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TheWay Library › The Obligations of the World to the Bible › Lecture VI: The Morality of the Bible

by Gardiner Spring

Lecture VI

The Morality of the Bible

There is no one particular in which the Bible has effected a greater change in the condition of the world, than its outward and visible morality. To say nothing of that spiritual character upon which the Scriptures every where insist, there is not now, nor has there been ever, any portion of the world where the principles of revealed religion have been received, where the most astonishing changes have not been produced in the moral habits of society. This justice must be done to infidelity, that while it has waged war upon the truths of the Bible, it has commended its moral precepts; and while it has ridiculed its miracles and prophecies, it has ingenuously acknowledged that its morality is altogether more pure and lofty than that which philosophy ever taught. And however involuntarily, or incautiously made, such confessions are no unmeaning homage rendered to the truth of the Sacred Scriptures. For, if disjointed, disfigured, mutilated, torn from its foundations, and deprived of all its natural life and vigor, as it has been by the great mass of infidel writers, the morality of the Bible has grandeur and excellence enough to extort the commendation of its enemies; what must it be, when undisturbed from its foundations, unsevered from its proper aliment, it is seen and recognized in its true power and excellence!

Neither pagan philosophers, nor modern infidels, nor the philosophical world in Christian lands have been without their moral theories. When the Saviour of men descended from heaven, the Grecian and Oriental philosophy had obtained powerful influence over the thinking part of mankind j — the former prevailing throughout Greece and Rome, the latter throughout Persia, Syria, Chaldea, and Egypt. “The Greeks sought after wisdom.” And yet among them we find the sect of the Epicureans, who believed that the world arose from chance; that the god’s extended no care over human aflfairs 5 that the soul was mortal 5 that pleasure was the chief good 5 and that virtue was to be prized only as it contributed to man’s enjoyment. The academical philosophy, from Plato down to the period when the academic school was transferred to Rome, was professedly a system of doubt and scepticism. Its disciples denied the possibility of arriving at truth and certainty; held it doubtful whether the god’s existed, or did not exist 5 whether the soul is mortal and survives the body 5 and whether virtue is preferable to vice, or vice to virtue. The most profound, as well as the most ingenious of this sect yielded to the notion, that amid the endless varieties of human opinion, nothing could be decided. This evil was so deeply felt by Socrates, that he deemed it necessary that an instructor should be sent from heaven with special authority to reveal and enforce the duty of man. The Stoics held that man was bound to act according to his nature 5 that nature impels him to pursue whatever appears to be a goodj that the great object of pursuit is not pleasure, but conformity to nature, and that this is the origin of all moral obligation. The oriental philosophy regarded matter as eternal, and as the source and origin of all evil and vice 5 and that the material creation in its present form, and the race of man, derive their origin not from the supreme God, but from some inferior being. The Persians asserted the existence of two eternal principles, the one presiding over light, the other over matter; the one good, and the other evil.* The professed character of the god’s of paganism was distinguished for crime, while the religion of those who worshipped them required them to be immoral. I hold it to be a truth capable of clear demon-

* Murdock’s Mosheim, Warberton’s Divine Legation, and Cudworth’s Intellectual System. stration, that no man is better than his principles. To be virtuous, he must possess virtuous principles. “As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he.” As his principles are, so is the man. There is an indissoluble connection between the nature of his moral conduct, and the principles from which they flow. Any thing may be called by any name, and any thing may appear under any shape 5 but never can it happen that of “thorns men gather figs, nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes.” Men are governed in their outward deportment by their inward views and motives. It is so in politics, in literature, in science and the arts *, and it is so in morals and religion. And yet, how often do we hear it asserted, that it is of little consequence what a man believes, if his heart is right 5 that you must look at his character and not at his doctrine 5 that good men are to be found in pagan, Mohammedan, and Christian lands, and of all creeds and professions; that moral conduct is not the result of any set of opinions 5 and that it is of no consequence what a man’s faith is, if he is only sincere! But this is a delusive and destructive morality. If there be any truth in such a theory, moral principles are of no account whatever. One system of morals is as good as another, and those persons are just as likely to be virtuous who believe what is false, as those who believe what is true. But common sense instinctively revolts from such a doctrine, while all observation and experience evince its absurdity. Good conduct never grows out of corrupt principles, nor is evil conduct the natural result of principles that are good. Is it so that a man may be one thing in his principles, and another in his morality j one thing in his belief, and another in his character? By what sort of philosophy is it that he is thus divided against himself 5 that he is thus torn asunder, and while one part of him is pronounced good, another is pronounced bad? A man’s principles are himself. His morality is himself. Suppose for a moment, that the hypothesis on which we are animadverting should be realized. Here is a man who is one thing in his principles and another thing in his practice. He believes for example that the earth is a sphere, and yet he navigates it as though it were a plain. He believes that food is necessary to animal life, and yet he abstains from food. He believes that the hand of the diligent maketh rich, and yet he is a sluggard. He believes that fire will burn, and yet he plunges deliberately into the flames. He believes that Jehovah is the true God and yet he worships the devil. You call him a madman 5 and well you may. But not more certainly than the man who believes there is no difference between what is right and what is wrong, and yet forms all his plans and conduct with a view to that difference. Not more certainly than the man who believes there is no God and no hereafter, and yet fears God and shapes his deportment with a view to an hereafter. His morality must take its rise from his principles. Moral principles constitute the seed, the germ of which moral character is but the developement.

Men are every where the subjects of moral law, and capable of moral actions. Their conduct as moral beings is good or evil, as it rests upon a true or false foundation, as it is determined by a true or false standard, as it flows from right, or wrong motives. And hence it is, that pagan morality is so defective. Detached from the Bible, it has no other guide than the passions of men, and those few principles which may be suggested by the lights of reason and nature. It is no caricature of pagan morality to say, that it had no settled standard of right and wrong, and that we look in vain throughout all their philosophy for any well established principles of duty, or motives and aims that commend themselves to an enhghtened conscience. What is the nature and foundation of virtue 5 what is the rule of moral conduct; what is the ultimate object toward which it should be directed 5 in what does the duty and happiness of man consist? are inquiries which never have been satisfactorily answered by the unassisted powers of the human mind. What the practical results of these uncertain speculations were, the annals of all pagan history show. Nor are they any where more comprehensively exhibited than in the following declarations of the great apostle, concerning the whole pagan world.” They became vain in their imaginations and their foolish heart was darkened. They were filled with all unrighte-

ousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, murder, deceit, malignity. They were backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, inventers of evil things, disobedient to parents, without natural affection, implacable and unmerciful.” Their manners and customs, where not dictated by the love of wickedness, seem to have been dictated by mere caprice and whim. What was virtue in one country, was vice in another 5 and what was unpardonable rudeness in one, was refinement in another. Egypt was distinguished for great corruption of morals, as early as the time of Abraham and Joseph. Their public festivals were celebrated by practises so shameful, that they disgrace the page of the historian. If from Egypt you pass to Asia Minor, you see the prominent traits of moral character still the same, — unrighteousness, malignity, luxury, effieminacy and sensuality. If you look to Greece, in the early part of their history, you see brutal savageness in its most shameless forms*, while, in the age of greater refinement, iniquity only “put on an embroidered garb, and of more delicate texture.” The Olympic, Pythian, and Isthmian games, while they imparted that strength of body and courage in battle, which were formerly the most enviable qualities which this nation knew, degraded and polluted their minds and morals to the lowest degree of debasement. Wherever indeed you read of the “heroic ages” of ancient times, you may be assured they are fruitful in crime and horror, in parricide and incest, and all those melancholy and tragic catastrophies which present the most dismal and hideous picture of our race. The monarchs of Assyria passed the greater part of their lives in voluptuousness and debauchery. The proud Semiramis, notwithstanding all the commendations passed upon her heroism, led her subjects a career of unrestricted voluptuousness and debauchery. The most brilliant ages of Babylon were most distinguished for dissolutenesss, and even the greatest refinement in debauchery. — Gorged with riches, they tasked their ingenuity in the invention of all that could delight the senses, and alternately excite and gratify the basest passions. Here was that memorable temple in which every female was obliged by law, once in her life to prostitute herself to a stranger, for the purpose of augmenting the public revenue. As a general fact, debauchery was not only allowed by the ancient pagans, but approved by their religion. Even as cultivated a mind as that of Cicero, regarded it as no crime. Horace represents Cato as commending the young men who frequent the public houses of pollution, because they did nothing worse.* If such were the morals of the

“Virtute esto, inquit sententia, Dia Catonis Nam simul ac venas inflavit tetra libido Hue juvenes, equum est descendere non alienas Permolere uxores.” Sat. lib. I. S. 2. v. 32. purest state of Rome, and of Cato, the severest censor of public manners, what must have been the most impure? I will tell you what they were. The emperor Nero drove through the streets of his capital with his naked mistress 5 and the emperor Commodus first dishonoured, and then murdered his own sister. “If these things were done in the green tree, what were done in the dry.” Vice always descends from rulers to subjects. If such were the morals of emperors, what must have been the morals of the common people? And what but such a depravation of morals is to be expected, where reason, blinded by appetite, is the only guide 5 where conscience has no firm mooring, and the only impulse is the fitful breath of passion? How could the doctrines of paganism excite to moral virtue? It is perfectly obvious from the character of their gods, and from their hopes of a voluptuous paradise, that the whole system of the pagan world had not the least tendency to produce and cherish virtuous emotions. And how much better are the moral principles of modern infidels? Lord Bolingbroke resolves all morality into self love. And so does Volney. Hobbes maintains that the sole foundation of right and wrong is the civil law. Rousseau says, “All the morality of our actions Hes in the judgment we ourselves form of them.” Lord Shaftesbury declares that “all the obligations to be virtuous arise from the advantages of virtue, and the disadvantages of vice.” Hume affirms, that “moral, intellectual, and corporeal virtues are nearly of the same kind.” Have such moral principles ever reformed the world? Did they reform their authors? Where will such principles lead, if carried out into practice? What are their fruits? What is there in an enlightened conscience that responds to their pretensions?

And are there not some systems of ethical philosophy which are not found either among pagans, or infidels that are far below the spirit of the Bible? What is the morality, the foundation of which is simply what is useful and expedient j the standard of which is the spirit and maxims of this world J and the motives of which are purely mercenary and selfish? Can that be called morality, which recognizes no immutable distinction- between what is right and what is wrong 5 which has no reference to the obligations of the divine law ‘j and is concerned only with our own interests? Can that be called morality which asks, not what is right, but what is profitable? which enquires not for duty, but for interest, for the opinions of men, for the spirit of the age? Such a morality is most certainly radically defective. It is the morality of the world, not of the Bible. It is a mere external - morality. It has no thorough lodgment, no permanent abode in the hidden chambers of the soul. It is a superficial observance. It is what all morality must be, separated from the truth of the Scriptures: — a body without a soul — a whited sepulchre — splendid only in sepulchral magnificence.

The morality of the Bible is well and intelligibly defined. Its foundation, its standard, its motives are distinctly set before us, and ought not to be misunderstood. Why then is any being in the universe under obligations to be morally virtuous? Why is the Divine Being bound to be holy, unless because holiness is right, and he is capable of perceiving it to be so? And why are intelligent creatures bound to be morally virtuous, unless because they are so made as to be able to perceive, and feel under obligation to approve and practise moral virtue?” Be ye holy for I the Lord your God am holy.’’’’ If the Divine Being were malevolent, or selfish, would that circumstance bind us to be so too? The moral excellence of the divine character is a good and sufficient reason why men should be morally excellent. God requires them to be holy., because he is holy. The character that is right in God, is right in creatures. It is in its own nature just what it ought to be. The Deity would not be satisfied with himself without possessing such a character; nor would virtuous and holy minds be satisfied with him, if he were not thus perfectly amiable and excellent. God is love 5 God is truth 5 God is rectitude 5 God is mercy •, God is justice. There is a wide and immutable diflference between such a character and the opposite. The former is right, and the latter is wrong. Nothing can reconcile them. There is not, nor can there be any gradual approximation of them to one another. They are perfect opposites, and so will always remain. It would not be right for God to possess any other character than that which he does possess 5 and no considerations of profit and loss, no considerations of the probable tendency of any other character, can ever induce him to change, or modify it •, nor were it possible to do so, except for the worse. The foundation of moral obligation therefore lies in the immutable difference between what is right and what is wrong, and in the capacity of intelligent beings to perceive that difference. I say in the capacity to perceive that difference 5 for in a fallen creature especially, that difference may not always be perceived, while the obligation to perceive it remains unimpared. When we look at our own natures, and the natures of our fellow men 5 when we contemplate the relations we sustain to them and they sustain to us j unless our minds are blinded by wickedness, we cannot help perceiving that all the moral virtues are right. They grow out of our mutual relations, and not to practise them is wrong. And on this basis the Scriptures place’ our obligations to moral virtue.

It has been often asserted that utility is the foundation of moral obligation. Utility to whom? To mc? Then indeed is the securing of my own advantage the great end. And what sort of moral virtue is this? Utility to the universe? Then let it be made to appear that throughout the vast empire of God no sinful thought or action was ever indispensable to the highest good. Nothing is more obvious from the Bible than that the reason why God requires moral virtue is, not because it is useful, but because it is right. He is “of purer eyes than to behold iniquity and cannot look on sin.” He could not be bribed to do this for all the universe, ten thousand times told. He requires the duties of morality because they are right, and in conformity with himself. He does not “do evil that good may come.” He never requires men to do what is wrong, even though he foresees in many instances, that their sinful conduct may be turned to the best account. It is utterly immoral to make utility the foundation of moral obhgation, and to assign either the direct or indirect tendency of an action to promote happiness, as the reason why it ought to be performed. Moral, virtue has a nature besides its tendency to happiness. Just as truth diflers essentially and immutably from falsehood, just as light differs from darkness, and sweet from bitter, does good differ from evil. No law can confound them j no beneficial tendency of the one, or of the other can alter their nature 5 but like the nature of the Deity, they will remain forever the same. To make utility the foundation of moral virtue, seems to my mind to tear up all the foundations of moral virtue itself. Virtue is no longer virtue, and vice is no longer vice, if this theory be true. If this theory were true, then, if in view of the divine mind, vice is expedient, it is no longer vice 5 and if virtue is inexpedient, it is no longer virtue. And what wonder if men should abuse this reasoning, put themselves in the place of God, and decide that to be virtue which promotes their happiness, and that to be vice which promotes their misery? There have been such moral philosophers and they are well described by the apostle as — “men of corrupt minds, supposing that gain is godliness.” Such a morality were the most changeful and evanescent thing in the world. No matter what its pretensions, it is mere selfishness, and radically hostile to all moral virtue. If virtue is any thing, it is virtue every where and always 5 and if vice is any thing — any thing but a name, it is vice always and every where. The divine nature is unchanging. It is virtue — the highest virtue and nothing in the condition of this world, or other worlds — nothing in the divine purposes or government — nothing in time or eternity, can alter its nature. And this is one reason why, when the knowledge of God was lost in the world, there were no longer any just ideas of virtue and moral obligation. How is it possible there should be a sound morality where there is no knowledge of God? There is a chasm in morals which can be supplied only by a just acquaintance with the Deity.

The Bible teaches us that the true and only standard of morality is the divine law. The rule, or standard of duty, is a different thing from the foundation of moral obligation. No being in the universe is so capable of judging of the nature of moral virtue, of the difference between what is right and what is wrong in all the circumstances and relations of human existence, and of what is, and what is not conformed to his own character, as God himself. No creature has the right to do this to any such extent as would make his own will, or judgment, or notions of any kind, the rule. The only standard to which all human conduct ought to be conformed, and conformity to which is rectitude, is the law of the great Supreme. If there be a God, he must rule j his will must be law. He has no superior, no antecedent 5 and there is no being of equal claims and rectitude. He only has a right to give law, and he only is able to give it in conformity to the eternal rule of his own perfect nature. We have perfect assurance that his law is like himself, and that he requires nothing but what is right, and forbids nothing but what is wrong. Because his own character is spotless and pure, he requires purity in others. Nothing ‘but moral virtue is the object of his approbation and complacency, and therefore he can require nothing else. His will is the safe standard in kind, weight and measure. Whose will should be law, if not his in whom men live, and move, and have their being 5 whose, if not the will of that great lawgiver, whose authority is uncontrolled and infinite? How can we wonder at the fluctuating morality of the pagan nations, when they have no unfluctuating standard? how can it be otherwise than that their ideas of moral virtue should be low and contracted, when even their very vices are prescribed as virtues?

If the previous remarks are just, it scarcely need be said, that the grand motive of a sound morality is a heart-felt respect for God as the rightful lawgiver. It is a remark of the infidel Volney, that “there is no merit, or crime in intention.” Just the reverse of this, is the morality of the Bible. What it uniformly requires is virtuous conduct springing from right motives. It aims at the heart. It addresses its claims, not to the love of pleasure, nor the love of the world, nor the love of fame and power, but to an ingenuous regard for God. It is a sense of duty that governs, and of duty springing from love to God. It is a sense of right. Our selfishness may be never so wisely directed 5 its calculations may be never so shrewd and politic j but they can never rise to the elevation of holy love. Nay, “though I give all my goods to feed the poor, and my body to be burned, and have not love 5 I am nothing.” The morality and the religion of the Bible are identified. “This is the love of God that we keep his commandments.” There is no love to God’ without keeping his commandments, and there is no keeping his commandments without love to God. There is no religion without morality, and there is no morality without religion. In the language of a modern Scottish writer, “Morality is religion in practice 5 religion is morality in principle.”* The morality of the Bible springs from the predominant principle of holy love. And it is an all-governing principle — fruitful, life-giving and powerful — stronger even than the energetic principles of evil within us, and making the yoke of obedience easy, and its burden light.

Such are the distinctions between the morality of the. world and the morality of the Scriptures. The former has no foundation on which it can rest 5 no unvarying standard, no high-born impulse. It may have instances of cautious abstinence, of ardent devotement, of heroic magnanimity 5 but they will not bear the inspection of the omniscient eye, nor the analysis of eternal truth. Their elements are pride, vanity, and egotism. Actions whose fame has resounded through the world, atchievements whose praise is recorded on the page of history, men whose proud name has been encircled with a halo of human glory from age to age, will all be found wanting when once weighed in the balances of eternal truth and rectitude. It is a remark of Foster, in his Essay upon the causes for the neglect of evangelical religion by men of taste, that” the moral philosophers seem anxious to avoid every thing that might subject them to the appellation of Christian divines. They regard their department as a science complete in itself j and they investigate the foundations of morality, define its laws, and affix its sanctions in a manner generally

Wardlaw’s Christian Ethics.

SO distinct from Christianity, that the reader would almost conclude religion to be another science complete in itself. It is striking to observe how small a portion of the ideas which distinguish the New Testament from other books, many moral philosophers have thought indispensable to a theory, in which they professed to include the entire duty and interests of men. A serious reader is constrained to feel that there is either too much in that book, or too little in theirs.” The justice and importance of these observations will occur to the mind of every one as he adverts to the treatises of Paley, Gisborn, Brown, Stewart, and Mcintosh. It should excite no great surprise in a Christian audience to be told that the science of morals is founded on the principles of divine revelation, and that the great principles of morality are inseparable from the word of God. Moral philosophy is the science which treats of the nature of human actions, of the motives and laws which govern them, and of the ends to which they ought to be directed. And surely such a philosophy is found in the Bible alone. For the heart to be right toward man, it must be right with God. Motives for the regulation of human conduct are suggested in abundance by men whose moral theories were never identified with the sacred volume 5 but they have been addressed, if not to the worst, to some of the most unworthy passions of the human heart. But the morality founded on such a basis, and supported by such incentives, is devoid of principle.

It knows no law but the opinions of men, and the ever fluctuating state of human society. It invests itself with different forms, as the character of the age, the state of the times, and the circumstances of the individual require. It is one thing in Europe, and another in Asia j one thing in the palace, and another in the mansions of the poor 5 one thing amid the quietude and searching observation of a rural village, and another amid the bustle and concealment of a crowded city 5 one thing on the Exchange, and another amid the retirement of private life j one thing in the equable seasons of untempting prosperity, another amid the embarrassments and agitations of calamity and misfortune*, one thing in peace, and another in war; one thing at home, and another abroad. It is one thing to-day, and another thing to-morrow. It is unstable as water and variable as the wind. It is a temporizing, time-serving morality. It complies with the hour and the occasion. It humours the current of opinion and circumstances. It is a system of moral obsequiousness, that is every where pliant and conciliating except to the claims of sterling integrity.

But with what different views do we regard the morality of the Scriptures. On every page of this sacred volume we see a system of ethics as pure, as lofty, as invariable as its Divine Author. We meet with perpetual evidence of those great principles of unbending virtue, which, while they purify and regulate the interior, also purify and regulate the exterior man 5 and which produce an equability of character, a “calm constancy,” a tenderness of conscience, a kindness of spirit, as far removed from the morality and philanthropy of the world, as are the cold abstractions of heathen philosophy from the sermon on the mount. The Bible settles the great question. What is duty? It is every where familiar with that all-important principle, that to do right men must do what is right in itself from right motives and with a right spirit. These two things God has joined together, and no man may put them asunder. It is not enough that a man’s conscience is satisfied that he is doing right, unless he does it with a right spirit and from right motives. Nor is it enough that he acts from a right spirit and right motives, unless he does what is right in itself. He may not speak what is untrue, because he does it with benevolent intentions j nor wreak a malignant revenge upon his enemy, because his conscience may be so blinded as to justify his malignity. Conscience may be so blinded as to lead a man sincerely to do what is abomination in the sight of God. The rectitude of his conduct may not depend on his sincerity. He may act from prejudice, selfishness, and malevolence; and the time may come when, notwithstanding all the convictions of his conscience, like Saul of Tarsus, he may bewail the madness of his spirit, and see that he was altogether without excuse. His conscience may adopt false conclusions, conclusions in which light is resisted because he loves darkness; while in opposition to evidence he may persist in these conclusions, because a wrong spirit has paramount power. It is only when conscience is obeyed from a right spirit, that we have convincing evidence that our conduct is right in the sight of God. We may do many things that seem to be right, from a wrong spirit 5 and we may do many things that are wrong, from a right spirit. The morahty of the Bible teaches us that to do right, we must do so from a right spirit.

Such a morality is the same thing every where. In every portion of it you see the divine original. What it is now, it always was, and always will be. The knowledge and love of God impart a simplicity, a symmetry, a beauty to the theory of morals which insinuate themselves into every part of the system, and by a thousand imperceptible shades and impulses, adorn and control the whole. What beautiful simplicity, what resistless energy, when contrasted with the heavy and complicated movements of an infidel, a pagan, or a pharisaic morality! God requires it — this is the motive which sways the Christian moralist. You may descant upon the dignity of his nature, upon the beauty of virtue, the turpitude of vice, and the claims of a well regulated selfishness •, but how weak and unattractive are such considerations compared with the authority of that Supreme Being whom he loves and adores!

Would you reform the manners of human society, you must aim at the heart 5 you must diffuse throughout the mass the leaven of truth, you must throw around the conscience the strong bonds of obhgation, and draw the heart by the cords of love, as with the bands of a man. You must extend the empire of the great Lawgiver over the understanding, over the memory, over the imagination, over the warm and grateful affections, over the whole soul. This alone will suppress the germinations of crime, and check wickedness in its bud. This will impart the seeds of virtuous principle, which, in the maturity of their growth and expansion, will exemphfy on the largest scale the great practical axiom, distinguished alike for its certainty and its perspicuity, “Make the tree good and its fruit good.”

The only specious objection to the morality of the Bible is, that it is one of its leading doctrines that moral virtue avails nothing toward making an atonement for sin *, that no transgressor of the divine law can merit anything by his good works; that his justification is entirely gratuitous and rests upon the righteousness of another 5 and that in the whole matter of his salvation, “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” If this is so, of what avail, it is asked, are all the moral virtues, and what encouragement have men to do the will of God? We need only reply to this, that the foundation of man’s acceptance and justification before God is one thing, and the character or moral condition in which he is justified is another. The foundation of his justification is the finished atonement, the obedience unto death of God’s eternal Son. The character, or moral condition in which he is justified is that of a repentant sinner, an humble believer in Jesus Christ. But what is the faith which is thus the condition of his acceptance? Is it a cold assent to the truths of the gospel? Or is it a warm, vivifying sentiment of the heart, working by love and putting all the powers of the soul into vigorous action in deeds of righteousness? “What doth it profit, tho’ a man say he have faith and have not works?” Do the Scriptures recognize any such faith as this, even though a man may say he have it, and that it is the true faith? “Can such a faith save him?” Never. If it have not works, “it is dead, being alone.” It is no faith. Works of righteousness are not merely the fruits of faith, but they enter into the nature of all the faith that lives, and breaths, and throws its animating pulsations throughout his moral frame. So that the method of gratuitous justification by faith in the Son of God, instead of annihilating, confirms *, instead of diminishing, augments 5 and instead of countervailing, gives a new impulse to the primoeval obligations and motives to moral virtue. “How shall we who are dead to sin, live any longer therein?” Is this undermining the obligations to moral virtue? “Ye have been bought with a price, and that not of silver and gold, but with the precious blood of the Son of God, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot J wherefore glorify God in your bodies and spirits, which are his.” Is this diminishing the motives to moral virtue? “The love of Christ constraineth us, because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead 5 and that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but to him that died for them, and rose again.” Is this weakening the force of moral obHgation? “Do we make void the law through faith? Yea, we establish the law.” “This do, and thou shall live,” is to the transgressor an impracticable condition. It is too late for a sinner to dream of being justified by deeds of law. But there is another law. “Believe, and thou shall be saved.” Under the first covenant, obedience secures salvation 5 under the second, salvation secures obedience. He “loves much, who has much forgiven j” and he only obeys, who loves.

If I urge upon you then, my young friends the claims of morality, it is the morality of the Bible. It is not the morality of Seneca or Plato. Nor is it the morality of the young man who said, “All these have I kept from my youth up j” but whose “heart was bound in fetters of gold.” There is a morality that will never become the possessor of heavenly treasures. Nay, it were “easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle,” than for such a morality to enter into the kingdom of God. You must practically acknowledge the God of heaven as your king and love him with an undivided heart. You must take up your cross and follow your Saviour, or you are not worthy of him. True morality will lead you to love him above all others, and prefer his service above that of all other masters. Without this, it were in vain to think of governing your life by his example and laws. A mere outward morality will serve you and your generation a little while j it may even diminish the aggravation of your guilt and the weight of your sufferings in the future world. But it can avert neither 5 and if this is all you have to plead in the presence of your Judge, it will “profit you nothing.”

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