Appendix, Containing Remarks on Several Authors
1. Hemarks on Bishop jYewtons Dissertation on the Final State and Condition of Men, contained in Vol. vi. of his works, page 325, &,c.
JV. B. In page 38 this dissertation was referred to, as quoted in the Monthly Review. The reason was I had not then seen the Dissertation itself.
The Bishop held, that all the damned will be punished according to their demerits; as may appear by the following passages: — “There will be different degrees of happiness or misery, in proportion to their different conduct and behaviour in this world. As nothing is juster and more equitable in itself, so nothing is clearer and more demonstrable from scripture. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right, in every single instance, as well as in the general account? It is not only agreeable to the first principles of reason, but may also be confirmed by the most express testimonies of revelation.“* — “Our Saviour threateneth different punishments to the wicked, as he promiseth different rewards to the righteous, greater or less, according to the nature and qualities of their ac<ic?15.“t “It is evident then and undeniable, that every man shall receive his own reward or punishment, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.”J: •’ It must be then admitted, that God hath threatened everlasting
* Page 344. f Page 347, X Ibid, misery to the wicked, as plainly and positively as he hath promised everlasting happiness to the righteous. He hath fairly set before us life and death, blessing and cnrpjing, eternal happiness as well as everlasting misery, the one to balance the other. Is there any injustice in this? Are not the terms and conditions equal? And if men will choose cursing rather than blessing, and voluntarily incur everlasting misery, when they might as easily attain eternal happiness, whom have they to complain of, or whom can they arraign of unequal proceeding but themselves? (Ezek. xviii. 29.) Are not my ways equal? Are not your ways unequal, saith the Lord? You cannot then complain of injustice, for the rewards and punishments are equal: and it was really necessary, that these rewards and punishments should be everlasting.“* —” Would any thing less than everlasting rewards and punishments be sufficient to encourage the good, to deter the bad, and secure obedience to the divine commands?! — How then can you complain, that God is an arbitrary governor, and annexeth greater penalties to his laws than are necessary. — You cannot then complain, that the sanction of eternal penalties is unreasonable, for you see plainly, that it is no more than is absolutely necessary. But possibly you may think, though it may be necessary in the government of this world for such things to be denounced by God, and believed by man, yet there may not be the like necessity for inflicting them in the world to come: God is not obliged to execute his threatenings, as he is to make good his promises. But why is he not obliged to perform the one as well as the other? H’s threatenings are never, like those of men, made rnshly, never founded in passion or caprice, that it should be better not to execute, than execute
* Page 356, t Page 357.
them. — If God will not execute as well as threaten, why doth he threaten at all? — Is it not more suitable to the character of a God of truth, and becoming the simplicity and sincerity of a divine revelation, to declare the truth, and nothing but the truth, and leave it to work upon men as it can, rather than denounce in the most solemn manner what was never intended, and never shall come to pass, and so endeavour to alarm them with taise fears, and to work upon them with false persuasions, which have nothing to answer them?’’* — God must be just as well as merciful. He can never exercise one of his attributes so as to clash or interfere with anolher.”1
On these quotations it may be remarked, that the Bishop plainly held, that endless misery is threatened; for he always uses the word everlasting in the endless sense, and believed this to be the scriptural sense of it, when applied to future punishment.j He also rejected the doctrine of annihilation. § Now then his opinion was either, that endless misery is unconditionally threatened to all who die impenitent; or that it is threatened to them on condition of their continued impenitence in the future world. If it be threatened unconditionally, it follows, (1) That endless misery is the just punishment of the sins committed in this life. For who will pretend, that God hath made a law, which contains an unjust penalty? This would be equally inconsistent with the divine moral rectitude, as to make a law containing unjust or unreasonable precepts; or to execute the unjust penalty. But if this were the opinion of the Bishop, to be consistent he must have given up the doctrine of universal salvation, to establish which he wrote his Dissertation. For he not only declares in the passages already quoted, that •’ God must be just as well as merciful, and can
* Pages 357, 358. f Page 388. % See page 355.
i See page 349.
never exercise one of his attributes so as to interfere with another;” and “that his threatenings are never like those of men, made rashly, never founded in passion or caprice, that it should be better not to execute, than execute them;”* but taccording- to Matt. v. 26, and xviii. 34, he acknowledges, that the damned shall pay the uttermost farthing, and all that is due. — (2) It will follow, that sin’is an infinite evil. Certainly that moral evil which deserves an infinite natural evil to be inflicted by way of punishment, is an infinitely ill-deserving moral evil; this is plain by the very terms: and a moral evil, which is infinitely ill-deserving, is all that is meant by the infinite evil of sin. Yet this sentiment he reprobates in the strongest terms.
Bit if those who die impenitent be threatened with endless misery, on condition of their continued impenitence only; then a mere salutary discipline is all the punishment which atiy sinner deserves according to strict justice. The law is the rule of righteousness; the penalty of that is adequate to the demand of justice; and if the penalty of that be an endless punishment unless the sinner shall repent, the penalty in reality is so much punishment only as shall lead the sinner to repentance; and this salutary and necessary discipline is the whole penalty or curse of the law.
That this was really the opinion of the Bishop may appear from the following expressions: “If God will not execute as well as threaten, why doth he threaten at all? It must be said, to reclaim a sinner; and it is allowed that if the sinner be reclaimed, the end is obtained, and the threatening is voided of course. “J —” Several of the fathers conceived the ‘fire of hell to be a purging as well as a pejial fire — But this penal purging fire is very
* Page 358. f Page 382. % Page 358.
different from the purgatory of the church of Rome; for that is not once mentioned in scripture, but this is often repeated.“* — “If the offender be corrected and reformed, the first end is fully answered, and the punishment should cease of course. If he still remain incorrigible, it is fitting that the punishment should be continued and increased, till it have the due effect.”! — “It is just, and wise, and good, and even merciful, to correct a sinner as long as he deserves correction, to chastise him into a sense of his guilt, to whip and scourge him, as I may say, out of his fauUs.”| — ^’ li” they will not repent, why should he not execute upon them the threatenings which they have despised V — “This is the only means of escaping, there is none other condition or reservation.’’^ — “This 1 conceive to be the true notion of the eternity vf rewards and punishments. Righteousness will be forever happy and glorified, wickedness will be forever miserable and tormented. But if righteousness should become wickedness, and wickness should become righteousness — with the change of their nature, their state and condition would be changed too.”||
But where in all the scriptures is any such condition mentioned in the account of future punishment? It is not said Depart ye cursed into fire which shall be everlasting unless ye repent: These shall go away into punishment which shall be everlasting unless they repent: Their worm shall not die unless they repent: They cannot pass the great gulf unless they repent: The smoke of their torment shall ascend up forever and ever, unless they repent. — And to say that the meaning of the scripture is thus conditional, is to assert without any proof or evidence: nor does the Bishop pretend to produce any.
* Page 379. + Page 365. t Ibi. * Page 359. |( Ibid.
The Bishop argues universal salvation in this manner, ‘* He would have all men to be saved; and whence then ariseth the obstruction to his good will and pleasure, or how Cometh it to pass, that his gracious purposes are ever defeated?“* — So it may be said, “God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, and now commandeth all men every where to repent.” It is the will of God that all mankind should repent now this very day. Yet all mankind do not repent this very day. Whence then ariseth the obstruction to his good will and pleasure, or how cometh it to pass.that his gracious purposes are defeated?
“Nothing,” says the Bishop, “is more contrariant to the divine nature and attributes, than for God to bestow existence on any beings, whose destiny he foreknows must terminate in wretchedness without recovery.”! The truth of this proposition depends on the following principle. That it is not, nor can be, in any case, consistent with the general good implying the glory of God, that a sinner should be miserable without end. For if God foresee that the endless misery of a man will be subservient to the general good; there is nothing contrariant to the divine nature, to bestow existence upon him, though he foreknow that he will sin, that he will deserve endless misery, and that his destiny will terminate in wretchedness without recovery.
We find that there are in fact temporary miseries in the world. On what principle can these be reconciled with the divine attributes? If it be answered, on the sole principle, that they will issue in the personal good of the patients; the reply is, ( 1.) That this will be fact wants proof It is by no means evident, that God aims at the personal good of every individual in all his dispensatiors,
* Page 367, t Ibid.
however distressing; it is not evident that the inhabitants of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, &,c. are more happy in the whole of their existence, than if they had lived and died like other men. — (2.) Especially it is not evident, that all the sin and wickedness which any man commits will finally make him a more happy man, than he would have been, if he had committed no sin. If God may without a view to promote the personal good of a man, permit him to fall into sin, why may he not without a view to the same object, punish him for that sin? To say that God could not consistently with the moral agency of the man, prevent his falling into sin, will infer that God cannot consistently with the moral agency of the man, certainly and infallibly lead him to repentance. — (3.) The principle now under consideration implies that there is not now nor ever has been in the universe, any thing which on the whole is a real evil to any man considered in his individual capacity: that no man ever was or ever will be the subject of any curse, or any calamity which any man, with a view to his own happiness only, should wish to avoid.
Or if temporary Cf.lamities be reconciled with the divine attributes on this principle, that they are subservient to the general good; on the same principle we reconcile with the divine attributes, the endless misery of the damned — This whole argument depends on the supposition, that the final misery of any sinner cannot be subservient to the general good. To take this for granted is intolerable.
As we have seen, it is a fundamental principle with the Bishop, that such a punishment as is sufficient to lead a sinner to repentance, is all which is threatened in scripture. This then is the penalty or curse of the divine law: this is the utmost which strict justice will admit: and he on this supposition justly asserts, ‘Mhat some time or other satisfaction may be made, the debt of sin may be discharyed, and the sinner himself released out oi prison.’“‘* — This is utterly inconsistent with thQ salvation of the damned in the way of forgiveness. Yet his texts to prove universal salvation, imply salvation in the way of forgiveness only. After quoting Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7; “The Lord, the Lord Gud, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin;” he adds, ‘^ But how can such attributes consist with a system of irrevocable vengeance for thous-mds, transgressions never to be forgiven,*’ &c.? To which I answer, They can just as well consist with such a system, as with Bishop TsTewton’s system, which implies that the damned suffer all that they deserve; for what is this but irrevocable vengeance to the highest degree? And sursely the transgressions of those who suffer such a punishment are never forgiven.
It is absurd therefore for him to argue from grace, compassTon, the divine readiness to forgive, &,c. And equally absurd to argue as he does from the merits of Christ — For do they obtain any relief by Christ, who themselves suffer the whole penalty of the law, and thus make satisfiiction for their own sins? Yet he abundantly holds the salvation of all men by the merits of Cnrist: as in the following passages out of many: “It is the declared end and purpose of our blessed Saviour’s coming into the world, to recover and to redeem lost mankind. — How often is he styled the Saviour of the World in the full extent and meaning of the words?”t — ‘’ His very enemies are reconciled to God by the merit and offerings of his beloved Son.“| — “He only requires us to exert our best endeavours, and the merits of our Saviour will atone for the rest.’’’^
* Page 382. t Page 3G2. i Page 383, Page 38T.
“To suppose that a man’s happiness or misery to all eternity should absolutely and unchangeably be fixed by the uncertain behaviour of a few years in this life, is a supposition even more unreasonable and unnatural, than that a man’s mind and manners should be completely formed in his cradle, and his whole future fortune and condition should depend upon his infancy; infancy being much greater in proportion to the few years of this life, than the whole of this life to eternity.”* — The same might be said, if the time of man’s probation were ever so long, but limited. Thus; To suppose that a man’s happiness or misery to all eternity should be unchangeably fixed by the uncertain behaviour of millions of millions of ages, is a supposition even more unreasonable, than that a man’s mind and manners should be completely formed in his cradle, and his whole future fortune and condition should depend upon his infancy; infancy being much greater in proportion to the few years of this life, than millions of millions of ages to eternity.
“Nor could even his” [God’s] ‘’justice for short-lived transgressions inflict everlasting punishment. ‘’t — But how long-lived must the transgressions be, that justice may consent to inflict for them everlasting punishments? Let them be ever so long-lived, provided they are limited, they are still infinitely short-lived in comparison with an everlasting duration. And will it be said that the transgression must be as long-lived as the punishment, and that justice will not admit that the punishment of any transgression be of longer cgntinuance, than the transgression was in the prepaiation?
“What glory to God, to see a number of his creatures plunged in the depth of misery? What good-will towards men, to consign so many of them to everlasting punish-
* Page 361. j Page 368.
tnents?”* It is doubtless glory to God, that they be plunged into the depth of misery, if both they deserve it, and it be subservient to the good of the universe: and the gospel is a revelation of divine good-will towards men, though many of them reject the infinite grace and eternal salvation exhibited in that revelation, and by this and their other sins justly deserve and finally bring on themselves everlasting punishment.
II. A few remarks on James Ptelly s Treatise on Union.
He seems to hold, that all mankind were from eternity so united to Christ, that he and they make properly one whole or complex person. But it is extremely difficult to determine with precision what his ideas were. I shall therefore make several quotations from him, and subjoin such remarks as appear pertinent. ‘’ It doth not appear how God — could punish sin upon Christ, without the concurrence of righteousness and truth: nor can this concurrence be proved, without union between Christ and those, for whom he endured the cross — because contrary to truth, which declareth, that every man shali die for his ozvn sin.’“t — “Such an union between Christ and his church, as gives him the right of redemption, and brings him under that character, which is obnoxious to punishment, is absolutely necessary.“J: —” Without the consideration of union, where is the justice of charging the black rebellion and crying guilt of man, upon the pure and spotless head of Jesus. “§” Sin is — a crime — only atoned for — by the death, yea, the eternal death of the sinner: which justice must inflict before it can be properly satisfied; nor can it possibly admit of a surety here; because it can only punish him, whom it first finds
* Page 382. f Fage 3. :y: Ibid. i Page 4.
guilty; and not by reckoning him, to be what he is not, according to human quibbles, but according to artless, reasonable, divine equity; which can only declare such guilty, on whom the fault is found, and can only find the fault on such who have committed it. We only committed the fault; upon us only can it be found. Therefore, without such an union between Christ and us, as exposes us in his person, to judgment and condemnation, the harmony of the divine perfections doth not appear in the things which he suffered, because contrary to truth and justice.“* He largely illustrates this union between Christ and his church, by the union between the head and members in the natural body, and adds, “The union and harmony of the body renders it equitable to punish and chastise the whole body in one member, for its offence in another. Because if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it. As the union of the body makes it equitable to punish the head, for the offence of the other members; with like equity do the members participate with the head, in all its honours and glory. Thus the crowning of the head, crowns the whole man, and every member partakes of the honour.”
These quotations may serve to give an idea of the union between Christ and mankind, for which Mr. Relly pleads, I now proceed to the following remarks.
1. It appears by the foregoing quotations, that Relly held such an union between Christ and his church, that he upon the ground of justice became liable to punishment on account of their sins. Otherwise the sufferings of Christ were both unjust and contrary to truth: unjust, as he did not deserve them, contrary to truth as the divine declaration is “The soul that sinneth shall die.” — But if this be true, if Christ was liable to punishment on the ground of justice, distributive justice; then Christ deserved death as much as the sinner. In his sufferings the Father did but treat him according to his own character and conduct: he did but cause him to eat the fruit of his own ways and to be filled with his own devices: and no more thanks or praise are due to Christ on account of his suflferings, than are due to the damned sinner, on account of his enduring the pains of hell. — Beside; how contrary is this to the scripture! That declares, that “Christ suffered the just for the unjust;” that “he was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners;” That “he did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth.” — Now if Christ was a “character obnoxious to punishment” on the foot of distributive justice, he was very far from being just and from being holy harmless undefiled; he did sin and guile was found in his mouth. Indeed this is no more than Relly asserts in the above quotations, when he says, “that justice can only punish him whom it finds guilty; not by reckoning hitn what he is not, but according to artless divine equity, which can only find the fault on such as have committed it.” Therefore, according to this, Christ as one with sinners, committed the fault, and therefore deservedly suflfered for it.
If it should be granted, that Christ did not himself commit the fault or sin, for which he suffered, but that by a ‘wise, sovereign, divine constitution, to which he himself fully consented, he suffered for the sins of others; this would be to give up all, and to acknowledge, that Christ did not suffer for sin on the footing of distributive justice.
2. It appears by the same quotations, that Relly was not of the opinion, that Christ suffered in consequence, of the imputation of sin to him, or because he was the surety of his church: but on the ground of his proper union with men. This appears by these words: “Sin is a crime only atoned for by death, which justice must inflict; nor can it possibly admit of a surety here: because it can only punish him whom it first finds guilty: and not by reckoning him to be what he is not.” Yet he holds* that Christ suffered on the sole ground of imputation. His words are, ‘’ The doctrine of union, which represents Jesus suffering under the character of the sinner, doth not suppose him such in his own particular person; nay strongly witnesseth the contrary, and respects him only thus by such an imputation as is just and true.” — If then the sufferings of Christ do not suppose him to be a sinner “in his own particular person;” how can this be reconciled with what is quoted above from page 3d, in which he argues, that unless Christ be one with those for whom he died, his sufferings cannot be reconciled with the scripture, which declares that every man shall die for his own sin? Or with what is quoted from page 4th, which declares, that justice does not admit of a surety or of reckoning Christ to be what he is not?
3. It further appears by the same quotations, that Relly considers Christ and mankind, as one, in the same sense that the head and members in the natural body are one. If this be so, then we are no more indebted to Christ for our redemption, than a man’s hands are indebted to his head for inventing means for his livelihood; or his head is indebted to his hands for applying those means.
4. It also appears, that on this plan Christ is now sufferi.ig, and will without end suffer, an eternal death. Observe the quotation from page 4th, “Sin is a crime «!fily atoned for by the death, yea the eternal death of the sinner; which justice must inflict, before it can be properly satisfied: nor can it possibly admit of a surety here; because it can only punish him whom it first finds guilty; and not by reckoning him to be what he is not, according to human quibbles, but according to divine equity, which can only declare such guilty on whom the fault is found, and can only find the fault on such who have committed it.” These expressions manifestly declare, (1) That Christ is a sinner, and committed the sin or fault for which he suffered, and that not by imputa’ tion and as the surety of his people, but really and literally. — (2) That sin can be atoned for by the suffering of eternal death only. This and this only will properly satisfy justice. — (3) That therefore, as Christ is the propitiation for our sins, he is now, and will without end, be suffering eternal death.
But I need not trouble the reader with any further remarks on such wild and confused mysticism; such horrid doctrine.
HI. Remarks on M. Petitpierre’s” Thoughts on the Divine Goodness relative to the government of moral agents particularly displayed in future rewards and punish’ ments.^^
This author is a Swiss, who was a clergyman in his own country; but falling into universalism, was censured and deposed. — After this he went to London, where he published the book which is now the subject of remark. It first appeared in French, and was published in English in 1788.
If I mistake not, the fundamental principles of this book are these two, — That the sinner on the footing of strict justice, deserves no other punishment, than that which is necessary to lead him to repentance and prepare him for happiness — That the happiness of every individual creature is necessary to the greatest happiness of the general system.
In page 38th, of the preceding work, a quotation or two was made to show, that the first of the two propositions now mentioned, is a principle of this author. To those quotations a great part of his book may be added to show the same; but 1 shall add the following sentences only. — “The Deity being infinitely just, will inflict on the wicked just and equtlable punishments; punishments exactly proportioned^b<>th in degree and duration, to the nature and extent of their crimes.”* — “The second rule which divine justice follows in the dispensation of punishment, is, to employ rigour only so much, and so long, as shall be necessary to the destruction of sin, and the conversion of the sinner.”! — “The third rule of divine justice in the dispensations of sufferings, informs us, when the Supreme Being ceases punishment;” L e. when the sinner repents.J — “We have established a principle whence to form consistent ideas of lhe justice and severity of God, who punishes the wicked that he might bless them in turning them every one from their iniquities.”§ — Infinite justice adapts with the most perfect and minute detail, the respective suitableness of his dealing to our moral state and consequently to our wants throughout the whole of our existence.“|| On these quotations it may be remarked, 1. That according to this plan, the most exact and rigorous justice, divine justice, infinite justice, admits that a sinner be made to suffer till he repents, and no further. Such a punishment as this, is” exactly proportioned both in degree and duration, to the nature and extent of
* Page 91. t Page 102. X Page 110. Page 137> the crimes” of the sinner. This then is the utmost which the divine law will admit: this is the true curse of the divine law; even that curse from which Christ hath redeemed us.
2. This punishment inflicted on any sinner, utterly precludes all pardon, forgiveness and mercy. How is he forgiven, who suffers to the utmost extent of justice? How is any sparing mercy exercised toward him, on whom the curse of the law is fully executed? — Yet M. Petilpierre constantly holds, that the salvation of sinners is effected in the way of mercy pardon and forgiveness. Thus’, speaking of the divine goodness, lie says,* ‘’Are men miserable? It is termed that infinite cotnpassion he has for their wretchedness. — But when by a sincere repentance they turn from their iniquity, then it is his clemency, his pardon, his mercy and his grace, that is extended to them.” — ‘’ How striking, how awful, and at the same time how merciful, are the representations of future torments!“t —” He will constantly jmrdon.^ and receive into favour the sincerely penitent offender. Repentance appeases divine anger and disarms its justice, because it accomplishes the end infinite goodness has in view, even when. arrayed in the awful majesty of avenging justice; which was severe, because the moral state of the sinner reqnh-ed such discipline; and which %vhen that state is reversed by conversion — will have nothing to bestow suitable to it, but the delightful manifestations o mercy and forgiveness.’’’’ It seems then, that not only is justice satisfied by the repentance of the sinr ner; but ^W ace, even the awful majesty of avenging justice, will bestow mercy and forgiveness. But how forgiveness can be an act of justice, and especially an act of avenging justice, remains to be explained.
* Page 6. t Page 109.
3. The punishment now under consideration, is utterly inconsistent with redemption by Christ. How are they redeemed or delivered from the curse of the law, who in their own persons suflfer that curse? And if Christ should deliver them from it, he would deprive them of an inestimable benefit.
4. If ^*’ infinite justice adapts with the most perfect and minute detail, the respective suitableness of his dealings to our moral state, and consequently to our wants, throughout the whole of our existence;” then what is goodness? and how is it distinguished from justice? What more kind and favourable than this, can goodness, the divine goodness, infinite and incomprehensible goodness, do for us? According to this definition of infinite justice, the institutions, promises and scheme of the gospel, nay the unspeakable gift of Christ himself, are mere communications of justice, and not of goodness and grace: and according to the same definition there never has been, and never can be, any benefit granted by the Deity to any of his creatures, which is any more than a fruit of mere justice, and which may be withholden consistently with justice: and all that God ever has done, and ever will or can do, for the happiness of his creatures, is barely sufficient to save his character from a well grounded charge of injustice.
But 1 mean not to dwell on this subject: I do but hint these particulars. It would be an infinite labour to point out the endless absurdities of this scheme of justice and punishment. I have considered the point more largely in chap. ii. to which I beg leave to refer the reader.
The other fundamental principle of this book is. That the happiness of every individual creature is necessary to the greatest happiness of the system. This idea is expressed in various passages, particularly in the following, “It is impossible the Divine Being should ever dispense any evii in this world, or in the world to come ■, which is not even to the individuals an actual exercise of perfect goodness.”*
And that this is necessarily implied in the scheme of this author, and of all others who argue universal salvation from the divine perfections, without respect to the atonement, must be manifest upon the slightest reflection. Goodness will always seek the greatest good or happiness of intelligent beings. And that the happiness of the system is a greater good than the happiness of any individual or individuals of that system, is a self-evident proposition. Therefore goodness will never seek the happiness of any individuals, so as to diminish the happiness of the system: for this would be not to seek the advancement of happiness on the whole, but the diminution of it. If therefore the divine goodness seeks the final happiness of every intelligent creature, it must be because the happiness of every creature promotes and is necessary to secure the greatest happiness of the system. If it be not necessary to the greatest happiness of the system, it is no object to goodness.
Concerning this principle the following strictures are suggested:
1. The truth of it is by no means evident. — Indeed M. Petitpierre supposes the absurdity of the contrary position to be exceedingly clear, and therefore indulges himself in the following ardent effusion: “Can we suppose that intelligent creatures capable by their nature of perfection and felicity, would be unable to attain tp this glorious destination, unless at the same time a number of intelligent beings existed in eternal misery? Among creatures of the same nature, thence capable of the same happiness; must a part be nvide happy at the
* Fae 220.
expense of a considerable portion devoted to endless misery and despair? Cannot a Being infinitely perfect and happy communicate beatitude to his intelligent offspring, on other and more favourable terms? Can he not be to some the inexhaustible source of happiness; unless he is to others the never-failing source of misery? Bat let us cease to heap contradiction on contradiction, horror upon horror, and end this disagreeable discussion.-’ — M. P -rre did not reflect, that if this passage
contain any argument, it is equally forcible against the evils which in fact take place in this world, as against the punishments of, the future: and that the passage may be retorted thus; Can we suppose that intelligent creatures capable by nature of peace, liberty, and all the enjoyments of human society, would be unable to attain to this excellent destination, unless at the same time a number of intelligent beings were rendered miserable by fines, confiscations, ignominy, prisons, chains, stripes and the gallows? Among creatures of the same nature, thence capable of the same happiness; must a part be made safe and happy at the expense of a considerable portion devoted to misery and despair, in the ways just mentioned? Cannot a Being infinitely perfect and happy communicate beatitude to his intelligent oifspring on other and more favourable terms? Can he not be to some the source of peace, safety, liberty and happiness; unless he be to others the source of misery? But let us cease to heap contradiction on contradiction, horror upon horror, and end this disagreeable discussion. To say that God can convert the wicked, and without endless imprisonment and punishment, prevent the mischief which they would do the system, affords no satisfaction. So God can convert the wicked in this world, and prevent all the mischief which they do here. The question is not, what God has power to do, but what he will in fact do; and what he may see fit to permit others to do.
M. P rre proceeds to argue against the possibility,
that the misery of some intelligent creatures should be necessary to the happiness of the rest; and urges that instead of this, it would subvert their happiness; because the inhabitants of heaven are so full of benevolence and compassion, that they cannot be happy, while numbers of their fellow creatures are miserable; and especially because it must be still more painful to them, to know that the eternal sufferings of those their fellow creatures, were necessary to their own happiness.* — But these observations are no more reconcileable with fact and with experience, than those which I just now quoted from the same author. Are the best of men in this world, so compassionate, that they cannot be happy so long as thieves and robbers are confined in workhouses and prisons, and murderers die on gibbets? And do they disdain to enjoy their lives, their liberty, their peace and their property, unless they can be secured in the possession of them, on terms less ignominious and painful to some of their fellow creatures?
Such are the arguments by which M. P rre endeavours to prove, that the misery of some men cannot be necessary to the greatest good of the system. If these arguments be not convincing, it is in vain to expect convincing evidence of the preposition now under consideration, from M. P rre.
2, The reader has doubtless taken notice that the proposition now under consideration implies, not only that endless misery, but any temporary calamity cannot be inflicted on an individual, consistently with the good of the whole, unless that temporary calamity be
Page 215, &c.
subservient to his personal good. Observe the words quoted above, “It is impossible the Divine Being should ever dispense any evil in this world or in the world to come, which is not even to the individuals an act of perfect goodness.” — Then all evils and calamities which have ever existed, or do exist, or ever will exist, in this world, as well as the future, are no real evils, no curse to the patients themselves; but they are all so many benefits and blessings to them. The destruction of the old world, of Sodom, &c. were real blessings to the patients personally. But how does this appear? They certainly did not in this world operate for the good of the patients; and how does it appear, that they will operate for their good in the future world? To assert this without assigning a reason, is impertinent. — Beside; on this hypothesis, there is no such thing as any curse either in this world or the future; and there is no difference between a curse and a blessing. What then shall we make of the scriptures, which speak abundantly of curses, and constantly distinguish between curses and blessings?
3. This, which 1 have called the second fundamental principle of this author, is in reality not distinct from the first. — If the good or happiness of the system require the happiness of every individual, it surely cannot require the misery of any individual: and if it do not require his misery, it is not consistent with justice, that he should be made miserable by punishment; or it is not consistent with justice that he be punished any further than is subservient to his own personal happiness. — No punishment is consistent with justice, which in view of the criminal alone, without respect to a substitute, or an atonement, the public good does not require.
So that the whole system of this author depends on this single principle, That it is not consistent with justice, to punish a sinper any further, than is subservient to his own personal good: and this principle, as 1 have endeavoured to show in chap. ii. and viii. really comes to this, Whether sin be a moral evil. Moral evil is in its own nature odious, and justly the object of divine disapprobation, and of the manifestation of disapprobation, whether such manifestation of disapprobation be subservient to the personal good of the sinner or not. But the manifestation of divine disapprobation is punishment. Therefore moral evil m.iy justly be punished, whether such punishment be subservient to the personal good of the sinner or not. But as sin according to the principle now under consideration, cannot be justly punished any further than is subservient to the personal good of the sinner, of course it is no moral evil.
Again; moral evil in its own nature impairs the good of the moral system. Therefore God as a friend to that system, must necessarily, and may justly disapprove it, and manifest his disapprobation, though it may not tend to the personal good of the sinner. But this manifestation of divine disapprobation is punishment, and just punishment. But sin, according to the principle now under consideration, cannot justly be thus punished. Therefore sin is not, according to this principle, a moral evil.
If therefore M. P rre believe, that sin is a moral
evil, and in its own nature ^leserves the divine abhorrence, he must, to be consistent, give up his whole system of universal salvation.
As the book now before us is a later publication than Dr. ChauncyU; and as the Doctor’s book, which at its first appearance was so highly extolled for deep learning and demonstrative reasoning, did not convert the world; the zealots for universalism have been lavish of their encomiums on this work of Petitpierre, and as it seems, have great expectations from it. However, it requires
APPfiNDIX. 403
DO spirit of prophecy to foresee, that this book will not effect more numerous conversions, than that of Dr. C. The author has a good talent at declamation; and those who are already persuaded of the truth of his system, may be much comforted by his pathetic representations of the divine goodness and universal happiness. But those who are doubtful, and wish to see a consistent system established on the broad basis of reason and revelation, will doubtless find themselves necessitated to prosecute their inquiries further, than M. Petitpierre will lead them.