ioie of it; but what will as properly lie against its being reckoned to him in any /iar/, so as that he should be subject to any condemnation or punishment on that account. If those reasons are good, all the difference there can be, is this; that to bring a great punishment on infants for Adam’s sin, is a great act of injustice, and to bring a comparatively small puni:,hmcnt, is a smaller act of injustice, but not, that this is not en truly ar.d de!7ionstrabl<i an act of injustice, as the oJier.

To illustrate this by an instance something parallel. It is used as an argument why I may not exact from one of my lieighbors, what was due to me from another that he and my debtor are 7:0/ the same; and that their concerns, interest? and properties are entirely distinct. Now if this argumcn: be good, it lies as truly ag.ninst my demanding from him a yarr of the deb’, as th? •!;oV. Indeed it Is a rrrc/rr act of injustice for me to take from him the rjhole of it, than a pai’t» but not mere truly and certainly an act of injustice.

The other divine thinks there is truly an imputation of Adam’s sin, so that vifants cannot be looked upon as innocent creatures; yet seems to think it not agreeable to the perfections of God, to make the state of mfantb in another world H’Jorjc than a slate of nonexistence. But this to me appears plainly A giving tip. that grand point of the vnymt.ation of Ad- 4im*K ^inv 1x)lh in w hole and in part. For it supposes it to lye luot’riijhti for God to bring any e-cil on a child of Adam, ‘wblcH-Vs-’ifinocent as to personal sin, without ftaijingfor it, or balafrvcinc It with good; eo that still the state of the child sbaitbt” 4s ^^oof/, as couid-be demanded in ^’z/5;/c<?, in case of >:[ncT(i innocence. ^Vhich plainly supposes that the child is iupt exposed 10 any proper /.zrz/f/;7;?r/zr at al!, or is not at all in tlUi: to divir.r jusiice, on the account of Adam’s sin. For if the child were iru’y up debt, then surely justice might take some: hing from Mm tiithout fmyingfor it or Vi’iihoxxi giving that which makes its state d good, as mere inTiocence could in justice require. If ]le owca the suffering of some fiunishwent then there is wo need that justice should requite the infant ibr sufPoring that punijhment; ov make ufifor it, by confer-I’m?; some gocd, that tshaU countervail it, and in effect remove and disannul it; so that, on the whole, good and evil shall be at an even balance, yea, so that the scale o good -shall preponderate. If it is unjust in a judge to orler any quantity of inoney to Iwi taken f ora another without raying him again, nd fully making it u<[-) io hini, it must be because he had justly ibrfeited none at all.

It seems to me pretty manifest that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own a real imputation of the iuilt of Adam’s first sin to his posterity, without owning that they ‘dve justly viewed and treated as aimiers, truly guilty and children of ivratk on that account; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole of the evil of that transgres- ^?ion; at least all that pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the covenant which

Cod Iwd established; even as much as if cacli one of mankind had ihc like covenant established wiih him sinyly, ana had by the like direct and full act cf r» hr!!’ i!>. •.■’.! ‘f-.J jr ir himself.