Observations Relating to Things Contained in the Three First Chapters of Genesis, with Reference to the Doctrine of Original Sin

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our Jirst Parents were created Righteousness or moral recti-’ tude of Heart?

THE doctrine of Original Righteousness or the crea” tion of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connexion, in several respects, with the doctrine of Original Sin. Dr Taylor was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against Original sin. And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the first place remove this authoi’s main objection against this doctrine, and then shew how the doctrine may be inferred from the account which Moses gives us, in the three Jirst chapters oJ” Genesis.

Dr. Taylor’s grand objection ftpainst this doctrine, ^vhicU Bfe abundantly insists on, is this: That it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with any person; because, if so, it must be by an act of Cod’s absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its very nature implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holiness: That a necessary holiness is no holiness. So p. 180, where he observes, “That Adam must exist, he must be created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous.*’ See also p. 250, *25l. In p. 161. o- he says, “To say, that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness.” And in like manner Dr. Turnbull in many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue that it’ be owing to our own choice, and diligent cuUare.

‘’ “VVith respect to this, I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of mankind; and also inconsistent with Dr. Taylor’s own notions of virtue. Therefore if it be truly so, that to affirm that to be virtue or holiness, which is not the fruit of preceding thought, reflection and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I shall shew plainly, that for him to afiirm otherwise, is a contradiction to himself.

In the first place, I think it a coni.radlction to the nature of things, as judged of by the common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of the minds of men in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or eflect of a good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself, from whence that effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that acUons derive their goodness from the principl<5**^ iFhencc they proceed; and so that the act of choosing that whidi is food, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes, that a virtuous disposition pf mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that therefore it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice? There can, according lo our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds frqm no virtuous principle, but from mere selflove, ambition, or some animal appeiite; and therefore a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruity and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it. The following things in Mr. Hutcheson*s inquiry con* cerning moral good and evil, are evidently agreeable to th nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason,. Section II. p. 132, 133.” Every action which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to fiow from some affections towards sensitiye natures. And whatever we call virtue or vice, is either soie such affection, or some action cor.sequent ujion it. All the actions counted religious in any country, are supposed by those who count them so, to Jlow from some afiections towards the Deity; and whatever we call social virtue, we stjU suppose to Jlow from affections towards our fellow creatures. Prudence, if it is only employed in promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a virtUjB.** In these things Pr. Turnbull expressly agrees with Mr. Hutcheson, who is his admired author.* If a virtuous disposition or affection is before acts that proceed from it, then they are before those virtuous acts of choice which proceed from it. And therefore there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice: And so no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition’s being natural, or from kind of instinct, implanted in the mind in its creation. Ar

Moral rkilosophy p, n2 115, p. 142, et alibi passivy.

greeaMe to -Nvhat Mr. Hutcheson says, (Jb’id, Section III. p. 196, 197.)” I know not, says he, for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct or passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, virtue arises from reason. What is reason, but the sagacity we Jiave in prosccutinij any end? The ultimate end proposed |)y common moralists, is the happiness of the aent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct, ^ow may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of viiiue, as the instinct towards private happiness? If it be said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from sclflove.*’

And if we consider what Dr. Taylor declares as his own notion of the essence of virtue, we shall find, what he so confidently and often affirms, of its being essential to all virtue., that it should follow choice, and proceed from it, is no less repugnant to that, than it is to the nature of things, and the general notions of mankind. For it is his notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson’s, that the essence of virtue lies in good affection,, and particularly in benevolence or love; as he very fully declares in these words in his Key,* ^’ That the word that signifies goodness and mercy should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, ii we consider that love is the fulfilling of the law. Goodness, according to the sense of scripture, and the nature of things, includes all moral rectitude which, I reckon, may every part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into this single firincifileJ* If it be so indeed, then certainly no act whatsoever can have moral rectitude, but what proceeds from this firiiicifile. And consequently no act of volition or choice can b.ave any moral rectitude, that takes place before this principle exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. This brings his

Marginal Note annexed to.§ 358.

U2 aRIGINAL SIK

scheme to an evident contradiction. For no act of choice can be viriuous but what proceeds from a principle of benevolence or ijve; for he insists that all genuine, moral rectitude, in every part of it, is resolved into this single principle; and yet the principle of benevolence itself cannot be virtuous, unless it proceeds from choice* for he aflpirms, that nothing can have the nature of virtue but what comes from choice. So that virtuous love, as the principle of ail virtue, must go before virtuous choice, and be the principle or spring of it; and yet virtuous choice must go before viriuous benevolence, and be the spring of that. If a virtuous act of choice goes before a principle of benevolence, and produces it, then this virtuous act is something distinct from that principle which follows it, and is its effect. So that here is at least one part of virtue, yea, the spring and source of all virtue, viz. a virtuous choice, that cannot be resolved into that single principle of love.

Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. Taylor, p. 128, says, “The cause of every eifect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth; or which proccedeth from it -y And so he argues, thai if the effect be bad, the cause alone is sinful. According to which reasoning, when the effect is good, the cause alone is righteous or virtuous; To the caase is to be ascribed all the praise of the good eifect it produceth. And by the same reasoning it will follow, that if, as Dr. Taylor says, Adam must choose to be righteous, before “he was righteous, and if it be essential to the nature of righteousness or moral rectitude, that it be the effect of choicej and hence a principle of benevolence cannot have moral rectitude, unless it proceeds from choice; then not to the principle of benevolence, which is the effect, but to the foregoing choice alone is to be ascribed all the virtue or righteousness that is in the case. And so, instead of all moral rectitude in every part of it, being resolved mto that single principle of benevolence, no moral rectitude, in any part of it, is to be resolved into that principle; but all is to be resolved into the foregoing choice, which is the cause.

But yet it follows from these inconsistent principles, that :hcre is no moral rectitude or virtue in that first act of choice, tKat la the cause oF all consequent virtue. This follows two “Ways: 1. Because every part of virtue lies in the benevolent principle, which is th» effect, and therefore no part of it can lie in the cause. 2. The choice of virtue, as to the first act at least, can have no virtue or righteousness at all, because it does not proceed from any forecoing choice. For Dr. Taylor insists that a man must first have reflection and choice, Ixjfore he can have righteousness, and that it is essential to holines*; that it proceed from choice. So that the first choice of holiness, uhich holiness proceeds from, can have no virtue at all, because by the supposition it does not proceed from choice, being the first choice. Hence if it be essential to holiness, that it proceeds from choice, it must proceed from an unholy choice; unless the first holy choice can be before itself, or there be a virtuous act of choice before that which is first of all.

And with respect to Adam, let us consider how, upon Dr. Taylor’s principles, it was not possible he ever should have any such thing as righteousness, by any means at all. In the state wherein God created him, he could have no such thing as love to God, or any love or benevolence in his heart. For if so, there would have been original righteousness; there would have been geiuine moral rectitude: Nothing would have been wanting; for our author says, True genuine, morat rectitude, in every part of it, is to be resolved into this singl’j firinciple. But if he were wholly without any such thing as love to God, or any virtuous love, how should he come by virtue? The answer doubtless will be, by act of choice: He must first choose to be virtuous. But what if he did choose to be virtuous? It could not be from love to God, or any virtuous principle, that he chose it; for, by the supposition, he has no such principle in his heart: And if he chooses it without such a principle, still, according to this author, there is no virtue in his choice; for all virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that single pr nciple of love. Or will he say, there may be produced in the heart a virtuous benevolence by an act or acts of choice, that are not virtuous? But this does not consist with what he implicitly asserts, that to the isn ORIGINAL SI!*.

cause alone is to be ascribed vrhat is in the effect. So ihfii there is no way that can possibly be devised, in consistence with Dr. Taylor’s scheme, in which Arfam ever could have any righteousness, or could ever either obtain any principle of virtue, or perform any one virtuous act.

These confused, inconsistent assertion, concerning virtue and iporal reciitude, arise from the absurd notions in vogue, concerning Freedom of Will, as if it consisted in the will’s self-deter?7:im7igpo-wei su])]iosed to be necessary to moral agency, virtue and vice. The absurdities of which, with the grounds of these errors, and what the truth is respecting these matters, with the evidences of it, I have, according to my ability, fully and largely considered, in my Inquiry on that subject; to which I must refer the reader, who desires further satisfactidn, and is willing to give himself the trouble of reading that discourse.

Having considered this great argument, and pretended demonstration of Dr. Taylor’s against original righteousness? 1 proceed to the firoofs of the doctrine. And in the first place, I v;ould consider, whether there be not evidence of it in the three first chapters of Genesis: Or, whether the history there delivered, does not lead us to suppose, that our Jirst fiarents were created in a state of moral rectitude and ho* liness.

I. This history leads us to suppose, Adam’s sin, with relation to the forbidden fruit, was the first sin he committed. Which could not have been, had he not always; till then, been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment of his existence, and consequently, created, or brought into existence righteous. In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly mnotenty as to be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there can no more be any medium between sin and righteousness, or between a being right and being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium between straight and crooked, in a natural sense. Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral agent, and therefore he was immediately under a rule of right actaon: He was ©bfiged as soon as he existed to acc right. And if he was obliged to act liiht as soon as he existed, he was Gbliged even then to be incliritd to act riht. Dr. Taylor says, p. 166, 6 ‘^ Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination;”* And just for the same reason he could not do right <t without an inclination to light action. And as he was obliged to act riht frcra the first moment of his existence, and did do so till he sinned in the affair of the forbidden fruit, he must have aa inclination or disposition of heart to do right the first moinent of his existence; and that is the same as to be created or brought into existence, with an inclination to right action, or, which is the same thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of keart.

Here it will be in vain to say, it is true that it was Adam’s duty to have a good disposition or inclination, as soon as ii was possible to be obtained, in the nature of things, but as it could not be without time to establish such an habit, which rsquires antecedent thought, refieclion, and repeated right afetion; therefore all that Adam could be obliged to in the Srst place, was to reflect and consider things in a right manner, and apply himself to right action, in order to obtain a right disposition. For this supposes, that even this reflec lion and consideration, which he was obliged to, was right action. Surely he was obliged to it no otherwise than as a thing that was right; and therefore he must have an viclL^ nation to this right action immediately, before he could per-f form those first right actions. And as the inclination to them should be right, the principle or disposition from which be performed even these actions, must be good; otherwise the actions would not be right m the sight ef him who looks at the heart; nor would they answer the man’s obligations, or be a doing his duty, if he had done them for some sinister end, and not from a regard to God and his duty. Therefore

This is doubtless true; for although there was no natural, sinful inclipation in Adam, yet an inclination to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit, was begotten in him by the delusion and err .r he was led into» and this iar dination to eat the forbidden fruit, must precede his actual •ating, T there must be a regard to God and his duty implanted in hir& at hii first existence; otherwise it is certain he would have done nothing from a regard to God and his duty; no, nor so much as to rtilcct and consider, and try to obtain such a disposition. The Tery supposition of a disposition to ritht action being first obtained by repeated right action is grossly inconsistent with itself; for it supposes a course of right action, brfore. there is a disposition to perform any right action. These are no invented quibbles or sophisms. If God expected of Adam any obedience or duty to him at all, when he first made him, whether it was in reflecting, considering, or any way exerting the faculties he had given him, then God expec’ed he should immediately exercise love and regard ta him. For how could it be expected, that Adam should have a stiict and perfect regard to God*s commands and authority, and his duty to him, when he had no love nor regard to him in his hearty nor could it be expected he should have any? If Adam from the beginning did his duty to God, and had more respect to the will of his Creator than to other things, and as much respect to him as he ought ttp have; then fronv the beginning he had a supreme and perfect respect and love to God; and if so, he was created with such a principle. There is no avoiding the consequence. Not only external duties, but internal duties-, such as summarily consist iiv love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as ho existed, if any duty at all was required. For it is most apparently absurd, to talk of a spiritual being, with the faculties of understanding and will, being required to perform external duties, without internal. Dr. Taylor himself observes, that iove is the fulfilling of the law, and that all moral rectitude even every pari of it must be rcsohed bito that single firinciple. Therefore, if any morally right act at all, reflection, consideration, or any thing else, was required of Adam immediately, on his first existence, and was performed as required; then he must, the first moment of his existence, have his heart possessed of that principle of divine love; which implies the whole of moral rectitude in every part of it, according to our aulhor’6 own docu ine; and so the whole of moral rectitude or ri^bteousness must begin with his existence; “which is the thing taught in the doctrine of Oiiginal Rishteousness.

And let us consider how it could be otherwise, than that Adam was always, in every itioment of his existence, obliged to exercise such regard or respect of heart towards every object or thin, as was ayreeable to the apparent nieiit of that object. For instance, would it not at any time have been a bf oominp: thin; in Adam, on the exhibition to his mind of God’s infinite goodness to him, for him to haflft exercised answerable graiitude, and the contrary have been unbecoming and odiou? And if somehinn: hinl been presented to Adam*s view, transcendently amiable -in i;seif, as for instance, the glorious perfection of the divine nature, would it not have become him to love, relish and delight in it I Would not such an object have merited this? And if the view of an object so amiable in itself did not affect his mind with complacence, would it not, according to the plain dictates of our understanding, have shewn an unbecoming temper of mind?

To say that he had not had time, by culture, to form and establish a good disposition or ielish, is not what would have taken off the disagreeableness and odiousness of the temper. And if there had been never so much time, I do not see how it could be expected be should improve it aright, ifl order to obtain a good disposition, if he had not ah’eady some good dibposition to engage him to it.

That belonging to the will and disposiiion of the heart, which is in itself either odious or amiable, unbecoming or decent, always would have been Adam’s virtue or sin, in any momtnt of his existence; if there be any such thing as virtue or vice, by which nothing can be meant, but that in our moral disposition and behavior, which is becoming or unbecoming, amiable or odious. Human nature must be created with some dispositions; a disposiiion to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable; otherwise it must be without any such thing as inclination or will: It must be perfectly indifferent, without preference, without choice or aversion towards atiy thing as agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions at aiy they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disatrreeable to the nature of things. It man had at first the highest relish of those things that were m6st excellent and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those things that were most worthy of it, then his dis* positions were morally right and amiable, and never can be de« cent and excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most tlltese things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious. And it is evident there can be no medium between these.

II. This notion of Adam’s being crested without a principle of holiness in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. Taylor’s scheme, is inconsistent wuh what the history, in the beginning of Genesis, leads us to suppose of the great favors and smiles of heaven, which Adam enjoyed while he remained in innocency. The Mosaic account suggests to us that till Adam sinned he was in happy circumstances, surrounded with testimonies and fruits of God’s favor. This is implicitly owned by Dr. Taylor, when he says, page 252. ‘’That in the dispen’^ation our first parents were under before the fall, they were placed in a condition proper to engage their gratitude, love and obedience.” But it will follow on our author’s principles, that Adam, while in innocency, was placed in far -Arorse circumstances than he was in after his disobedience, and infinitely worse than his posterity are in; under unspeakably greater disadvantages for the avoiding of sin, and the performance of duty. For by his doctrine, Adam’s posterity come into the world with their hearts as free from any propensity to sin as he, and he was made as destitute of any propensity to righteousness as they; and yet God, in favor to them, does great things to restrain them from sin, and excite them to virtue, which ho never did for Adam in innocency, but li«id him, in the highest degree, under contrary disadvantages.

God, as an instance of his great favor, and fatherly love to man, since the fall, has denied him the ease and pleasures of tctradise, which gratified and allured his senses, and bodilv

Bkjipetites; that he might diminish his temptations to sin* And as a still greater means to restrain from sin, and promote virtue, has subjected him to lubor, toil and sorrow in the world; and not only so, but as a means to promote his spiritual and eternal good far beyond this, has doomed him to death: And ltfticn all this was found insufficient, he, in further prosecution of the designs of his love, shortened men’s lives exceedingly, made them twelve or thirteen tinr;es shorter than in the first ages. And yet this, with ali the innumerable calamities, which God in great faor to mankind has brought on the world, whereby their temptations are so vast-Jy cut short, and the means and inducements to virtue heaped one upon another, to so great a degree, all have proved insufficient, now for so many thousand years together, to restrain from wickedness in any considerable degree; innocent human nature, all along, coming into the world with the same purity and harmless dispositions that our first parents had in Paradise. What vast disadvantages indeed then must Adam and Eve have been in, that had no more in their nature to keep them from sin, or incline them to virtue, than their posterity, and yet were without all those additional and extraordinary means 1 Not only without such exceeding great means as we now have, when our lives are made so very short, but having vastly less advantages than their antedilnvian posterity, who to prevent their being wicked, and to make them good, had so much labor and toil, sweat and sorrow, briers and thorns, with a body gradually decaying and returning to the dust; when our first parents had the extreme disadvantage d being placed in the midst of so many and exceeding great tempta — tions, not only without toil or sorrow, p:iin or disease, to humble and mortify them, and a sentence of death to wean them from the world, but in the midst of the most exquisite and alluring sensitive delights, the reverse in every respect, and to the highest degree, of that most gracious state of requisite means, and great advantages, which mankind now enjoy 1 If mankind now under these vast restraint*, and great advantages, are not restrained from gcr.eral, and as it were universal ‘’>icl;Gc]ness, how could it be expected that Adam and Eve, created wih no better hearts than men bring into the world now, and destitute of all these advantages, and in the midst of all contrary disadvantages, should escape it?

These things are not agreeable to Moses* account; -which represents an happy state of peculiar favors and blessings before the fall, and the curse coming aiterwards* but according to this scheme, the curse was before the fall, and the great favors and testimonies of love followed the apostacy. And the curse before the fall must be a curse with a witness, being to so high a degree the reverse of such means, meang so necessary for such a creature as innocent man, and in all their multitude and fulness proving too little* Paradise therefore must be a mere delusion! There was indeed a great shew of favor, in placing man in the midst of such delights-But this delightful garden, it seems, with all its »beauty and sweetness, was in its real tendency worse than the apples of Sodom: It was but a mere buit (God forbid the blasphemy) the more clTectually enticing by its beauty and deliciousness, to Adam’s eternal ruin; which might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing that he was the first man that ever existed, having no superiority of capacity to his posterity, and wholly without the advantage ot the observations, experiences, and improvements of preceding generations; which his posterity have.

I proceed now to take notice of an additional proof of the doctrine we are upon, from another part of the holy scripture. A very clear text for original righteousness is that -in F.ccles. vii. 29. Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.’*

It is an observation of no weight which Dr. Taylor makes on this text, that the word man is commonly used to signify mankind in general, or mankind collectively taken. It is true, it often signifies the species of mankind; but then it is used to signify the species, with regard to its duration and succession from its beginning, as well as with regard to its extent. The English word mankind is used to signify the species: hut what if it be so? Would it be an improper or unintelligible way of speaking, to s-^y, that when God first made man-ORIGINAL SIN. fit

“kind, he placed them in a pleasar.t paradise, (moaning; irt their first parents) hut now they live in the mi-lsi of briers and thorns? And it is certain, that to speuk of God*3 making mankind in such a meaning* viz. his giving the species ait existence in their first parents, at the creation of the world, is atreeablc to the scripture use of such an expression. As ift Deut. iv. 32. “Since the diiy ihjt God created man upon thtf ea’*tb.’* Job xx. 4.” Knowest thou not this of old, since man was placed upon the earth.” Isa. xlv. 12. “I have made the earth, and created man upon it: I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens.” Jcr. xxvii. 5. “I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power “All these texts speak of God’s making man, by the word 7«a7i, signifying the species of mankind; and yet they all plainly have respect to God*s makio?^ man at Jirst when God made the earth, and stretched out the heavenst and created tiic first parents of mankind. In all these places the same word Adam is used, as here in Ecclesiastes; and in the last of them, used with he emfihaticum as it is here; though Dr. Taylor omits it, when he tells us, he gives us a catalogue of all the places in scripture where the word is used. And it argues nothing to the doctor’s purpose, that the pronoun they is used. They have sought out many inven* tions. Which is properly applied to the species, which God made at first upright: God having begun the species with more than one, and it being continued in a muUitnde. A% Christ speaks of the two sexes, in the relation of man and wife, as conti’iuha successive generations. Matth. xix. 4. He that made them at the beginning, made them male and female;” bavins; reference to Adam and Eve.

No less impertinent, and also very unfair, is his criticism on the word jashar translated iLfiright. Because the word sometimes signifies rights he would from thence infer, that it does not properly signify a moral rectitude, even when used to express the character of moral agents. He might as well insist, that the English viardufiright sometimes, and in its most original meaning, signifies right %ifi or in an erect posture, therefoi’e it does not properly signify any moral cJiaracter, -when applied to moral agents; and indeed less unreasoii-’ ably; lor it is known, that in the Hebrew language, in a peculiar manner, most words used to signify moral and spiritual thin’s, arc taken from lhin!;s external and natural. The word jaskar is used, as applied to moral agents, or to the words and actions of such, (if i have not misreckoned*) about an hundred and ten times in scripture; and about an hundred of them, without all dispute, to signify virtue, or moral rectitude, though Dr. Taylor is pleased to say, the word does not generally signify a moral character) and for the most part it signifies true virtue or virtue in such a sense, as distinguishes it from all false appearances of virtue, or what is only virtue in some respects, but not truly so in the sight of God. It is used at least eighty times in this sense: And scarce any word can be found in the Hebrew language more significant of this. It is thus used constantly in Solomon’s writings, (where it is often found) when used to express a character or property of moral agents. And it is beyond all controversy, that he uses it in this place, in the 7th of Ecclesiastes to signify a moral rectitude, or character of real virtue and integrity. For the wise man, in this context, is speaking of men with respect to their moral character, inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind (as is confessed p. 184) and he here declares, he had not found more than one among a thousand of the right stamp, truly and thoroughly virtuourp and upright; which appeared a strange thing! But in ihis text he clears God, and lays the blame on man: Man was noi made thus at first. He was made of the right stamp, altogether good in his kind, (as all other things were) truly and thoroughly virtuous, as he ought to be; but they have sought out many inventions. Which last expression signifies things sinful, or morally evil; as is confessed, p. 185. And this expression, used to signify those moral evils he found in man, which he sets in opposition to the uprightness roan was made in, shews, that by uprightness he means the most true and

Making use of Buxtorf’s Concordance, which, according to the author’s professed design, directs to all the plaecs where the word is used.

smcere goodness. The word rendered inventions, roost naturally and aptly siynifies the subtle devices, and crooked, deceitful ways of hypocrites, wherein they are of a character contrary to men of simplicity and godly sincerity; wh«>i though wise in that which is good, are simple concerning evil. Thus the same wise man, in Prov. xii. 2, sets a t»’uly good man in opposition to a man of nvicked devices whom God will condemn. Solomon had occasion to observe many who put on an artful disguise and fair shew of goodness; but on search* ing thoroughly, he found very few truly upright. As he says, Prov. XX. 6. “Most met will proclaim every one his own goodness: But a faithful man who can find?” So that it is exceeding plain, that by uprightness, in this place in Ecclesiastes, Solomon means true n»ral goodness.

What our author urges concerning many inventions being spoken of, whereas Adam’s eating the forbidden fruit was but one invention, is of as little weight as the resrof what he says on this text. For the many lusts and corruptions of mankind, appearing in innumerable ways of sinning, are all the consequence of that sin. The great corruption men are fallen in» to by the original apostasy appears in the multitude of wicked ways they are inclined to. And therefore these are property tnentioned as the fruits and evidences of the greatness of tha;; apostasy and corruption.

.*;.&i

SECTION XL

Concerning the kind of Death, threatened to our Jirst ParerHa if they should eat of the Forbidden Fruit.

BR. TAYLOR, in his observations on the three first chapters of Genesis, says, p. 7. “The threatening to man, in case cf transgression was, that he should surely die. Death is the losing of IH’e. Death is opposed to life, and must be mklei.stood accoidinii to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed. Now the death here threatened can, with any cerv;iinty, be opposed only to the life God gave Adam, when he created him, verse 7. Any thing besides this must be pure conjecture, without solid foundation.”

, To this 1 would say, It is true, dea(/i is ofifioscd to l[fe and must be vndcrstcod according to the nature of that life to which it is ofifioscd: But doet* it therefore follow, that nothing can be meant by it but the loss of life? Misery is opposed to happiness, and sorrow is in scripture often opposed to joy; but can we conclude from thence, that nothing is meant in scripture by sorrow, but the loss of joy? Or that there is no more in misery, than the loss or absence of happiness? And if it be so, that the death threatened to Adam can, with certainty, be opposed pnly to the life given to ^da?n, ivheji God created him; 3 think, a state of perfect, perpetual and hopeless misery i« properly opposed to that state Mum was in, when God created him. For I suppose it will not be denied,, that the life Adam Jiad, was truly a hapfiij life; happy in perfect innocency, in the favor of his maker, surrounded with the happy fruits and testiinouics of his love; And I think it has been proved, that lye also was happy in a state of perfect righteousness. And nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreeable to a very common acceptation of the word life in scripture, that it be understood as signifying a stale of excellent and happy existence. jNow that which is most opposite to that life and state Adam nv’.is created in, is a state of total, confirmed wickedness, and perfect hopeless misery, under the divine displeasure and curse; not excluding temporal death, or the destruction of the body, as an introduction to it.

And besides, that which is much more evident, than anything Dr. Taylor says on this head, is this, viz. that the death, which was to come on Adam, as the punishment of his disobedivncey was opposed to that life, which he would have had as the reward of his obedience in case he had not sinned. Obedience and dinobcdicncc are contraries: And the threaten ings and fij’omiscs, that are sanctions of a law, arc set in direct

opposition; and the firoiniscd rewards and threatened fiunish- 7nfntny are what are most properly taken as each other’s opposites. But none will deny, that the life which would have been Adam’s reward, if he had persisted in obedience, wa» eternal life. And therefore we ariue justly, that the death which stands ofi/ioscd to that life (Dr. Taylor himself being jud, p. 120. S.) is manifestly eternal deaths a death ividcly different from the death ive now dic....{o use his own words. It**Adam, for his persevering obedience y vf% to have had everlasting life a?id hap/iiness, in perfect holiness union with his tnaker, and enjoyment of his favor and this was the life which pyas to be confirmed by the tree of life; then doubtless the death threatened in case ot disoledience, which stands in direct opposition to this, was a being given over to everlasting Kuickedness and 77iigeru’, in sefyaration finym God and in ■endur’. ing his nvratk.

And it may with the ^-reatest reason be supposed, that when God first made mankind, and made known to them the methods of his moral government towards them, in the revelation he made of himself to the natural head of the whole species; and let him know, that obedience to him was expected as his duty; and enforced this duty with the sanction of a threatened punishment, called by the name -o death; I say, we may with the greatest reason suppose in such a case; that by death was meant that same death which God esteem >^d to be the most proper punishment of the sin of mankind, and which he speaks of under that name, throughout the scripture, as the proper wages of the sin of man, and was always ftom the beginning understood to be so in the chuvch of God. It would be strange indeed, if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange, if when the law of God was first given, and enforced by the threatening of a punishment, nothing at all had been mentioned of that great punislpment, ever spoken of under the name of death, (in the revelations which he has given to mankind from age to age) as the proper punishinent of the sin of mankind. And it would be no less strange, if “When the punishment which was mentioned and threatened on that occasion, was called by the same name, even deaths

yet we tnupt not understand it to mean the same thing, but something infinitely diverse, and infinitely more inconsiderftble.

But now let us consider what that death ia, which the scripture ever speaks of as the proper wages of the sin of mankind, and is spoken of as such by God’s saints in all ages of the church, from the first beginning of a written revelation, to the conclusion of it. I will begin with the New Testament. When the Apostle Paul says, Rom. vi. 23. the ludgts of sin is death, Dr. Taylor tells us, p. 120. S. that “this means eternal death, the second death, a death widely different from the death we now die.” The same apostle speaks of death as the proper punishment due for sin, in Rom. vii. «. and chap. viii. 13. 2 Cor. iii. 7. 1 Cor. xv. 56. In all which places, Dr. Taylor himself supposes the apostle to intend eternal death.* And when the Apostle Jarnes speaks of death as the proper reward, fruit, and end of sin. Jam. i. 15. “Sin when it is finished bringeth forth death.” It is manifest that our author supposes eternal destruction to be meant.f And the Apostle John, agreeable to Dr. Taylor’s sense, speaks of the second death as that which sin unrepented of will bring all men to at last. Rev. ii. ll.xx. 6. 14. and xxi. 8. In the same sense the Apostle John uses the word in his 1st epistle, chap. iii. 14.” We know, that we have passed from deaCh to life, because we love the brethren: He that hateth his brother, abldeth in death.

In the same manner Christ used the word from time to time when he was on earth, and spake concerning the punishment and issue of sin. John v. 24. “He that heareth my -word, and believeth, &c. hath everlasting life; and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death to life.” Where, according to Dr. Taylor’s own way of arguing, it

5w p. 78. Note on Rom. vii. 5. and Note on verse 6. Note on Rom, ▼, 20, Note on Rom. vii. 8.

+ By comparing what he says. p. 126, with what he often stys of that death and destruction which is the demerit and end of personal sin which

he cays is the jtronJ death or eternal dcstrucUen tannot be the death which we now die, that Christ speaks of, but eternal death, because it is set in opposition to everlastinp life. John vi. 50. This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die.” Chap, viii. 51. “Verily, verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying, he shall never see death.** Chap. xi. 26. “And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die.” In which places it is plain Christ does not mean that believers shall never see temporal death. See also Matth. x. 28, and Luke X. 28. In like manner, the word was commonly used by the prophets of old, when they spake of death as the proper end and recompense-of sin. So, abundantly by the Prophet fczo kiel. Ezek. iii. 18. “When I say unto the wicked man, thou shalt surely die.** In the original it is, Dyi/jg- thou s/ialf die. The same form of expression, which God used in the threatening to Adam. We have the same words again, chap. xxxiii. 18. In chap, xviii. 4, it is said, The noul that sinnethy it shall iWe. To the like purpose are chap. iii. 19,20, and xviii. 4, 9, 13, 17. ...2 I, 24,:^6, 28, chap, xxxiii. 8, 9, 12, 14, 19. And that temporal death is not meant in these places is plain, because it is promised most absolutely, that the righteous shll not die the death spoken of. Chap, xviii. 21. Ne ehatl surely live, he shall not die. So verses 9, 17, 1 9, and 22, and chap. iii. 21. And it is evident the Prophet Jeremiah uses the word in the same sense. Jer. xxxi. 30. Every one shall die/or his own iniquity. And the same death is spoken of by the Prophet Isaiah. Isai. xi. 4. IVith the breath of his lifin shall he slay the luicked. See also chap. lxvi. 16, with verse 24. Solomon, who we must suppose was thoroughly acquainted with the sense in which the word was used by the wise, and by the ancients, continually speaks of death as the proper fruit, issue, and recompense of sin, using the word only in this sense. Prov. xi. 19. Js righteoumess tcndcth to life, 80 he that fmrsueth evil fiursueth it to his ovm death. So chap. V. 5, 6, 23, vii. 27, viii. 36, ix. 18, x. 21, xf. 19, xiv. 12, XV. 10, xviii. 21, xix. 16, xxi. 16, and xxiii. 13, 14. In these places he cannot mean temporal death, for he often speaks of it as a punishment of the wicked, wbciein the righteous shall certainly be distinguished from them; as in Prov. xii. 28. In the ivaxj of righteousness is Ufe and in the pathway thereof is no death. So in chap. x. 2, xi. 4, xiii. 14, xiv. 27, and manyother places. But we find th?s same wise man observes, that as to temporal death, and temporal events in general, there is TiO distinction, but that they happen alike to iood and bad. Eccl.ii. 14, 15, 16, viii. 14, and ix.2,3. His words are remark* able in Eccl. vii. 15. “There is a just man ihut fierisheth in his I’i.^hleousness, and there is a wicked man thdii firolong-eth his life in his wickedness.” So we find David, in the Book of Psalms, uses the v»-ord death in the same sense,’vvhen he speaks of it as the proper wages and issue of sin. Psal. xxxiv. 21. “Evil shall s/az, the wicked.” He speaks of it as a certain thing, Psal. cxxxix. 19. Surely thou wilt «/ay the wicked,

0 God.” And he speaks of it as a thing wherein the wicked are distinguished from the righteous. Psalm lxix. 28. Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be writ- len with the righteous.” And thus we find the word death used in the Pentateuch, or Books of Moses; in which part of the Scripture it is, that we have the account of the threatening of death to Adam. When death, in these books, is spoken ot” as the proper fruit, and appointed reward of sin, it is to be understood of eternal death. So Deut. xxx. 15.” See,

1 have set before thee this dav life and good, and death and evil.” Verse 19. “1 call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and deathy blessing and cursing.” The life that is spoken of here, is doubtless the same that is spoken of in Levit. xviii. 5. “Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and my judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them.” This the apostle understands n{ eternal ///<?, as is plain by Rom. x. 5, and Gal. iii. 12. But that the death threatened for sm in the law of Moses, meant eternal death, is what Dr. Taylor abundantly declares. So in his Note on Rom. v. 20, Par. p. 291. “Such a constitution the law of Moses was, subjecting those who were under it to deaih for every transgression; meaning by death eternal death.’* These are his words. I’he like he asserts in n»any other places. When it is said, in the place row mentioned, I have set before thee life and death, blccsinff and cursing, without doubt, the same blea»17ig and cursing’ is meant which God had aheady set before them with such solemnity, in the 27th and 28ih chapters, where we have the sum of the curses in those last words of the 27ih chapter,” Cur-ied is every one, which confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them.’* Which the apostle speaks of as a threat eninir of eternal death, and with him Dr. Taylor himself.* In this sense also Job and his friends, spake of death, as the wages and end of sin, who lived before any written revelation, and had their rclii:^ion and their phraseology about the things of religion from the ancients.

If any should insist upon it as an objection against supposing that death was intended to signify eternal death in the threatening to Adam, that this use of the word is figurative; I reply, that though this should be allowed, yet it is by no means so figurative as many other phrases used in the history contained in these three chapters; as when it is said, God mid J Let there be light: God said, Let there be a firmament, &c. as though God spake such words with a voice. So when it is said, God called the light, day: God called the firmament, heaven, Sec.: God rested on the seventh day; as though he had been weary, and then rested. And when it is said. They heard the i/o/c<? of God walking; as tho-jgh the: Deity had two feet, and took steps on the ground. Dr. Taylor supposes, that when it is said of Adam and Eve, “* Their eyes were opened, and they saw that they were naked;” by the word naked is meaui a state of guilt; page 12. Which sense of the word naked is much further from the common use of the word, than the supposed sense of the word death. So this author supposes the promise concerning the seed oT the woman’s bruisi?ig the serfient’s head while the serpent should bruise his heel, is to be understood of “the Messiah’s destroying the power and sovereignty of the Devil, and rcreceiving some slight hurt from him;” pages 15, 16. Which makes the sentence full of figures, vastly more beside the common use of words. And why might not God deliver

Note on Rom. v. 20. Par. p. 291 — 299.

ihre:ateniTi|;s to cur first parents in figurative cxpressionsi aft well as promises? Many other strong figures are used in these chapters.

But indeed, there is no necessity of supposing the vford death, or the Hebrew word so iranshtted, if used in the manner that lias been supposed, to have been figurative at all. It does not appear but that this word, in its true and propei’ meaning, might signiiy perfect misery, and sensible destruction, though the word was also applied to signify something more external and visible. There are many words in our language, such as hearty .ferisft view, discovery c one efition flight., and many ethers, which are applied to signify external things, as that muscular part of llie body called heart; external feeling, culled sense; the sight of the bodily eye, called -uienv; the finding of a thing by its being uncovered, called discovery the first beginning of the foetus in the womb, called ronc:”^- tion; and the rays of the sun, called light: Yet these words do as truly and properly signify other things of a more spiritual, internal nature, as those: Such as the disposition, affection, perception, and thought of the mind, and manifestation and evidence to the soul. Common use, which governs the propiiety of language, makes the latter things to be as rfiuch signified by those words, in their proper meaning, as the former. It is especially common in the Hebrew, and I »nppo?c, other oriental languages, that the same word that signifies something external, does no less properly and usually signify something more spiritual. So the Hebrew words !sed for breath, have such a double signification; jVehama signifies both breaih and the noul, and the latter as commonly as the former. Ruach is used for breath or wmrf,but yet more commonly signifies sfiint. Xcfihesh is used for breath., but yet more commonly signifies safuL So the word Icbh hearty no kbs properly signifies I’ne aoiil, especially with regard to the will and afl’ections, than that part of the body so called. The word .s7ia/o7n, which we render /?i?ace, no less properly signifies prosperity and happiness, than mutual agreement. The word translated Itfe, signifies the natural life of the body, and :i:-o the perfect and happy stale of sensible, active being* bttrciNAL Sim wj:

fjtld the latter as properly as the forTner. So the word f/carA fei?i»ifies deslruclion, as to outward sensibility activity and enjoyment; but it has most evidently another si ‘unification, Which, in the Hebrew tongue, is no less proper, lz* iierfect se?i.ubky hoficless ruin and misery,

I” is therefore wholly without reason uried, that death properly signifies only the loss of this present life; and that therefore nothinp: else was meant by that death which was threatened for eatini< the forbidden fruit. Nor does it at all appear but that Adam, who, from what God said concerning the seed of the woman, that was so very fi<j;urative, could understand, that relief was promised as to the death which was threatened, (as Dr. Taylor himself supposes) understood the death that was threatened in the more important sense; especially seein;^ temporal death, as it is ori8;mally, and in itself- is evermore, excepting as changed by divine grace, an introduction or entrance into that gloomy, dismal state of miaery, winch is shadowed forth by the dark and awful circumstances of this death, naturally sugcesiing to the mind the most dreadful state of hopeless, sensible ruin.

As to that objection which some have made, that the phrase, dying thou shalt die is several times used in the Books of Moses, to signify temporal death, it can be of no force; For it has been shewn already, that the same phrase is sometimes used in scripture to signify eternal death, in instances much more parallel with this. But indeed nothing can be certainly argued concerning the nature of the thing intended, from its being expressed in such a manner. For it is evident that such repetitions of a word in the Hebrew language, are. <’ no more than an emphasis upon a word in the more modern languages, to signify the great degree of a thing, the importance of it, or the certainty of it, &c. When we would signify and impress these, we commonly put an emphasi n ouF words: Instead of this, the Hebrews, when they wo.d express a thing strongly, repeated or doubled the word, the more to impress the mind of the hearer; as may be plain to every one in the least conversant with the Hebrew Bible. The repetition in the threatening to Adam, therefore only W loi ORIGINAL SIN.

implies the solemnity and importance of the threatemTigi But God may denounce either eternal or temporal death with pcrcmplorincss and solemnity, and nothing can certainly be inferred concerning the nature of the thing threatened, because it is threatened with emphasis, more than this, that the ihrca’ening is much to be regarded. Though it be true, that it might in an especial manner be expected that a threat* cning of eternal deathwould be denounced with great emphasis, such a threattniiig being infmitely important, and to be J egardcd above all others.

SECTION III.

UVierein it ia inquired %vhether there be any thing in the hist or ‘^ of the three first cliajUers of Geiusis which should lead us to iiUfifiose that Godj in his constitution with Adam.^ dealt with, mankind in general, as included in their hrst father, and that the thrtatcriing of death in case he should eat the for” bidden fruit, had resjiect not only to him, but his posterity?

DR. TAYLOR, rehearsing that threatening to Adam, Thou shall nurely dic and giving us his paraphrase of it, p. T, 8, concludes thus: “Observe, here is not one word relating to Adam’s posterity.” But it may be observed in opposition to this, that there is scarcely one word that we have an account of, which God ever said to Adam or Lve, but what does manifestly include their posterity in the meaning and design of it. There is as much of a word said about Adam’s posterity in that threatening, as there is in those werds of God to Adam and Eve, Gen. i. 28; “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it;” and as much in events* to lead us to suppose Adam’s posterity to be included. There fe as much of a luord of his posterity in that threat eninj;, as ir those words, verse 29. “Behold, I have given you every herb beaiint seed. ...and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed,” &c. Even when (iod was about to create Adam, what he said on that occasion, had not respect only to Adam, but to his posterity. Gen. i. 26. *’ Let us make man in our image, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea,’* Sec. And, what is more remarkable, there is as much of a word said about Adam’s posterity in the threatening of ^eath, ns there is in that sentence, Gen- iii. 19. “Unto dust shaltthou return.” Which Dr. Taylor himself supposes to fee a sent-ence pronounced for the execution of that very threatening, “Thou shalt surely die;” and which sentence liC himself also oft-en speaks of as including Adam’s posterity j and what is much more remarkable still, is a sentence which Dr. Taylor himself often speaks of, as including his posterity €s a sentence of condemnation as a judicial sentence, and a sentence which God proiwunced with regard to Adam’s /iosterity aciing the part ofaJudge and as such condemning them to temporal death. Though he is therein utterly inconsistent with himself, inasmuch as he at the same time abundantly insists, that death is not brought on Adam’s posterity in consequence of his sin, at all as a punishment; but merely by the gracious disposal of a Father, bestowing a be7i(‘Jit of the highest nature upon them.*

But I shall shew that I do not in any of these things falsely charge, or misrepresent Dr. Taylor. He speaks of the sentence in chap. iii. 19, as pronounced in pursuance of the threatening in the former chapter, in these words, pages 17, 18. The sentence upon man, verses ir, 18, 19, first affects the earth, upon which he was to subsist: The ground should be incumbered with many noxious weeds, and the tillage of it more toilsome; which would oblige the man to procure a sustenance by hard labor, till he should die, and drop into the ground, from whence he was taken. Thus death entered by

♦Page 27,5,

sin into te world, anci pian became mortal,** qccording to fhs Mveaiening in the former chapter Now, if mankind becomes inoria!, and must die, according to the ihreaieninj; in the foip Hicr chapter, then doubtless the threatenintj: in the former chapter, Thnu shult llifj had respect not only to 7(lam, but tq jnankind, and included Adam’s posterity. Yea, and Dr. Taylor is express in it, and very often so, ‘hat the sentence concerning droppino into the iround, or returning to the dustj did include Adam’s posterity. So, page 20, speaking there of that sentence, *’ Observe, (says he) that we their posterity arc in fact sybjected to the same affliction and mortality, here by sentence inflicted upon cur first parents. Page 42, Note, But yet men through that long tract, were all subject to death, therefore they must be included in the semesnce.’^ The. same he affirms in innumerable other places, some of which I shall have occasion to mention presently.

The sentence which is founded on the threatening, and fts Dr. Taylor says, according! to (he threatening, extends to as many as were included in the threatening, and to no more, Ifihe sentence be upon a collective subject, infinitely, (as it -were) the greatest part of which were not included in the threatening, nor were ever threatened at all by any threatening whatsoever, then certainly this sentence is not according to the threatening nor built upon ir. If the sentence be ac” cording to the threatening, then we may justly explain the threatening by the sentence; and if we find the sentenca spoken to the same person, to whom the threatening was spoken, and spoken in the second person singular, in like manner with the threatening, nm founded on the threatening, and according to the threatening; and if we find the sentence includes Adam’s posterity, then we may certainly infer, that so did the threatening; and hence, that both. the threatening and sentence were delivered to Adam as the public head and peprescntativc of his posterity.

Tlx •uhscqufnt part of the quotation, the rooaer will not meet with io Cx Ihird edition of Dr. Taylor, but in the fccood of 1741, ‘And we may also further infer from it, in [inother respect iireclly contrary to Dr. Taylor’s tloctrine, that the sentence “Virhich included .4dam-s posterity, was to deaihas apunUhiyumi to that posterity, as well as to Adam hinyielf. For a sentcnc» pronounced in execution of a thrcjjtening. is to a punish -nentw Threatenings are of punishments. ^Jeither (iod nor man are vont to threaten others with favors and benefits.

But lest any of this author’s admirers should stand toity that it may very properly, be said, God threatened mr.’.nkind with bestowina; great kindness upon them, I would observe* at Dr. Taylor often speaks of this sentence as prononnced by God on all mankind as condemning- them, speaks of it as tL sentence of condemnation judicially ftionouricedii or a sentence which God pronounced ,on ail mankind acting as their judgcp and in a judicial firoceeding. Which he affirms in multitudes of places. In p. 20. speaking; of this sentence, which he there says, subjects us, Adam’s and Eve’s posterity, to afBiction and mortality, he calls it a judicial act of condemnation. The judicial act of condenmation (says he) clearly implies, a taking him to pieces, and turning him to the ground fsonn ‘whence he was taken.” And p. 28, 29, Note. “in all the scripture froni one end to the other, there is recorded but one judifment to condemnation Vkhich came upon all me?i, and that is, Gen. iii. 17... 19. Dust thou art,” Sec. P. 40, speakino- of the same, he says, “all men 2iVQ brought under condemnation.” In p. 27, 28. “By judgment, judgment to condemnation, it appearcth evidently to me? he (Paul) means the being adyidged to the forementioned death; he mc’^ns the sentence of death, of a general mortality, pro?iounced ujion mankind in consequence Qf Adam’s first transgression. And the condemnation inflicted by lhejudgnent of God, answeveth to, and is in effect the same thing with being dead.” P. 50. “The many, that is mankinds were subject to death by the judicial act of God.’* P. 31. “Being made dinners, may very well signifj’’, being adjudged or condenmed to death. For the Hebrew word &c. signifies to make one a sinner by 2i judicial se?itence, or to condemn.** P. 178. Par. on Rom. v. 19. “Upon the account of <aijie man’s disobedience, mankind were judicially constituted ainmrs; that is, subiected to death, by the sentence of iGo3 te judge” And there are many other places where he repeats the same thing. And it is pretty remarkable, that in p. 48,49, immediately after citinc Prov. xvii. 15. “He that justifii th the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, are both an ahominntion to the Lord;” and when he is careful in citing these words to pr.t us in mind, that it is meant of aywdicial act; yet in the very next words he supposes that God himself does so, since he constantly supposes that Adam’s posterity, whom God condemns, are innocent His words are these, “From all this it followeth, that as the judgment, that passed upon all men to condsmnatiofi is death’s coming upon alliven by the judicial act of God upon occasion of Adam’s transgression: So, S?.c.” And it is very remarkable, that in p. 3, 4,7. «S, he insists, “That in scripture no action is said to be imputed, reckoned, or accounted to any person for right** eousness or CONDEMNATION, but the proper act and deed of that person.” And yet he thus continually affirms, that all mankind are made sinners by a judicial act of God the Jiidgc<f even to condomiation, &xid judicially constituted sinners, and so subjected to 2^ judicial sentence of covdemr,ation on occasion of Adam’s sin; and all according to the threatening denounced to Adam, thou shall surely die: Though he supposes Adam’s posterity were not included in the threatening, and are looked upon as perfectly innocent, and treated wholly ag such.

I am sensible Dr. Taylor does not run into all this incon« slstencc, only through oversight and blundering; but that he is driven to it, to make out his matters in his evasion of that noted paragraph in the 5th chapter of Romans; especially those three sentences, ver. 16. ‘* The judgment was by one to condemnation.” Ver. 18 “By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation;” and ver. 19. “By one man’s disobedience many were made sinners.” And I am ulso sensible of what he offers to salve the inconvenience, viz. «’ That if the threatening had immediately been executed on Adam, he would have had no posterity; and that so far the possible existence of Adam’s posterity fell under the threaten-ORIGINAL SI!<»/ i(ff

!ng6f the Taw, and into the hands of the judpjc, to be disposed of as he should think fit: And that this is the ground of the judgment-to condemnation, cominjp upon all men.”* But this is trifling, to a great degree: For,

1. Suffering deaih, and failing of possible existence, are entirely different things. If there had never been any such thing as sin committed, there would have been infinite numbers of possible beings, which would have failed of existence, by God*s appointment. God has appointed not to bring into existence numberless possible worlds, each replenished with, innumerable possible inhabitants. But is this equivalent to God*s appointing them all to suffer death?

2. Our author represents, that dy Jdam’s in, the possible existence of his fiostcrityfell into the hands of the judge to b: disfiosed of as he should think ft. But there was no need of any sin of Adam’s, or anybody’s else, in order to their being brought into God’s hands in this respect. The future possible existence of all created beings, is in God*s hands, antecedently to the existence of any sin. And therefore by God’s sovereign appointment, infinite numbers of possible beings, “without any relation to Adam, or any other sinning being, do fail of their possible existence. And if Adam had never sin-Tied, yet it would be unreasonable to suppose, but that innumerable multitudes of his possible posterity, would have failed of existence by God’s disposal. For will any be so un reasonable as to imagine, that God would, and must have brought into existence as many of his posterity as it was possible should be, if he had not sinned? Or that in that case, it “would not have been possible, that any other persons of his posterity should ever have existed, than those individual persons, who now actually fall under that sentence of suffering death, and returning to the dust?

3. We have many accounts in scripture, which imply the actual failing of the possible existence of innumerable multitudes of Adam’s posterity, yea, of many more than ever come into existence. As of the possible posterity of Abel, the

* Page go, gi 95.

Ui OtllGlNAL SIJ?.

possible posterity of nil them that were destroyed by theoo^ and the possible postcuiy of the innumerable nniliitudes which we read of in scripture, destroyed l)v sword, pestilence, &C. And if the threatening to Ad.im reached his posterity in no other respect than this, that they were liable to be deprived by it of il’.cir possible existence, ihen these instances are niuch more properly a fulfilment of that threatenine, than the suffering of death by such as actually come into e:%istence; and so is that which is most properly the judgment to condemrotion, executed by the sentence of the judge, proceeding on the foot of that threatening. But where do we ever find thifi so represented in scripture? We read of multitudes cut off for their personal sins, who thereby failed of their possible posterity. And these arc mentioned as God’s judgments on them, and effects of God’s condemnation of them: But when arc they ever spoken of as God’sjudicially proceeding against, and ccndcmnine; their possible posterity?

4. Dr. Taylor, in what he says concerning- this matterj speaks of the threatening of the law delivered to Adam, which the possible existence of his posterity fell under, cs the ground flf the judgment to condemnation coming upon all men. But herein he is exceedins; inconsistent with himself; for he aflirms in a place forecited, that the scripture never speaks of any sentence of condemnation coming upon all men, but that sentence in the third of Genesis, concerning man’s turning to dust. But according to him, the threatening of the law delivered to Adam, could not be the ground of that sentence; for he greatly insists upon it, that that law was entirely abrogated before that sentence was pronounced, that this law at that time was not in beings had no existence to have any such influence, as might procure a sentence of death; and that therefore this sentence was introduced entirely «n another foot, viz. on the foot of a new dispensation of grace. The reader mny see this matter strenuously urged, and particularly argued by hini,p. 113. ..220. 8. So that this sentence could not, according to him, have the threatening of that law for its ground, as he supposes; for it never stood upon that ground. It could not be called a judgment of condemnation imder any

DftlGINAt StN. m

auch view; for it could not be viewed under circumstances linder which it never existed.

5. If it be as our author supposes, that the sentence of death on all mon comes under the notion of a judgttient to condemnation by this means, viz. that the threatening to Adam was in some respect the ground of it; then it also comes under the notion of a punishment: For threatenings annexed to breaches of laws, are to punishments; and a judgment of condemnation to the thing threatened, must be to punishment; and the thing condemned to, must have as much the notion of a punishment, as the sentence has the notion of a judgment to condemnation. I^ut this, Dr. Taylor wholly denies: He denies that the death sentenced to, comes as any punishment at all, but insists that it comes only as afavor and benefit, and a fruit of fatherly love to Adam’s posterity, respected, not as guilty, but wholly innocent. So that his scheme will not admit of its coming under the notion of a sentence to condemnation in any respect Whatsoever. Our author’s supposition, that the possible existence of Adam’s posterity comes under the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the judge, and is the ground of the condemnation of all men to death, implies, that death, by this sentence, is appointed to mankind as an evil, at least negatively so; as it is a privation of good r For he manifestly speaks of a nonexistence as a negative evil. But herein he is inconsistent with himself: For he continually insists, that mankind are subjected to death only as a beji’ efit as has been before shewn. According to him, death is not appointed to mankind as a negative evil, as any cessation of existence, as any cessation or even diminution of good; but on the contrary, as a means of a more hafifiy existence and a great increase of good.

So that thio evasion, or salvo of Dr. Taylor’s, is so far from helping the matter, or salving the inconsistence, that it increases it.

And that the constitution or law, with the threatening of

death annexed, which was given to Adan>, was to him as the

head of mankind, and to his posterity as included in him, not

only follows from some of our author’s own assertions and the plain and full declarations of the apostle, in the fifth of Romans (of which more afterwards) which drove Dr. Taylof into such gross inconsistencies: But the account given in the three first chapters of Genesis, directly and inevitably leads U3 to such a conclusion.

Though the sentence, Gen. iii. 19. Unto dust thou shall rcttim be not of equal extent with the threatening in the foregoing chapter, or an execution of the main curse of the law therein denounced; for, that it should have been so, would have been inconsistent with the intimations of mercy just before given: Yet it is plain, this sentence is in pursuance of that threatening, being to something that was included in it. The words of the sentence were delivered to the same perbon, with the words of the threatening, and in the same manlier, in like singular terms, as much without any express mention of his posterity; And yet it manifestly appears by the consequence, as well as all circumstances, that his posterity were included in the words of the sentence; as is confessed on all hands. And as the words were apparently delivered in the form of the sentence of a judge, condemning for something that he was displeased with, and ought to be condemned, viz. sin; and as the sentence to him and his posterity was but one, dooming to the same suffering, under the same circumstances, both the one and the other sentenced in the same v’ords, spoken but once, and immediately to but one person we hence justly infer, that it was the same thing to both; and not as Dr. Taylor suggests, p. 67, a sentence to a proper punishment to Adam, but a mere promise of favor tp his posterity.

Indeed, sometimes our author seems to suppose, that God meant the thing denounced in this sentence, as a favor both to Adam and his posterity.* But to his posterity, or mankind in general, who are the main subject, he ever insists, that it was purely intended as a favor. And therefore, one would have thought the sentence should have been delivered, with manifestations and appearances of favor, and not of an-

* Page £5, 45, ^6. S,

er. How could Adam understand it as a promise of great favor, considering the manner and circumstances of the denunciation? How could he think, that God would go about to delude him, by clothing himself with garments of vengeance, .using words of displeasure and rebuke, setting forth the hciiiousness of his crime, attended with cherubimsand a flaming sword; when all that he meant was only higher testimonies of favor, than he had before in a state of innocence, and to manifest fatherly love and kindness, in promises of great blessings? If this was the case, God’s words to Adam must be understood thus: “Because thou hast done so wickedly, hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it; therefore I will be more kind to thee than I was in thy state of innocence, and do now appoint for thee the following great favors: Cursed be the ground for thy sake” &c. And thus Adam must understand what was said, unless any will say (and God forbid. that any should be so blasphemous) that God clothed himself with appearances of displeasure, to deceive Adam, and make him believe the contrary of what he intended, and lead him to expect a dismal train of evils on his posterity, contrary to all reason and justice, implying the most horribly unrighteous treatment of millions of perfectly innocent creatures. It is certain there is not the least appearance in what God said, or the manner of it, as Moses gives us the account, of any other, than that God was now testifying displeasure, condemning the subject of the sentence he was pronouncing, as justly exposed to punishment for sin, and for that sin which he mentions.

When God was pronouncing this sentence, Adam doubtless understood, that God had respect to his posterity, as well as himself, though God spake wholly in ihc second person singular, Because thou hast eaten. ...In sorrow shalt thou eat ....Unto the dust shalt thou return.” But he had as much reason to understand God as having respect to his posterity, when he directed his speech to him in like manner in the threatening. Thou shalt surely die. The sentence plainly refers to the threatening, and results from it. The threatening says, Jf thou caty thou shalt die: The sentence says, Be cause thou hast eaten thou shalt die. And Moses, who wrote the account, had no reason to doubt but that the affair would be thus understood by his readers; for such a way oi speaking; was well understood in those days: The history he gives us of the origin of things, abounds with it. Such a manner of speaking to the first of the kind, or heads pf the race, having respect to the progeny, is not only used in almost every thing that God said to Adam and Eve, but even in what he said to ihc very birds and fishes, Gen. i, 22; and also in what he said afterwards to Noah, Gen. ix. and to Shem, Ham and Japhelh, and Canaan, Gen. ix. 25. ...27. So in promises made to Abraham, in which God directed his speech to him, and spake in the second person singular, from time to tinie, but meant chiefly his posterity: To thee will I give this land. In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed,” &c. See. And in what is said of Ishmael, as of his person, but m.eant chiefly of his posterity. Gen. xvi. 12, and xvii. 20. And so in what Isaac said to Esau and Jacob, in his blessing; in which he spake to them in the second person singular, but meant chiefly their posterity. And so for the most part in the proniises made to Isaac and Jacob, and in Jacob’s blessing of Eph-^ raim and Manasseh, and of his twelve sons.

But I shall take notice of one or two things further, shewing that Adam’s posterity were included in God’s establishment with him, and the threatening denounced for his sin; and that the calamines which come upon them in consequence of his sin, are brought on thcra as punishments.

This is evident from the curse on the ground; which, if it be any curse at all, comes equally on Adam’s posterity with Ijimsclf. And if it be a curse, then against whomsoever it is desigfied and on whomsoever it terminates, it comes as a punishment, and not as a blesiing, so far as it comes in conse* quence of that sentence.

Dr Taylor, page 19, says, “A curse is pronounced upon the gror.j.d, but no curse upon the woman and the man.” And in pages 45, 46, 6’. he inisls that the ground only was cursed, and not the man; just as though a curse oould ter

Xninate on lifeless, senseless earth I To understand this curse otherwise than as terminating upon man through the ground, would be as senseless as to suppose the meaning to be, The ground shall be fiunishetU ad shall be mifierable for thy sake. Our author interprets the curse on the ground, of its being incumbered with noxious weeds; but would these weeds have been any curse on the ground, if there had been no inhabitants, or if the inhabitants had been of slich a nature, that these weeds would not have been noxious, but useful to them? It is said, Deut. xxviii. 17, Cursed shall be thy gasket, and thy store;” and would he not be thought to talk very ridiculously, who should say, “Here is a curse upon the basket, but not a word of any curse upon the owner; and therefore we have no reason at all to look upon it, as any punishment upon him, or any testimony of God’s displeasure towards him.” How plain is it, that when lifeless things, which are not capable of either benefit or suffering, are said to be cursed or blessed with regard to sensible beings, that Vse or possess these things or have connexion with them, the meaning must be, that these sensible beings are cursed or blessed in the other, or with respect to them! In Exod. xxiii. 35, it is said, “He shall bless thy bread and thy water.” And I suppose, never any body yet proceeded to such a degree of Bubtilty in distinguishing, as to say, “Here is a blessing on the bread and the water, which went into the possessors* mouths, but no blessing on them.” To make such a distinction with regard to the curse God pronounced on the ground, would in some respects be more unreasonable, bejcause God is express in explaining the matter, declaring that it was /or 7nan*s sake, expressly referring this curse to hifn as being with respect to him, and for the sake of his guilt, and as consisting in the sorrow and suffering he should have from it. ♦’ In sorrow shalt thou eat of it. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee.” So that God*s own words tell us where the curse terminates. The words are parallel with those in Deut. xxviii. 16, but only more plain and explicit, “Cursed ishalt thou be in the field,” or in the ground.

If this part of the sentence was pronounced under no no* tion of any curse or punishment at all upon mankind, but on the contrary, as making an alteration in the ground, that should be for the better as to them; that instead of the sweet, but tempting, pernicious fruits of paradise, it might produce wholesome fruits, more for the health of the soul; that it might bring forth thorns and thistles, as excellent medicines, to prevent or cure moral distempers, diseases which would issue in eternal death; 1 say, if what was pronounced was under this notion, then it was a blessing on the ground, and not a curse; and it might more properly have been said, “Blessed shall the ground be for thy sake. I will make a happy change in it, that it may be a habitation more fit for a creature so infirm, and so apt to be overcome with temptation, as thou art.””

The event makes it evident, that in pronouncing this curse, God had as much respect to Adam’s posterity, as to himself: And so it was understood by his pious posterity before the ilood; as appears by what Lamech, the father of Noah, says, Gen. V. 29. And he called his name Aba/z, saying, This same shall comfort us concerning our’work, and the toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed,^^

Another thing Which argues, that Adam’s posterity were included in the threatening of death, and that our first parents tinderstood, when fallen, that the tempter, jn persuading them to eat the forbidden fruit, had aimed at the punishment and ruin of both them and their posterity, and had procured it, is Adam’s immediately giving his wife that new name. Eve, or X//”f, on the promise or intimation of the disappointment and overthrow of the tempter in that matter, by her seed, which’ Adam understood to be by his procuring life, not only for themselves, but for many of their posterity, and thereby delivering them from that death and ruin which the serpent had brought upon them. Those that should be thus delivered, and obtain life, Adam calls the livhig; and because he observed, by what God had said, that deliverance and life were 10 be by the seed of the woman, he therefore remarks tha

ih is the mother of all living; and thereupon gives her a new name, calls her Chavahy life, Gen. iii. 20.

There is a great deal of evidence, that this is the occasion of Adam’s giving his wife her new name. This was her new honor, and the greatest honor, at least in her present state, that the lledeemer was to be of her seed. New names were wont to be given for something that was the person’s peculiar honor. So it was with regard to the new names of Abraham, Sarah, and Israel. Dr. Taylor himself observes,* that they who are saved by Christ, are called the livers, o» ^uvreci 2 Cor. iv. 11, the living, or they that live. So we find in the Old Testament, the righteous are called by the name of Mc livingy Psalm lxix. 28. “Let them be blotted out of the book of tfie livings and not be written with the righteous.? If what Adam meant by her being the ?nother of all livingy was only her being the mother of mankind, and gave her the name life upon that account; it were much the most likely that he would have given her this name at first, when God first united them, under that blessing, “Be fruitful and multiply,” and when he had a prospect of her being the mother of mankind in a state of immortality living indeed, livings and never dying. But that Adam should at that time give her only the name of Isha, and then immediately on that melancholy change, by their coming under the sentence of deaths with all their posterity, having now a new, awful prospect of her being the mother of nothing but a dying race, all from gen-eralion to generation turning to dust, through her folly; I saw, that immediately on this, he should change her name into life, calling her now the mother o[ all living is perfectly unaccountable. Besides, it is manifest that it was not her being the mother of all mankind, or her relation as a mother, which she stood in to her posterity, but the quality of those she was to be the mother of, which was the thing Adam had in view, in giving his wife this new name; as appears by the name itself, which signifies life. And if it had been only a natural and mortal life which he had in view, this v;as

Note annexed to 287.

hothing distinguishing of her posterity from the brutes; fof the very same name oUiving ones, or /m?7^ things, is given from time to time in this liooh of Genesis to them; as in chap. i. 21, 24, 28, ii. 19, vi. 19, vii. 23, viii. I, and many other places in the Bible. And besides, if by life the quality of her posterity was not meant, there was nothing in it to distiniuish her from Adam; for thus she was no more the mother of all living, than he was the father of all living; and she could no more properly be called by the name bnife oil any such account, than he; but names are fiven for distinction. Doubtless Adam took notice of something distinguishm concerning her, that occasioned his giving her this new rame. And I think it is exceeding natural to suppose, that as Adam had given her htv/irst name from the manner of her creation so he gave her her new name from redcmfiiioriy and as it were, new creation, through a Redeemer, of her seed; and that he should give her this name from that v.’hich comforted him, with respect to the curse thai God had pronounced on him and the earth, as Lamech named Noah, Gen. v. 29, Saying, This same shall comfort us concerning our work, and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed.’* Accordingly he gave her this new name, not at her first creation, but immediately after the promise of a Redeemer, of her seed. See Gen. iii. 15.. ..20.

Nov as to the consequence which I infer from Adam’s “•iving his wife this name, on the intimation which God had given, that Satan should by her seed be overthrown and disappointed, as to his malicious design, in that deed’of his which God then spake of, viz. his tempting the woman. Adam infers from it, that great numbers of mankind should be saved, whom he calls the living; they should be saved from the effects of this malicious design of the old serpent, and from that ruin which he had brought upon them by tempting their first parents to sin; and so the serpent would be, with respect to them, disappointed and overthrown in his design-But how is any death or ruin, or indeed any calamity at alJ, brought upon their posterity by Satan’s malice in that temptation, if instead of that, all the death and sorrow that was con-ORIGINAL StN. 7i

^equent, pvas the Crult of God’s fatherly love, ard.not Satan’s malice, and was an instance of God’s free and sovereign favor’, such favor as Satan could not possibly foresee? And if multitudes of Eve’s posterity arc saved, from either spiiiuial or temporal death, by a Redeemer, of her seed, how is that any disappointment ofSatan’s desip;n in tempting our first parents? How came he to have any such thing in view, as the death of Adam’s and Eve’s posterity, by tempting them to sin, or any expectation that their death would be the consequence, unless he knew that they were included in the threatening?

Some have objected against Adam’s posterity’s being included in the threatening delivered to Adam, that the threatening itself was inconsistent with his having any posterity; it being that he should die on the day that hr sinned.

To this I answer, that the threatening was not inconsistent with his having posterity, on two accounts.

Those words, “In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalC surely die,” according to the use of such like expressions among the Hebrews, do not signify immediate death, or that thetxecution shall be within twentyfour hours from the commission of the fact; nor did God, by those words, limit himself as to the time of executing the threatened punishment, but that was still left to God’s pleasure. Such a phrase, according to the idiom of the Hebrew tongue, signifies no more than these two things:

1. A real connexion between the sin and the punishmeni. So Ezek. xxxiii. 12, 13. “The righteousness of the righteous shall not deliver him in the day of his transgression. As for the wickedness of the wicked, he shall not fall thereby in the day that he turneth from his ^Vickedness; neither shall the righteous be able to live in the day that he sinneth; But for his iniquity that he hath commi’ted, he shall die for it.” Here it is said, that in the day he sinneth, he shall not be able to live, but he shall die; not signifying ihc time v, hen death shall be executed upon him, but the connexion between his sin and death; such a connexion as in ou’’ present common use of language is signified by the adverb of time, when / Y irs ORIGINAL SIN.

as if one should say, According to the laws of our natioft*- so long as a man behaves himself as a good subject, he may live; but when he turns rebel, he must die:” Not signifying the hour, day or month in which he must be executed, but only the connexion between his crime and death.

‘2. Another thing which seems to be signified by such an expression, is, that Adam should be exposed to death for o7ie transgrcssioTiy without waiting on him to try him the second time. If he eat of that tree, he should immediately fall under condemnation, though afterwards he might abstain ever so strictly. In this respect the words are much of the same force with those words of Solomon to Shimei, 1 Kings ii. ^7. “For it shall be that on the day that thou goest out, and passest over the brook Kidron, thou shalt know for certaiuy that thou shalt fiurelij die.” Not meaning that he should certainly be executed on that day, but that he should be assuredly liable to death for the first ofTence, and that he should not have another trial to see whether he would go over the brook Kidron a second time.

And then besides,

II. If the words had implied that Adam should’ die that very day, within twentyfour or twelve hours, or that moment that he transgressed, yet it will by no means follow, that God obliged himself to execute the punishment in its utmost extefit on that day. The sentence was in great part executed immediately: He then died spiritually: He lost his innocence and original righteousness, arid the favor of God; a dismal alteration was made in his soul, by the loss of that holy, divine principle, which was in the highest sense the life of the soul. In this he was truly ruined and undone that very day, becoming cc^rrupt, miserable and helpless. And I thinh it has been shewn /that such a spiritual death was one great thing implied in the threatening. And the alteration then made in his body and external state, was the beginning of temporal death. Grievous, external calamity is called by the name of dcofh in scripture, Exod. x. 17. “Intreat the Lord that he may take away this death.’* Not only was Adam’s soul ruined that day, but his body was ruined: It lost its r’pcauty Jind vigor, and became a poor, dull, decaying, dying thing. And besides all this, Adam was that day undone in a more dreadful sense: He immediately fell under the curse of the law, and condemnation to eternal perdition. In the language of scripture, he is dead, that is, in a state of condemnation to death; even as our author often explains this language in his exposition upon Komans. In scripture language, he that believes in Christ, immediately receives life. He passes at that time from death to life, and thenceforward {to use the Apostle .Tohn’s phrase) “has eternal life abiding in him,” But yet he does not then receive eternal life in its highest completion; he has but th-e beginning of it, and receives it in a vastly greater degree at death; but the proper time for the complete fulness is not till the day of judgment. When the angels sinned? their punishment was immediately executed in a degree; but their full punishment is not until the end of the world. And there is nothing in Gods threatening to Adam that bound him to execute his full punishment at once, nor any thing which deterrnines that he should have no posterity. The law or constitution which God established and declared, determined that if he sinned, and had posterity, he and they should die; but there was no constitution determining concerning the actual being of his posterity in this case; what posterity he should have, how many, or whether any at all. All these things God had reserved in his own power: The law and its sanction intermeddled not with the jmatter.

It may be proper in this place also to take some notice of that objection of Dr. Taylor’s, against Adam’s being supposed to be a federal head for his posterity, that it gives him greater honor than Christ, as it supposes that all his posterity would have had eternaMife by his obedience, if he had stood; and so a greater number would have had the benefit of his obedience, than are saved by Christ.* I think a very little consideration is sufficient to shew that there is no

»Page 120, &c,S.

weight in this objection; for the benefit ofChribL’b mciivi may nevertheless be vastly beyond that which would have been by the obedience of Adam. For those that arc saved by-Christ, are not merely advanced to happiness by his merits, but arc saved from the infinitely dreadful efiects of Adam’s sin, and many from immense guilt, pollution and misery, by personal sins; also brought to a holy and happy state, as it wtre through infinite obstacles, and are exalted to a far greater degree of dignity, felicity and glory, than would have been due for Adam’s obedience, for aught I know, many thousand limes so great. And there is enough in the gospel dispensation, clearly to manifest the sufficiency of Christ’s merits for buch tftects in all mankind. And how great the number will be, that shall actually be the subjects of them, or how great a proportion of the whole race, considering the vast succesti of the gospel, that shall be in that future, extraordinary and glorious season, often spoken of, none can telL And the honor of these two federal heads arises not yo much from what was proposed to each for his trial, as from their success, and the good actually obtained, and also the manner of obtaining. Christ obtains the benefits men have through him by proper jntrit of condigniiy.-and a true purchase by an equivalent; which would not have been the case wjth Adam, if he hai obeyed.

I have now particularly considered the account which Mobes gives us in the bei-inning of the Bible, of our first parents, and Go(J*s dealings with them, the constitution he established with them, their transgression, and What followed. And on the whole, if we consider the manner in which God apparently speaks to Adam from time to time j and particularly, if We consider how plairdy and undeniably his posterity are included in the sentence of death pronounced on Adam after his fall, founded on the foregoing threatening; and consider the curse denounced on the ground for his sake, and for his and his posterity’s sorrow: And also consider what is evidently the occabion of his giving his wife the new name of Eve, and his meaning in it, and withal consider apparent fact in constant and ^nivei’sal events, with relation to the state of our first parents, fcnd their posterity from that time forward, through all ages of the world; I cannot but think, it must appear to every impartial person, that Mosps* account docs, with sufficient evidence, lead all mankind, to whom his account is communicated, to understand, that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with him as a public person, and as the head of the human species, and had respect to his posterity, as included in him: And that this history is given by divine dii’ection, in the beginning of the first written revelation, to exhibit to our view the origin of the present, sinful, miserable state of mankind, that we might see what that was, which first gave occasion for all those consequent, wonderful dispensations of divine mercy and grace towards mankind, which are the great subject of the scriptures, both’of the Old and New Testament: And that these things are not obscurely and doubtfully pointed forth, but delivered in a plain account of things, which easily and naturally exhibits them to our understandings.

And by what follows in this discourse, we may have, in some measure, opportunity to see how other things in the Holy Scripture agree with what has been now observed from .the three first chapters of Genesis,