The Plan of Salvation

The subject to which our attention is to be directed in this series of lectures is ordinarily spoken of as “The Plan of Salvation.’’ Its more technical designation is, “The Order of Decrees.” And this technical designation has the advantage over the more popular one, of more accurately defining the scope of the subject matter. This is not commonly confined to the processes of salvation itself, but is generally made to include the entire course of the divine dealing with man which ends in his salvation. Creation is not uncommonly comprehended in it, and of course the fall, and the condition of man brought about by the fall. This portion of the subject matter may, however, possibly with some pressure, be looked upon as rather of the nature of a presupposition, than as a substantive part of the subject matter itself; and so no great harm will be done if we abide by the more popular designation. Its greater concreteness gives it an advantage which should not be accoimted small; and above all it has the merit of throwing into emphasis the main subject, salvation. The series of the divine actilaties which

are brought into consideration are in any event supposed to circle around as their center, and to have as their proximate goal, the salvation of sinful man. When the implications of this are fairly considered it may not seem to require much argument to justify the designation of the whole by the term, “The Plan of Salvation.”

It does not seem necessary to pause to discuss the previous question whether God, in his saving activities, acts upon a plan. That God acts upon a plan in all his activities, and therefore also in his saving activities, is already given in Theism. On the establishment of a personal God, this question is closed. For person means purpose: precisely what distinguishes a person from a thing is that its modes of action are purposive, that all it does is directed to an end and proceeds through the choice of means to that end. Even the Deist, therefore, must allow that God has a plan. We may, no doubt, imagine an extremle form of Deism, in which it may be contended that God does not concern himself .at all with what happens in his imiverse; that, having created it, he turns aside from it and lets it run its own course to any end that may happen to it, without having himself given a thought to it. It is needless to say, however, that no such extreme form of Deism actually exists, though, strange to say, there are some, as we shall have occasion to observe, who appear to think that in the particular matter of the salvation of man God does act much after this irresponsible fashion.

What the actual Deist stands for is law. He conceives that God commits his imiverse, not to imforeseen and imprepared caprice, but to law; law which God has impressed on his imiverse and to the guidance of which he can safely leave his imiverse. That is to say, even the Deist conceives God to have a plan; a plan which embraces all that happens in the imiverse. He differs with the Theist only as to the modes of activity by which he conceives God to carry out this plan. Deism involves a mechanical conception of the imiverse. God has made a machine, and just because it is a good machine, he can leave it to work out, not its, but his ends. So we may make a dock and then, just because it is a good clock, leave it to tick off the seconds, and point out the minutes, and strike the hours, and mark off the days of the month, and turn up the phases of the moon and the accompanying tides; and, if we choose, we may put in a comet which shall appear on the dial but once in the life of the dock, not erratically, but when and where and how we have arranged for it to appear. The dock does not go its own way; it goes our way, the way which we have arranged for it to go; and God’s dock, the imiverse, goes not its way but his way, as he has ordained for it, grinding out the inevitable events with mechanical predsion.

This is a great conception, the Ddstic conception of law. It delivers us from chance. But it does so, only to cast us into the cogged teeth of a machine. It is, therefore, not the greatest conception. .The

greatest conception is the conception of Theism, which delivers us even from law, and places us in the immediate hands of a person. It is a great thing to be delivered from the inordinate realm of aimless chance. The goddess Tyche, Fortima, was one of the most terrible divinities of the old world, quite as terrible as and scarcely distinguishable from Fate. It is a great thing to be imder the control of intelligent purpose. But it makes every difference whether the purpose is executed by mere law, acting automatically, or by the ever-present personal control of the person himself. There is nothing more ordinate than the control of a person, all of whose actions are governed by intelligent purpose, directed to an end.

If we believe in a personal God, then, and much more if, being Theists, we believe in the immediate control by this personal God of the world he has made, we must believe in a plan underlying all that God does, and therefore also in a plan of salvation. The only question that can arise concerns not the reality but the nature of this plan. As to its nature, however, it must be admitted that a great many diflfering opinions have been held. Indeed pretty nearly every possible opinion has been annoimced at one time or another, in one quarter or another. Even if we leave all extra-Christian opinions to one side, we need scarcely modify this statement. Lines of division have been drawn through the Church; parties have been set over against parties; and different t)T)es

of belief have been developed which amount to nothing less than different systems of religion, which are at one in little more than the mere common name of Christian, claimed by them all.

It is my purpose in this lecture to bring before us in a rapid survey such of these var)dng views as have been held by large parties in the Church, that some conception may be formed of their range and relations. This may be most conveniently done by observing, in the first instance at least, only the great points of difference which separate them. I shall enumerate them in the order of significance, proceeding from the most profound and far-reaching differences which divide Christians to those of less radical effect.

I. The deepest cleft which separates men calling themselves Christians in their conceptions of the plan of salvation, is that which divides what we may call the Naturalistic and the Supematuralistic views. The line of division here is whether, in the matter of the salvation of man, God has planned simply to leave men, with more or less completeness, to save themselves, or whether he has planned himself to intervene to save them. The issue between the naturalist and the supematuralist is thus the eminently simple but quite absolute one: Does man saves himself or does God save him?

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